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Abstract 
This study provides the first comprehensive quantitative assessment of Australia's pilot Hunter 
River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS). It casts new light on the relative merits of tradable 
permit system in terms of environmental and cost effectiveness under the PHRSTS, highlighting 
the potential benefits from an integrated regulatory instrument for management of natural 
resource and environmental quality. 
The PHRSTS was introduced by the New South Wales Environmental Protection Authority 
(NSW EPA) in 1995 to regulate the discharge of saline water from the coal mines and electric 
power generators into the Hunter River, which was affecting other uses of the River. It was 
made permanent in 2002, becoming the formalised HRSTS (FHRSTS). Allowing for the total 
permitted salt discharge to vary dynamically from day to day subject to river flow conditions, 
and for salt permits be traded among the mines and power generators, the Scheme is widely 
known as Australia's first active water quality trading program, and still appears to be the only 
dynamic tradable permits scheme operating in the world. The NSW EPA has claimed that the 
PHRSTS achieved significant environmental and economic benefits, but until now there has 
been no rigorous examination of its operational performance. To help fill this gap, this study 
investigates the origins, evolution and institutional arrangements of the PHRSTS, examines the 
performance of the salt credits trading market of the PHRSTS and the two credit auctions of the 
FHRSTS, and evaluates the environmental and economic effectiveness of the PHRSTS. 
In particular, this study finds that: 
(1) The credits trading market of the PHRSTS was active in terms of both volume of trading and 
number of participants, in spite of the high proportion of intra-company trading. The successful 
bidders in the credit auctions of the FHRSTS were a mix of sellers and buyers on the credit 
trading market of the PHRSTS. The low, narrowly-spread auction prices suggest that the firms 
did not value the credits highly and that the differentials in marginal cost of salt control across 
the participants are not large enough to yield significant savings from the credit trading. 
(2) The overall salinity objectives of the Hunter River were attained under the PHRSTS. 
However, the PHRSTS did not significantly improve the river salinity compared to the previous 
Trickle Discharge management system. The PHRSTS only generated trivial savings in social 
damage cost. 
iii 
(3) The PHRSTS generated measurable cost savings in the total control cost of saline water to 
its participants over its entire period. But this was minor in relation to the participants' sales 
revenues, and the tradability of the discharge permits accounted for only a very small proportion 
of the control cost savings. Dynamicism, instead oftradability, of the discharge permits was by 
far the main source of the cost savings. 
This study therefore concludes that neither the environmental effectiveness nor the economic 
effectiveness of the PHRSTS is as impressive as that claimed by the NSW EPA. Nevertheless, 
the valuable experience drawn from the experimental design and operation of the PHRSTS 
should prove useful for broader water quality management strategies in Australia and elsewhere. 
iv 
Acronyms 
Please see Glossary for the full explanation of some key acronyms. 
ABS 
ACF 
AIC 
ARI 
AWE 
CAC 
COD 
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DECC 
DEP 
DIPNR 
DLWC 
DMR 
DN 
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EPA 
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GHG 
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Average Recurrence Interval 
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Chemical oxygen demand 
Department of Environment and Conservation (NSW) 
Department of Environment and Climate Change (NSW) 
Department of Environment and Planning (NSW) 
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Dynamic non-tradable permits 
Department of Natural Resources (NSW) 
Dynamic tradable permits 
Department of Water Resources (NSW) 
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Environmental Protection Authority (NSW) 
Formalised Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (from 1/12/2002 to 
present) 
Greenhouse gases 
Hunter Integrated Telemetiy Scheme 
Hunter Valley Research Foundation (NSW) 
Identification number 
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PS 
RO 
SN 
SPA 
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ST 
TAD 
TD 
TDS 
TSS 
WAC 
WRC 
Integrated Quantity and Quality Model 
Marginal abatement cost 
Market-based instruments 
Marginal social damage 
Nonpoint sources 
New South Wales 
Partial autocorrelation function 
Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (from 111/1995 to 30/11/2002) 
Point sources 
Reverse osmosis 
Static non-tradable permits 
State Planning Authority 
State Pollution Control Commission 
Static tradable permits 
Total allowable discharge 
Trickle Discharge 
Total dissolved salt 
Total soluble salt 
Waste assimilative capacity 
Water Resource Commission (NSW) 
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Glossary 
Please see Acronyms for some of the terms listed below. 
A (single) trade of salt credits 
Arm-relationship trades 
Autocorrelation effect 
(time series effect) 
Block (of river flow) 
Conditional permit system 
Conservative ( dilutable) 
pollutants 
Contribution fee 
Currency of a salt credit 
Dilution Discharge 
Discharge permits 
One transfer of salt credits from one HRSTS participant to 
another. 
The trades of salt credits under the HRSTS between the 
power stations and the coal mines that are the power 
stations' coal suppliers. 
In a sequence of observations measured typically at 
successive times, spaced at (often uniform) time intervals, 
the observations are usually not independent of each other. 
Autocorrelation effect is the effect of the observation made 
· at a particular time on those made at immediately preceding 
times. 
The amount of water that passes the Singleton gauging 
station during a 24-hour period. There are 365 blocks within 
a year defined under the HRSTS. 
The quantity of permitted discharge of a pollutant at one 
time is a pre-specified function of instantaneous river 
conditions. 
Pollutants that do not reduce in mass on entering a river 
system and whose ambient concentration in the river is 
inversely related to the river flow, other things being equal. 
The fee that each PHRSTS participant was required to pay 
to share the operational cost of the PHRSTS. 
The amount of salt load (in tonnes) that a salt credit allows 
to be discharged into a specific block of river flow. 
The strategy of increasing diluting effects of the river 
through artificially increasing the river flow 
Permits that define the maximum amount of a specific 
pollutant allowed to be discharged from pollutant sources 
within a certain period of time, measured as kg/day or 
tonnes/day. 
vii 
Discriminatory pricing 
(pay-as-you-bid) 
Dynamic permits 
Dynamic tradable permits 
Dynamicism 
Economic effectiveness 
(or cost effectiveness) 
Economic performance 
Effluent standards 
Electrical conductivity 
Environmental effectiveness 
Environmental performance 
Flood flow period 
Flow augmentation 
An auction pricing rule that requires successful bidders to 
pay their own bid prices. 
Regulatory changes in the total number of permits issued at , 
any time in response to rapidly changing river conditions, 
such as flow and background concentrations. 
Discharge permits that vary in response to changing river 
conditions and are allowed to be traded between 
dischargers. 
Allowing the total permitted discharge to change over time 
in response to river conditions. 
The inverse of the control cost for achieving a given water 
quality standard. 
Measured by the control cost of achieving a given water 
quality standard 
Dictate the amount of a pollutant that can be discharged 
from its source. 
Unit of ambient concentration of salinity. 
lEC = 1 micro Siemens per centimeter (µs/cm) at 25°C 
1000 µs/cm =approximately 600~680 mg/L 
Improvement in water quality, measured by a lower 
ambient concentration of a pollutant in a river in for 
example mg/L. 
Measured by achievement of a given water quality standard. 
(See Table 5.1 for Flood flow thresholds for Upper, Middle 
and Low river sectors of the Hunter River). In the Flood 
flow period, salt discharges are effectively unlimited, 
provided the maximum volumetric discharge rates set in 
discharge licences are met. 
Alternative to achieving water quality standards for 
conservative pollutants by artificially increasing river flow · 
to provide a waste assimilative capacity beyond that 
provided by natural river flow. 
viii 
Formalised Hunter River Salinity Stage of the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme that 
Trading Scheme became permanent on 1 December 2002, through the NSW 
Protection of the Environmental Operation Regulation 
2002. 
High flow period 
Hot spot 
Hunter River Salinity Trading 
Scheme 
Inter-company trades 
: Intra-company trades 
Low flow period 
Lower river sector 
(See Table 5.1 for High flow thresholds for the Upper, 
Middle and Lower river sectors of the Hunter River). In the 
High flow period, the total quantity of salt discharge 
permits is dynamically determined by the river flow 
conditions and in-river salinity levels and thus varies on a 
daily basis. The discharge permits in the form of salt credits 
are tradable among industries, subject to river salinity 
objectives being met. 
The phenomenon m which more discharges are 
concentrated spatially and in tum cause site-specific 
impacts on river quality as a result of permit trading. 
A dynamic tradable permit scheme introduced by the NSW 
EPA in 1995 to regulate the discharge of saline water from 
the coal mines and electric power generators into the Hunter 
. River. It includes two phases: pilot HRSTS (PHRSTS) from 
1 January 1995 to 30 November 2002, and formalised 
HRSTS (FHRSTS) from 1December2002 to the present. 
The trades of salt credits under the HRSTS between the ' 
mines owned by different companies, and those between the 
• power stations and mines that had no supply relationship 
with the power stations. 
The trades of salt credits under the HRSTS between mines 
owned by the same parent company. 
(See Table 5.1 for Low flow thresholds for the Upper, 
Middle and Lower river sectors of the Hunter River). In the 
Low flow period, the discharge of industrial saline water is 
prohibited. 
The river sector of the Hunter River between Glennies 
Creek/Hunter River junction and Singleton. 
ix 
Maximum (volumetric) discharge A condition set in the discharge licences that specifies the 
rate 
Middle river sector 
Mine water 
Multiple-round auction 
New development 
Non-conservative substances 
Periodic (dynamic) permit 
system 
PHRSTS participants 
Pilot Hunter River Salinity 
Trading Scheme 
Precautionary excess discharges 
(for coal mines) 
Prioritised Discharge 
maximum daily volume of saline water (measured in . 
ML/day) that is allowed to be discharged by a licence 
holder from each licensed point, but does not limit the salt 
load in that volume. 
The river sector of the Hunter River between Denman and 
Glennies Creek/Hunter River junction. 
Water collected within mine workings as a result of 
groundwater seepage and rainfall accumulation. 
An open, iterative bidding procedure that allows bidders in 
each bidding round to make a series of bids, taking into 
account the information revealed by other earlier bids. 
Refers to Bengalla Coal Mine and Redbank Power Station, 
which participated in the PHRSTS in 2000 and 2001, 
respectively. 
Substances that are reduced in quantity by the physical, 
chemical and biological processes of receiving water 
Wastewater discharge is regulated on the basis of calendar 
date. 
Refers to those coal mines and electric power generators 
that participated in the PHRSTS. At the start of the · 
PHRSTS, there were 19 coal mines and 2 power stations 
participating in the Scheme. Two new developments, 
Bengalla Coal Mine and Redbank Power Station, then 
participated in the PHRSTS in 2000 and 2001, respectively. 
Pilot stage of the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
from 1 January 1995 to 30 November 2002. 
The discharges that occurred whenever a mine, facing a 
high degree of uncertainty in the time and duration of the 
next discharge event, chooses to make an excess discharge 
one day even when it still has spare dam capacity. 
A proposal for managing industrial wastewater discharged 
into the Hunter River based on the degree of reliability of 
use of the discharge permits. 
x 
Quality margin 
River salinity 
Salt credit 
Salt load 
Salt spike 
Sealed-bid auction 
Staged Discharge 
Static permits 
. Total allowable discharge 
Tradability 
Tradable permits 
' The difference between the concentration limit of a 
· pollutant specified in water quality standards and the 
. existing concentration of the pollutant in a river 
Ambient concentration of salt in a river. 
A salt credit entitles 0.1 % of the total allowable salt load to 
be discharged into a specific block of river flow. 
The mass of salt (in tonnes/day or tonnes/year) passing a 
particular location within a given time period. 
A sharp increase in the river's salinity at the beginning of a 
storm event after a long drought period, caused by storm 
water :flushing accumulated salt from the river streams. 
One round of bidding in which the bidders simultaneously · 
submit their demand quantities at one or more price levels 
without knowing the bids of other bidders. These bids are 
added to form the aggregated demand curve. The 
intersection between the demand curve and available supply 
determines the clearing price and allocation. 
The strategy of allowing more industrial saline water to be 
discharged into the Hunter River when river flow is high 
and river salinity is low. 
The discharge permits of pollutants that are defined based 
on worst-case conditions (such as, river flow, flow velocity 
and water temperature) of the receiving water body, and 
remain unchanged at all times . 
The aggregated maximum amount of salt load (tonnes/day) 
that is allowed to be discharged into a High-flow river block 
without resulting in the river salinity exceeding 900 EC at 
Singleton. 
Defines whether individual permits are tradable or non- . 
tradable among different dischargers. 
A total allowable discharge is established and allocated 
among firms in the form of permits, which can be bought . 
and sold among firms, provided a firm's discharge never 
exceeds the amount of permits it owns. 
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Trading ratio 
Transaction costs 
Trickle Discharge 
Trigger value approach 
Uniform pricing 
Upper river sector 
Utilisation rate of credits 
Water quality standards 
Under a tradable permit scheme, the number of units of a 
pollutant that are required to be reduced for a source in 
. order that a single unit of the pollutant can be credited for 
another source. 
The costs that are required to establish the pollution control 
program and those required to manage the program and 
keep in running. 
A licensing system that the NSW EPA adopted before 1995 . 
to regulate the industrial wastewater discharge to the Hunter 
River. Initially it allowed industries to discharge wastewater : 
into the nearest watercourse on a continuous, low-rate basis 
all year around, but with little regard for changing river . 
flow and background salinity conditions. 
, Defines dynamic permits based on ranges of flows rather 
than individual instantaneous flows. 
An auction pricing rule that requires all the winners to pay 
the same price (that is, the clearing price) for every item 
they acquire. 
The river sector of the Hunter River between Muswell 
Brook and Denman. 
The percentage of the actual aggregated salt load discharged 
. on one day by the PHRSTS participants over the total 
allowable discharge on that day. 
Desired ambient concentrations of pollutants in rivers. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Management of river quality 
Management of water quality in rivers is recognised as an important and complex issue 
throughout the world, including Australia. A river's agricultural, industrial, ecological, aesthetic 
and recreational uses are all affected by the physical, chemical and biological aspects of river 
water quality (called "river quality" hereinafter). The strategies for managing river quality raise 
three main issues. First, how can a desired quality of water be determined? As a part of this 
problem, the degree of control of pollutant discharges needs to be decided. Second, how can a 
given level and pattern of water quality be achieved at a minimal cost? There is a wide variety 
of strategies potentially available to improve water quality. To find an optimal combination of 
strategies to achieve a given level and pattern of water quality requires comparison of the costs 
associated with impacts and control of pollutant discharges under various strategies. Third, what 
institutional capability and organisational arrangements for water quality management are 
needed? Defining the level of water quality to be achieved and the strategies to achieve it will 
be of no avail if there is no adequate institutional and organisational framework to implement 
the system and carry out the spectrum of activities involved in water quality management 
(Kneese and Bower 1968). 
This study focuses on the second issue of water quality management, that is, to achieve a pre-
determined level of water quality at the minimal cost. It focuses particularly on discharges 
(effluents) of a conservative, dilutable pollutant, defined as a pollutant that does not reduce in 
mass on entering a river system and whose ambient concentration in the river is negatively 
related to the river flow, other things being equal. The study also focuses particularly on point 
sources of pollutant discharge, such as an industrial facility which may have a few outlets 
("points") which can be easily identified and monitored, rather than nonpoint sources associated 
with agriculture and other large-scale land uses. These issues are explored in both a theoretical 
and an empirical way for the case of industrial discharges of salt into the Hunter River, which 
flows to the central coast of New South Wales (NSW) in eastern Australia. 
It is not possible to introduce even basic aspects of managing river water quality without briefly 
explaining some technical terms, even though full definitions must wait until Chapter 2. In the 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
literature on river quality management, many frequently-used terms are ambiguous. For 
example, "standards" could refer to ambient concentrations of pollutants present in receiving 
water bodies, or to pollutant concentrations in discharges. Moreover, many alternative phrases 
exist for the common terms in use. For instance, "standards" can also be "targets" or "limits" or 
"constraints" or "prescriptions" or "specifications". These terms therefore need to be clarified. 
In addition, many frequently-used phrases like "pollution control target" and "environmental 
objective" are also ambiguous in the literature and thus need to be clearly defined as well. 
In this study, water quality standards refer to desired ambient concentrations of pollutants in 
rivers, and effluent standards refer to desired concentrations of pollutants in effluent discharges. 
Correspondingly, environmental objectives are applied to river water quality (in a form of water 
quality standards). The term control is applied to pollutant discharges, in order to achieve a 
target defined in numerical terms, usually a discharge permit (in, for example, kilograms per 
day or tonnes per year), mostly to fulfil some prescription or specification usually expressed in 
the form of a statement. 
How pollutant discharges affect ambient concentrations in a river is a complex question 
determined by not only the pollutant loads entering the river, but also the hydrological, chemical 
and biological conditions of the river. In theory, either controlling pollutant discharges to the 
river, or modifying river conditions, or both, can achieve water quality standards of a river. In 
practice, however, controlling pollution discharges into the river is far more feasible than 
modifying river conditions. For this reason, controlling pollutant discharge is the dominant 
strategy used for managing river water quality. 
Control of pollutant discharge is often achieved using discharge permits, which set limits on 
pollutant load in discharges. Discharge permits can be defined in two dimensions. One is 
dynamicism, defining whether the total permitted discharge is changeable or unchangeable over 
time in response to river conditions (Kneese 1964; Reheis et al. 1982; Eheart et al. 1987; Noss 
and Gladstone 1987). The other is tradability, defining whether individual permits are tradable 
or non-tradable among different dischargers (Dales 1968; Montgomery 1972). Combining these 
two dimensions forms four schemes of discharge permits, shown in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 Formats of discharge permits 
Scheme Non-tradable permits Tradable permits 
Static permits Static non-tradable permits Static tradable permits 
(SN) (ST) 
Dynamic permits Dynamic non-tradable permits Dynamic tradable permits 
(DN) (DT) 
The term "dynamic tradable permits" (DT) used in this study is therefore different from the idea 
of "dynamic tradable quotas" cited in the mainstream of literature on emission trading, such as 
Hagem and Westskog (1998), Ermoliev et al.(2000) and Armstrong (2008). The former means 
regulatory changes in the total number of permits issued at any time in response to rapidly 
changing environmental conditions, as often occur in rivers; an alternative name is jlow-
variable permits (Noss and Gladstone 1987). The latter, mainstream usage, also called 
intertemporal emission trading (Rubin 1996), means permit banking and borrowing for 
pollutants (for example, S02 and C02) which are long-lived in the environment, and hence 
diffuse very widely and accumulate steadily (discussed further in Section 2.3.5.3). 
In comparing the above permits schemes, this study focuses on two kinds of performances: 
environmental performance, as measured by water quality standards attained; and economic 
performance, as measured by the total control cost. As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, any 
move from SN to one of ST, DN or DT is in theory a move to a control system either with a 
higher environmental performance, as measured by a fall in ambient concentration of the 
pollutant for example mg/L, called environmental effectiveness; or with a higher economic 
performance, as measured by a fall in control cost in for example $/year, called economic 
effectiveness or cost effectiveness. DT is expected to be, at least in theory, more cost-effective 
than either ST or DN alone. 
Although conceptually appealing, DT has attracted little theoretical analysis compared to the 
prolific research on ST. Empirical studies of the DT system are also limited due to its few 
practical applications. As one of its research tasks, this thesis fills in this gap to some extent by 
constructing an analytical framework to compare various discharge permit schemes from both 
environmental and economic perspectives. This framework enriches the theoretical foundation 
of DT as the most cost-effective river pollution control scheme. 
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1.2 Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
This study sheds light on the topic of dynamic tradable permits (DT) through study of a real 
case, the pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS). The PHRSTS was introduced 
by the NSW Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)1 in 1995 to manage the discharge of 
saline water from coal mining and power generating industries to the Hunter River. It was 
Australia's first active water quality trading program and still appears to be the only DT scheme 
operating in the world. It makes an ideal setting for an illustrative case study of how various 
economic instruments can be integrated for management of the water quality of conservative 
pollutants from industrial point sources for a river system. 
The Hunter River (see Figure 3.1) drains the largest coastal catchment in NSW and supports a 
diverse and productive industrial and agricultural economy and urban activities (HVRF 2003). 
Like most of Australia's rivers, the Hunter River presents highly uncertain and variable river 
flow conditions (Day 1986). The salinity, the ambient concentration of salt, in the River is 
naturally high due to the catchment's geological features. Salinity concentrations have a 
generally inverse relationship with river flows and progressively increase along the river 
downstream (NSW DLWC 2000). 
Coal mining and coal-fired electricity generation are the two most important industries in the 
Hunter Region in terms of their contributions to the national and local economy and 
employment (HVRF 2003). They are also the primary point sources discharging saline water 
into the Hunter River. The coal mines accumulate mine water as they operate, and the power 
stations concentrate natural salts in their waste water in the production of steam for electricity 
generation (NSW EPA 1994a). Because discharges of the industrial saline water to the Hunter 
River at low river flows significantly elevate river salinity and in tum affect other water uses of 
the River, the key issue in managing industrial discharge is the timing of the discharge in 
relation to river flow, in addition to the amount of discharge (Croft & Associates 1983). 
For about 20 years, starting in the 1970s, the NSW EPA used a traditional licencing system, 
known as Trickle Discharge (TD), to regulate industrial saline water discharge. Having evolved 
considerably over time, TD was not a particularly coherent system, but it was predominantly a 
1 Its name then changed to NSW Department of Environment and Conservation. It is now called NSW Department of 
Environment and Climate Change. To avoid confusion, NSW EPA will mostly be used throughout this thesis. 
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static non-tradable permit scheme (SN) in nature. Allowing industries to continuously discharge 
small quantities of saline water, but with little regard for river flow conditions and cumulative 
effects of salinity, the TD system resulted in long-standing conflicts over water use between the 
industries and the community because of the salinity cost to the community (NSW EPA 1994a; 
Smith 1995). 
The NSW EPA introduced a pilot stage of the HRS TS in 1995, aiming to "manage saline water 
discharges so as to minimise impacts on irrigation, other water uses, and on the aquatic 
ecosystems of the Hunter River catchment, at least overall cost to the community; in an 
equitable and flexible manner; in a way that provides ongoing financial incentives to further 
reduce pollution" (NSW EPA 1995:1). It was developed on the basis of a number of historical 
strategies for management of water quality in the Hunter River. 
The NSW EPA then formalised the Scheme, that is, made it permanent, on 1 December 2002 
through the Protection of the Environmental Operation Regulation 2002 (the Regulation). In 
this thesis, FHRSTS denotes the formalised Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme, as distinct 
from the pilot Scheme denoted PHRSTS. The following notations in Table 1.2 are used to 
indicate the key systems that have been applied in regulating industrial discharge of saline water 
into the Hunter River. 
Table 1.2 Notations and timeframes of systems for regulating Hunter River salinity 
Notation Timeframe 
TD (Trickle discharge) 1980-30/12/1994 
HRS TS (Hunter PHRSTS (pilot HRSTS) 111/1995-30/11/2002 
River Salinity 
Trading Scheme) FHRSTS (formalised HRSTS) 1112/2002 - current 
As explained in detail in Chapter 5.1, under both the PHRSTS and FHRSTS, discharges of 
industrial saline water to the Hunter River are prohibited when the river flow is in its Low 
period. Discharges are allowed at times of High and Flood flows when the salt dilution capacity 
of the river is greater and demands by and impacts on other uses are lower. In the High flow 
period, the total quantity of salt discharge permits is dynamically determined by the river flow 
conditions and in-river salinity levels, and thus varies on a daily basis. Furthermore, the 
discharge permits in the form of salt credits representing one-time right to discharge saline 
water into a certain water block of the Hunter River are tradable among industries, subject to 
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river salinity objectives being met. In the Flood flow period, salt discharges are effectively 
unlimited providing the maximum volumetric discharge rates set in discharge licences are met 
(NSW EPA 1995; 2002). Combining both dynamic and tradable dimensions of discharge 
permits, the Scheme is a unique DT program not found elsewhere in the world. 
As one of the key changes accompanying the move to the FHRSTS in 2002, the salt credits that 
were initially allocated to the industries free of charge under the PHRSTS were re-distributed 
through periodic public auctions (NSW EPA 2002). Note that differing from the salt credits on 
the trading market, the salt credits put on auctions represent an ongoing right to discharge saline 
water into the Hunter River over a ten-year period. Three auctions were conducted in 2004, 
2006 and 2008 respectively (NSW EPA 2004; NSW DEC 2006; NSW DECC 2008): this study 
examines the first two. 
1.3 Research justification 
The NSW EPA has claimed the success of the PHRSTS on a number of occasions, noticeable in 
its publications, such as NSW EPA (2001) and NSW EPA (2003a), and on its official website. 
One of the NSW EPA's statements in regard to the success of the PHRSTS is provided in Box 
1.1. 
Box 1.1 NSW EPA's claim on the success of the PHRSTS 
"The Scheme has allowed major industries (coal mining and power generation) in the catchment 
to continue to discharge saline water to the river on a managed basis, and so has reduced the 
significant costs of water storage or treatment that would otherwise have been incurred by those 
industries under the previous discharge management system. It has also allowed new facilities 
to be established within the catchment, which may not have been possible under the previous 
management system. 
At the same time, the Scheme has protected the environment. Since the Scheme's 
commencement, the frequency with which the salinity target at Singleton was exceeded 
decreased from 33% before the Scheme to around 4% currently. None of the current 
exceedances are due to discharge by licensees." 
Source: NSW EPA (2001:v) 
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Although anecdotal evidence has been provided by the NSW EPA (2001), there has been no 
rigorous examination so far of the PHRSTS' s performance to substantiate these statements. 
Because it is widely known as the first active trading program in Australia's history of water 
quality management, the PHRSTS has been frequently cited in the literature (for example, 
Brunton 1999; OECD 1999; Young and Hayes 2001; Action Salinity & Water Australia 2002; 
Whitten et al. 2003; Kraemer et al. 2004; US EPA 2004; Henderson and Norris 2008) as one of 
the few successful examples of effluent trading programs. Moreover, almost all of these reports 
cite the above-mentioned publicly available reports ofNSW EPA and its website. However, no 
independent, critical attempt has yet been made to verify the NSW EPA's claim. 
Evaluation of the actions and outcomes of public policy comes within a field of learning 
referred to as "evaluation research" (Robson 2002). It is a necessary exercise in policy analysis; 
evaluation is an important part of the policy cycle, the process where policy is created, 
implemented, evaluated and evolved (Robson 2002). An important consideration in any 
environmental policy mechanism is the ability to evaluate and monitor actions and outcomes, 
and to see how they achieve their objectives (Tietenberg and Johnstone 2004). The absence of 
ex-post measurement and accountability processes of the PHRSTS could limit policy learning 
and evolution. 
This study attempts to fill in this gap through a comprehensive evaluation of the operational 
performance and actual experience of the PHRSTS. To this end, the study provides the interim 
feedback necessary to shape the evolution of the Scheme over time. In a broader sense, the 
study enriches our understanding of applications of water quality trading in a way that is 
relevant and would be beneficial to other potential tradable permit programs in the areas beyond 
water quality management. Moreover, the insights derived from this study on the relative merits 
of tradable permit system in terms of environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness 
highlights the potential benefits of integrating various regulatory instruments for managing 
natural resources and environmental quality. 
1.4 Research questions 
Evaluating the operational performance of the PHRSTS should at least involve analysing how 
well the PHRSTS had achieved its objectives. However, while the objectives of the PHRSTS 
were wide and ambitious, they seem somewhat ambiguous and therefore hard to measure. For 
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example, how can one measure whether the PHRSTS achieved one of its principle objectives, 
"to minimise impacts on irrigations, other water uses and on the aquatic ecosystems of the 
Hunter River catchment" (NSW EPA 1995)? How can another principle objective of the 
PHRSTS, that is, minimising impacts "at least overall cost to the community" (NSW EPA 
1995), be measured, while the baseline control system against which the PHRSTS is compared 
was not explicit in the statement of its objective? 
An important and complex initial issue for this thesis was thus choosing the criteria against 
which to evaluate the PHRSTS. A number of criteria can be used to evaluate an environmental 
program. These criteria include, but are not limited to, environmental effectiveness, cost 
effectiveness, dynamic incentives, enforceability, equity, flexibility and long-term effects 
(Environment Australia 1997; Dietz and Vollebergh 1999; Perman et al. 2003; Tietenberg and 
Johnstone 2004). This study focuses on both the environmental effectiveness and economic 
effectiveness of the PHRSTS. The indicator for evaluating the environmental effectiveness is 
improvement in the river salinity level in the Hunter River. The indicator for evaluating the 
economic effectiveness is the saving in total control cost of saline water to the PHRSTS 
participants. Accordingly, two research questions of this study were developed: 
(1) Did the PHRSTS significantly improve the river salinity of the Hunter River? 
(2) Did the PHRSTS generate substantial saving to its participants in control costs? 
In order to address these research questions, the following specific research activities were 
conducted: 
For the conceptual analysis, this study 
• reviewed two basic dimensions of discharge permits for rivers - dynamicism and 
tradability; 
• conceptualised DT building on these two basic dimensions; and 
• constructed an analytic framework comparing both environmental and economic 
performances of various discharge permits schemes. 
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For the empirical study, this study 
• investigated the origins, history and evolution of the PHRSTS; 
• reviewed the design features of the PHRSTS; 
• examined the operation and implementation of the PHRSTS; 
• examined the credit trading market under the PHRSTS and its implications for the two 
credit auctions in 2004 and 2006 under the FHRSTS; 
• compared the river salinity at Singleton gauging station under the PHRSTS to that under 
the TD; and 
• estimated actual savings in control cost generated by the PHRSTS over the TD system. 
1.5 Research methodology 
This study adopted the research philosophy and methodology of a "real world enquiry" 
espoused by Colin Robson (2002). It seeks to say something sensible about a complex and 
interactive situation in the real world. This research cannot be conducted in a laboratory, but a 
scientific attitude is adopted through conducting the research systematically, skeptically and 
ethically for the purpose of seeking the "truth" about the subject. Particular attention is given to 
avoiding prejudice and reaching conclusions that are objectively justified. The methodological 
approaches used in this study are wide-ranging, being a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, as follows. 
Critical review and analysis of literature (as detailed in Chapter 2) has been used to construct the 
theoretical framework of this study. Both algebraic and diagrammatic models are developed to 
examine the cost effectiveness ofDT in controlling pollution. 
A systematic search for relevant information and a synthesis of this information formed part of 
this study to investigate the evolution of strategies for management of river salinity in the 
Hunter River and the origins of the PHRSTS. As part of information gathering, this study 
involved site visits and extensive consultations with the HRSTS stakeholders (see Appendix 1) 
in the form of interviews, target group meetings and discussions and electronic 
communications. This study uses both primary and secondary information, sourced from 
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publicly available documents (for example, published academic papers, government reports and 
industrial reports) and confidential documents (for example, consultant reports, firms' records 
and government financial reports). 
Quantitative analysis is the dominant approach in this study in examining the environmental and 
economic performances of the PHRSTS. Both the methodologies used in the qualitative and 
quantitative analyses were largely determined by the availability of data and the accuracy of the 
available data. Lack of data is a key, uncontrollable problem in this study. The main points 
concerning methods and data in this study are summarised here. The data used in quantitative 
analysis, including their availability and sources are detailed in Appendix 2. The availability of 
the data and their implications for each quantitative approach are discussed fully where 
appropriate in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
The daily flow and salinity monitoring data are available for the PHRSTS period (from 111995 
to 1112002), but only monthly average data (with a number of missing data) are available for the 
TD period (from 111980 to 12/1994). These data problems could affect the accuracy of the 
comparisons of the river flow and salinity between the PHRSTS and the TD, and as well as the 
accuracy of modelling of the relationship of flow, discharge and river salinity. 
Lack of data was also the most difficult technical barrier to the application of the purpose-built 
theoretical model to compare the total control costs under various real and hypothetical 
discharge permit schemes. Data on industrial discharges at either aggregate or individual level 
for the TD period are not available. Information on the industrial control costs for either the TD 
or the PHRSTS period is limited. The trading prices of salt credits under the PHRSTS are also 
not available. Due to these and other data problems, even the operational model, which has 
fewer data requirements, can only make a rough estimate of the cost saving generated by the 
PHRSTS. Therefore, the findings of this analysis should be treated as indicative but still capable 
of yielding justifiable conclusions, rather than as being quantitatively accurate. 
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1.6 Structure and contributions of this thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters including this Introduction chapter, followed by ten 
appendices (see Table of Contents). 
Chapter 2 first reviews the literature on theories, designs and practices of discharge permits in 
two separate domains: static versus dynamic permits and tradable versus non-tradable permits. 
This review facilitates the positioning of DT within established disciplines and theoretical 
discussions. Following the overview, I construct a theoretical framework for comparing various 
discharge permits schemes from both environmental and economic perspectives. The main 
contributions of this chapter are building bridges between two basic dimensions of discharge 
permits, dynamicism and tradability, and enriching the theoretical foundation of DT as the most 
cost-effective river pollution control strategy available at present. The analytical framework will 
inform other empirical studies of strategies for river quality management where data are 
available. 
Chapter 3 provides a general background of the Hunter River, including the main features of its 
river flow and salinity. The focus is on the factors affecting the generation of industrial saline 
water and those determining the impacts of industrial discharges on river salinity. This helps 
provide a better understanding of the nature and scale of industrial saline water discharges and 
their implications for the development of the strategies for managing the river salinity in the 
Hunter. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the historical strategies for the management of salinity in the 
Hunter River before the inception of the PHRSTS. A number of important strategies and events 
are described in detail. This chapter presents the findings from the collation of unpublished 
literature and several field trips. These trips involved consulting widely with people from a 
number of agencies, organisations, institutions and local industries who participated in the 
initiation, development and implementation of the PHRSTS. This chapter provides the basis for 
a thorough understanding the origin and institutional arrangement of the PHRSTS. It also 
identifies alternative management strategies against which the PHRSTS can be compared. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 form the core of this thesis. Together they provide the first comprehensive 
quantitative assessment of many aspects of the PHRSTS, in particular, its environmental and 
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economic performances. Quantitative measurements are therefore the main outputs of these 
chapters. The findings of these chapters not only enable an overall conclusion on the PHRSTS 
performance to be reached, but also contribute to ongoing improvement of the FHRSTS 
operation. In addition, the methodologies described in these chapters offer a useful reference for 
other research on river quality management, in particular, the methodology used to estimate the 
cost saving for the coal mines can easily be extended to water quality research on storable 
pollutants. 
Chapter 5 starts with a description and interpretation of the main mechanisms of the PHRSTS. 
Examination of the operation and implementation of the PHRSTS then follows. This chapter 
also undertakes a preliminary analysis of the credit trading markets under the PHRSTS and the 
two credit auctions held in 2004 and 2006 under the FHRSTS. Findings from this examination 
and analysis are then used to proceed to and interpret the environmental and economic analyses 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter 6 examines the environmental performance of the PHRSTS. It addresses this first 
research question - Did the PHRSTS significantly improve the river salinity of the Hunter River? 
A hydrologic and water quality analysis is conducted from both the before-vs-after PHRSTS 
perspective and the with-vs-without PHRSTS perspective. From the before-vs-after PHRSTS 
perspective, the long-series (from 1980 to 2002) monthly river salinity and flow between the TD 
periods (from 1/1980 to 12/1994) and the PHRSTS periods (from 1/1995 to 11/2002) are 
compared using advanced regression models that account for the time series effect in the data. 
From the with-vs-without perspective, a relationship of river salinity, river flow and industrial 
salt discharge is developed using available daily observations during the PHRSTS period (from 
1/1995 to 11/2002). Based on this relationship, the river salinity of the Hunter in a without-
PHRSTS scenario is simulated and then compared with the observed salinity with the PHRSTS. 
Following this simulation, the social benefits from the improvement of the river salinity under 
the PHRSTS are also quantified. In addition to yielding the first set of quantitative 
measurements for the environmental performance of the PHRSTS, the key contribution of this 
chapter is the new approach to accounting for the time series effect in Hunter River quality 
analysis. The flow-discharge-salinity model developed in this analysis will contribute to the 
improvement of the ongoing FHRSTS operation by providing a more advanced model to predict 
the discharge events and calculate the salt discharge permits. 
12 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 presents an economic analysis to estimate actual cost-savings of the PHRSTS over 
the previous TD system. It addresses the second research question of this study - Did the 
PHRSTS generate substantial saving to its participants in control costs? This chapter starts with 
an innovative, purpose-built theoretical model to estimate the total control cost under various 
real and hypothetical discharge permits schemes, based on the theoretical framework 
constructed in Chapter 2. However, the absence of the required information at the individual 
firm level makes it impossible to proceed further. As an alternative, a simple operational model 
is developed to estimate the cost saving of the PHRSTS over the TD derived from its 
dynamicism and tradability, which are certainly the two radical elements of the PHRSTS, 
separately. Significance of the total cost saving to the industry is then measured. In addition to 
delivery of the first set of quantitative measurements of the economic performance of the 
PHRSTS, the key contribution of this chapter is that the methodology used in the operational 
model provides cost estimation for storable river pollutants, a procedure which is lacking in the 
literature. 
Chapter 8 summarises the research findings, recommends some improvements on the FHRSTS 
and reviews prospects for further research. 
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Chapter 2 Overview of Strategies for Water Quality 
Management 
Water pollutants from various sources have different features. The impact of wastewater 
discharge on river quality depends not only on the nature of the pollutant and the pollutant load 
that enters into the river, but also on the conditions of the receiving water. Water quality 
objectives for the management of a river system can be achieved by controlling pollutant 
discharge, or by modifying the receiving water, or by some combination of the two. The focus 
of this study is on river water quality and optimum measures for its management. This chapter 
provides a broad overview of the strategies for water quality management of river systems. It 
briefly summarises a voluminous theoretical and applied literature on water quality 
management. This review aims to be comprehensive and relevant rather than definitive and 
exhaustive. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a base for understanding the evolution of 
the strategies for the Hunter River quality management and for assessing the environmental and 
economic effectiveness of the pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS). 
The chapter starts with a short presentation of the factors relevant to river pollution (Section 
2.1 ). These characteristics crucially influence the adoption of strategies for managing river 
quality. The aim of this section is to provide background to the environmental and economic 
aspects of river quality management. The chapter then focuses on various types of discharge 
permits put in place for the control of pollution sources. Section 2.2 compares static and 
dynamic permits, while Section 2.3 compares non-tradable and tradable permits. Section 2.4 
introduces the concept of dynamic tradable permits (DT), building on dynamic permits and 
tradable permits. The primary purpose of this section is to introduce DT as the most cost-
effective river pollution control system via both algebraic and diagrammatic models. This 
section also provides an analytical framework for the examination of environmental and 
economic performances of the PHRSTS in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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2.1 Factors relevant to river pollution 
2.1.1 Sources 
Water pollutants result from a great variety of processes. They have markedly different 
characteristics, produce complex changes in receiving waters and affect subsequent water uses 
in numerous ways. Based on the generation sources, water pollutants can be broadly classified 
into point-source pollutants and nonpoint-source pollutants. 
Point-source (PS) pollutants enter into receiving waters at discrete and identifiable locations. 
They usually can be directly measured or otherwise quantified and their impact directly 
evaluated. Major point sources include effluents from industrial facilities, municipal sewage 
treatment plants and effluents from farm buildings or solid waste deposition sites (Krenkel and 
Novotny 1980). Unlike PS pollutants, nonpoint-source (NPS) pollutants are not generated from 
a discrete conveyance, but come from many different sources and locations, usually associated 
with rainfall or snowmelt runoff moving over the ground or groundwater discharge carrying 
natural and human-made pollutants into the receiving water body (Jarvie and Solomon 1998). 
As the NPS pollutants enter water bodies over a large area and the load is often highly variable, 
NPS pollutants are more difficult to detect, model and manage than PS pollutants. 
2.1.2 Substances 
Water can be polluted by many substances with many very distinctly different effects on aquatic 
ecosystems. Based on their behaviour in the waters that receive them, pollutants can be grouped 
into conservative and non-conservative substances. 
Conservative substances do not degrade or change in character. Once they enter the receiving 
waters, they are usually diluted and may be changed in form, but they are not appreciably 
reduced in total mass. Therefore, given the mass of a pollutant in effluent and the volume of the 
effluent, the resultant concentration of a conservative pollutant over time in receiving waters is 
relatively easy to predict because dilution is the dominant process that occurs when the 
substance is dissolved. Major conservative pollutants include inorganic chemicals, such as 
chlorides (for example, salt), some synthetic organic chemicals and inorganic suspended solids 
(Kneese and Bower 1968). Unlike conservative pollutants, non-conservative pollutants degrade 
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or change in character. They are reduced in quantity by the physical, chemical and biological 
processes of the receiving water (Kneese and Bower 1968). For this reason, predicting the 
temporal and spatial patterns of concentration of non-conservative pollutants is technically more 
difficult than for conservative pollutants. The emphasis in this research is on a point-source 
conservative pollutant - salt. 
2.1.3 Water quality management and water pollution control 
This review and the whole study focus on managing the water quality of conservative pollutants 
from the point sources in a river system. Clarification of some of the basic terminology is a 
useful starting point. 
One clarification is to distinguish between water quality management and water pollution 
control. Water quality is not synonymous with water pollution, and similarly, water quality 
management should not be equated only with water pollution control. The following definitions 
are derived from Krenke! and Novotny (1980:5): "Water quality management deals with all 
aspects of water quality problems relating to the many beneficial uses of water, while water 
pollution control usually conotates adequate treatment and disposal of wastewater." 
The distinction between water quality standards and effluent standards should also be made. 
Water quality standards define water quality goals of a water body by designating uses of the 
water and by setting the criteria necessary to protect uses of the water (for example, drinking 
water, fisheries, irrigation, aquatic life and recreation). The criteria usually specify the threshold 
values of pollutants allowed in the receiving water (Krenke! and Novotny 1 980). Effluent 
standards dictate the amount of a pollutant that can be discharged from its source. While water 
quality standards are often defined as ambient concentration, effluent standards can be based on 
either concentration and/or total mass discharged or on the degree of treatment required in order 
to maintain a specific waste load discharge. When effluent standards are based on total mass 
discharged, they are often called effluent limits, discharge permits or load targets (Krenke! and 
Novotny 1980). The term discharge permits is used throughout this thesis. 
The impact of an effluent on the quality of a river depends on the load of pollutants entering the 
river and the conditions of the river at the time. In river quality management, waste assimilative 
capacity (WAC) is a term widely used to connote the capability of a receiving water body to 
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assimilate a certain quantity of a pollutant under certain conditions. WAC depends upon 
processes within the water body that can reduce the concentration of pollutants. These processes 
include dilution, biological degradation, adsorption, sedimentation and volatilisation (Kerenkel 
and Novotny 1980). The WAC of a water body can thus be influenced by a number of factors, 
including the runoff or flow rate in the water, the background water quality and temperature of 
the water, as well as the flora and fauna in the area. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the causal chain of effluent discharge, water quality, social damage and 
costs. Despite information gaps and measurement errors in each step, and the level of ignorance 
increasing with each step, the pollution control targets may be positioned conceptually at any 
point in the chain. The most fundamental question is whether, in setting control targets, only 
damage or both damage and abatement costs should be considered. 
Figure 2.1 Causal chain of discharge 
1. Discharge (permits) 
Discharge sources, 
load of pollutant 
discharge 
2. Water quality (standards) 
Ambient pollutant 
concentration in 
water body 
Source: Adapted from Milliman (1982) 
3. Damage 
Impacts on human 
health, economics 
and ecosystem 
4. Costs 
Monetary 
value of 
damages 
Economists advocate that a discharge target should be set at the efficiency level of discharges, 
where both damages and abatement costs are considered. The efficient level is the one at which 
marginal social damage (MSD, cost of damage to the society caused by the incremental units of 
discharge) is equal to marginal abatement cost (MAC, cost incurred by an additional unit of 
discharge reduction), shown as D* in Figure 2.2. At this level, the sum of total abatement cost 
and social damage cost should be the least (Perman et al. 2003). In practice, however, more 
often a discharge target is set at the acceptable level based on the damage threshold alone, to 
assure human health and reasonable quality of environment (shown as D in Figure 2.2). It is 
expected that the MSD curve would rise sharply if the discharge exceeds the acceptable level. In 
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this case, ambient concentration standard of a pollutant, as proxy of social damages of this 
pollutant, is used to set control target of this pollutant. 
Figure 2.2 Pollution control target 
Cost 
($/year) 
MAC= marginal abatement cost 
MSD = marginal social damage 
MAC 
D* =efficient level of pollutant discharge 
D =acceptable level of pollutant discharge 
D* D 
MSD 
Pollutant discharge 
(tonnes/day) 
The above discussion is implicitly framed in the context of these pollutants whose damage of 
discharge depends directly on the level of discharge. For river pollutants, including salt in this 
study, the damage of discharge is a function of the ambient concentrations of the pollutants, 
which are jointly determined by both the level of discharge and the river conditions such as 
flows. While the damage is associated with the ambient concentrations, what environmental 
regulators typically control or regulate are effluent discharges (Perman et al. 2003: 117). 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand the linkage between the discharges, ambient 
concentrations and damage when setting control targets for river pollutants. 
For a river pollutant whose social damage varies considerably with river flows, a related issue is 
whether or not pollution targets should be the same over time. As shown in Figure 2.3 and as 
will be further discussed in Section 2.2 and demonstrated by the case of the PHRSTS (see 
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Chapter 1 ), allowing the discharge targets to vary in response to river flow will ensure the same 
level of social damage (or ambient concentration) but at lower total abatement cost. 
Figure 2.3 Dynamic pollution control target 
Cost 
($/year) 
Low river flows High river flows 
Pollutant discharge 
(tonnes/day) 
MSDL, MSD8 - marginal social cost of pollutant discharge at low and high river flows respectively 
DL, D8 - acceptable levels of pollutant discharge at low and high river flows respectively 
CL,H - ambient concentration of a pollutant at low and high river flows 
The process of setting of water quality standards for a river system is a task that involves several 
disciplines. It involves, or should involve, epidemiologists, toxicologists, chemists, 
hydrologists, water quality modellers, and other disciplines as required. The difficulties and the 
many areas of uncertainty in setting water quality standards are recognised, the resolution of 
which may require additional extensive data. It is not the purpose of this study to determine 
levels of ambient standards of pollutants for river systems. Therefore, this study will not provide 
in-depth background information, nor a detailed discussion of the many areas of debate 
associated with water quality standard setting. Nor will it address the numerous bifurcations in 
the process where a decision needs to be made, nor details of technical nuances for all situations 
that may arise when setting a standard. Rather, the study will focus on the strategies that can 
achieve pre-determined water quality standards at a reduced cost. This gives a simple and 
realistic setting in which various pollution schemes can be compared. 
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2.1.4 Enhancement of a river's wastewater assimilative capacity 
The load of pollutants discharged from various sources to a river and the waste assimilative 
capacity (WAC) of the river are the two major factors determining ambient concentrations of 
the pollutants. Correspondingly, a pre-determined water quality standard can be achieved by 
either controlling the discharge of pollutants, or modifying the WAC of the river, or by doing 
both simultaneously. For a river system where there is a monotonic, inverse relationship 
between river flow and water quality, enhancing natural WAC by flow augmentation was often 
recommended in some early literature (Kneese 1964; Kneese and Bower 1968; Institute of 
Water Resources 1973; Mills 1978) as an engineering alternative to achieving water quality 
standards for conservative pollutants. With this alternative, river flow is artificially increased 
during critical low-flow periods, which often coincide with a heavy background concentration 
of pollutants and/or high water temperature, to provide a WAC beyond that normally provided 
by natural river flow. An array of options is available to augment flow, including controlled 
release from reservoir storage, withdrawal of water from groundwater sources and releasing it 
into a surface watercourse, and transfer of water from other water sources, such as rivers and 
lakes (Kneese 1964; Kneese and Bower 1968; Institute of Water Resources 1973; Mills 1978). 
While conceptually appealing, the operational feasibility of flow augmentation depends on a 
number of factors. The feasibility of flow augmentation depends critically on the availability of 
water, particularly during low-flow periods. Water taken from an upstream impoundment for 
flow augmentation incurs an opportunity cost. This opportunity cost varies between basins, and 
may not be easily quantified when it is derived from flood control, water supply and 
recreational considerations (Institute of Water Resources 1973). If opportunity costs are 1 ow, the 
likelihood of providing flow augmentation is enhanced. Otherwise, the option of flow 
augmentation is not favoured. Even so, philosophically this means that society pays the cost of 
controlling the pollution compared with the polluters. 
The effectiveness of flow augmentation depends on both the type of waste and the type of 
receiving water involved. For example, with respect to organic wastes, increasing WAC by flow 
augmentation is effective for streams, but not for lakes, and only to a limited extent for 
estuaries. With respect to conservative wastes such as chlorides, however, increasing the flow 
into streams, lakes and even estuaries can result in a significant improvement in water quality 
(Kneese and Bower 1968). In cases where augmented flow is provided by controlled release 
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from reservoir storage, the effects of reservoir storage itself on the quality of water later released 
have both positive and negative aspects. While bacteriological quality tends to be stabilised in 
reservoir storage and summertime releases from reservoirs tend to be cooler than normal stream 
flows, harmful impacts of impoundment on the dissolved oxygen content of releases have been 
found (Kneese and Bower 1968). For these and other reasons, the application of flow 
augmentation in practice is limited to dilution of conservative pollutants to maintain or improve 
the water quality, or using the release as cooling water to maintain a desired stream temperature. 
A trial flow augmentation for managing salinity for the Hunter River, as well as its 
environmental effectiveness and operational feasibility will be discussed in Section 4.4. 
While flow augmentation offers an alternative for maintaining river quality, controlling 
pollutants entering rivers, that is, water pollution control, is the dominant strategy for river 
quality management and involves actions being taken by polluters. Coincident with this 
strategy, management of point sources is usually achieved using discharge permits, which 
define the maximum amount of a specific pollutant that is allowed to be discharged from 
pollutant sources within a certain period of time, measured as kg/day or tonnes/day. As will be 
presented in the following subsections, discharge permits take various forms, but are generally 
defined in two basic dimensions: dynamicism, defining whether the permits are changeable or 
unchangeable over time, and tradability, defining whether the permits are tradable or non-
tradable among different dischargers. 
2.2 Dynamic permits 
In river quality management, water quality standards serve a dual role: first, they establish water 
quality benchmarks that specify the limits on the effects of pollution; and second, they provide a 
regulatory basis for establishing water quality-based pollution control programs. For any water 
pollution control program, the challenge is to logically translate the water quality standards into 
load targets - discharge permits. Discharge permits are set by back-calculating from ambient 
concentration to ensure that discharges will not result in exceedance of a water quality standard 
at a location of reference point. Noss and Gladstone (1987) introduced a precise term - quality 
margin (measured by mg/L), to represent the difference between the concentration limit of a 
pollutant specified in water quality standards and the existing concentration of the pollutant in a 
river, for implementing discharge permits. The quality margin is virtually a proxy of WAC 
(measured in tonnes/day) and is generally an increasing function ofriver flows. It is used here to 
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help convey the distinction between static permits and dynamic permit in terms of the degree of 
use of WAC. 
2.2.1 Static permits versus dynamic permits 
Under a static permits system, the effluent limits for a particular pollutant are determined by a 
steady state analysis of worst-case conditions of the receiving water body. These worst-case 
conditions are usually specified in terms of a critical volumetric flow, velocity of flow, water 
temperature or/and concentration background of pollutants. Furthermore, once this single basic 
permit has been determined, it is enforced at all times without taking account of the temporal 
variations in the quality margin of the river (shown as Figure 2.4). The underlying philosophy of 
this system is that the discharge permits based on the worst conditions ensure that the ambient 
concentration of a pollutant is always below the threshold of water quality standards or exceeds 
it only over a certain limited, acceptable percentage of the time. 
Figure 2.4 
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For most rivers, river flow is the most important physical parameter affecting the capacity of a 
river to assimilate conservative pollutants. Poor water quality usually occurs in drought periods 
due to insufficient flow to dilute the pollutants. Droughts are thus critical for defining the waste 
assimilative capacity (WAC) of streams for various pollutants. In pollution control programs, 
the lowest seven-day average flow with a recurrence interval of ten years, denoted as 7QJO, is 
used as a prevailing design flow for total allowable discharge permits (Krenke! and Novotny 
1980), and 7QIO, which is often exceeded about 97-99% of the time on unregulated rivers, is 
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regarded a fairly conservative design parameter. Studies (Reheis et al. 1982; Noss and 
Gladstone 1987) have shown that discharge permits based on 7QIO flow could ensure water 
quality remains above specified levels almost all of the time. 
Dynamic permits, as the name suggests, allow a variable quantity of pollutant to be discharged 
at any point in time depending on the river conditions. (As discussed after Table 1.1, there is an 
alternative, intertemporal meaning of "dynamic permit" which we do not use here.) The 
concept behind this method is to induce maximum use of quality margin by allowing more 
discharges during times when WAC of a river is relatively large. The idea of dynamic permits 
seems to have been originated by Kneese (1964) as an engineering approach instead of a cost-
effective pollution control instrument. Nevertheless, it did not receive adequate academic 
attention until the 1980s. A search of the literature does not reveal any further studies of 
dynamic discharge permits in recent years. Thus, the literature reviewed in this section is mainly 
the work done in the 70s and 80s. While a limited number of early studies focused on 
simulation and design aspects (Reheis et al. 1982; O'Neil 1983a; Eheart et al. 1987; Noss and 
Gladstone 1987), few provided rigorous theoretical justification for the cost saving potential of 
the dynamic permits. 
Eheart et al. (1987) grouped dynamic permits into two forms: periodic permits and conditional 
permits. Periodic (dynamic) permits are also called seasonal permits, timing discharge, phasing 
discharge or staged discharge in the early literature (Kneese 1964; Eheart et al.1987; Croft & 
Associates 1983). They regulate wastewater discharge on the basis of calendar date. In such 
systems, the year is divided into several periods based on a statistical analysis of the historical 
record of river parameters, usually flow and temperature, each exhibiting relatively constant 
conditions. For each period, different discharge permits are specified so that water quality 
standards can be met with reliable probabilities. The periodic permit is more applicable to cases 
where river variations are quite reliable and recur regularly over the course of an annual cycle 
and therefore are predictable. In its simplest form, only two periods are set: a critical period in 
which only low or no pollutant discharge is allowed; and a non-critical period in which higher 
or unlimited pollutant discharge is permitted. 
Conditional (dynamic) permits are discussed broadly in the literature under the terms variable 
flow permits, variable effluent limits or time-varying discharge permits (Reheis et al. 1982; 
Eheart et al. 1987; Noss and Gladstone 1987). They differ from periodic permits in that the 
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quantity of discharge permitted at a time under the conditional permit system is a pre-specified 
function of instantaneous stream conditions. For example, for the pollutants whose 
concentrations highly correlate with river flows, the total discharge permits might be 
proportional to the instantaneous river flow. 
Kneese (1964) offered a number of options for industrial plants and municipalities in response 
to the mechanism of dynamic discharge. For instance, firms can reschedule production in 
accordance with pre-programmed dynamic permits. For some firms the lowest cost solution 
might be to cut back production over short periods of time, perhaps by planning staff vacation 
schedules to coincide with typical periods of critical river conditions or even temporarily 
shutting down. Also, treatment processes can be designed and operated to yield varying levels 
of treatment of pollutants. In addition, the wastewater can be withheld in storage for some 
periods of time, providing the wastewater is storable without causing secondary pollution (as 
appears to be the case of the HRS TS. For details of the mechanisms of the PHRSTS, please see 
Section 5.1). Nevertheless, this option seems more applicable in non-urban areas where 
detention ponds could be built without great costs due to land being cheaper. 
2.2.2 Environmental performance 
While both well-designed static and dynamic permits can achieve water quality standards with 
an acceptably low possibility of non-compliance of water quality, most of the time the river 
water quality under static permits is superior to that under dynamic permits, and this superiority 
shows a positive correlative with river flows. 
Appropriately designed and effectively implemented dynamic permits can protect the river 
quality to the required standards all the time. However, Reheis et al. (1982) were concerned 
about the long-term effect of dynamic permits on water quality. While dynamic permits can 
reduce treatment effort without necessarily increasing the frequency of water quality violations, 
the cumulative mass of pollutants discharged to the receiving water is greater than for constant 
year-round, static permits. This may cause a negative effect on water quality from a long-term 
perspective. 
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2.2.3 Economic performance 
A dynamic approach can potentially yield protective but less restrictive permit limits if a 
positive correlation exists between the point sources and instream dilution capability. Dynamic 
permits could represent significant cost savings to dischargers without compromising the 
attainment of water quality standards. Such cost-savings result from the less stringent limits on 
pollutant discharge and in tum, less pollution abatement is required during high flow conditions. 
Although examples of the dynamic permit programs are rare in practice, the cost-saving 
potential of dynamic permits has been supported by several simulation studies, such as Y aron 
(1979), Reheis et al.(1982), Eheart et al. (1987), and Noss and Gladstone (1987). The general 
conclusion of these studies was that compared to static permits, dynamic permit programs have 
the potential for meeting water quality standards at a lower total control cost. The savings of 
dynamic permits appear to mainly come from operational and maintenance cost savings, since 
the capital plant installed must still be able to meet the more stringent discharge limits during 
some critical river conditions. 
Noss and Gladstone (1987) also raised concerns about the impact of the use of quality margins 
for discharge on maximisation of social welfare. While a case can clearly be made for 
dischargers to increase discharge during periods of high flow, where excess quality margin in a 
river exists, this may not always maximise social welfare. Noss and Gladstone suggested that 
this surplus quality may be of value to other water users and the benefits to fishing, for example, 
may outweigh the benefits of using the excess quality for increased waste assimilation. This 
concern is more related to the efficiency level of discharge mentioned in Section 2.1.3. 
However, further discussion is outside the scope of this study. 
2.2.4 Design and implementation issues 
While the concept of dynamic permits is appealing, its application poses a range of design and 
implementation challenges, as discussed below. 
2.2.4.1 Suitability 
The nature of the effluent pollutant affects the application of dynamic permits. The dynamic 
permit approach appears to be more suitable for the management of conservative pollutants than 
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for non-conservative pollutants. A low flow is often selected as a critical design river flow 
because it is commonly thought to represent a minimally acceptable condition for the 
assimilative capacity of a river. The assumption that the worst water quality occurs at the lowest 
river flow may not always hold in instances involving multiple discharges and non-conservative 
pollutants. The additional dilution resulting from higher flow may be offset by adverse changes 
in the parameters that govern water quality and in decreased residence time, which allows the 
river less time to recover from the effect of one discharge before receiving another. Eheart 
(1988) demonstrated that for Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) the critical pollutant impact on 
a river may increase through increasing the river flow. This suggests dynamic permits may have 
limited application in the management of river quality for non-conservative pollutants. 
The characteristics of the effluent load also affect the application of static permits and dynamic 
permits, as well as their effect on river water quality (Butcher and Diamond 2003 ). The static 
permit approach works well when the effluent load is constant in time and independent of the 
dilution capacity (and other factors affecting impacts) of the receiving water. In this situation, 
given a constant load, the maximum impacts occur at low flows. The probability of the 
exceedance of water quality standards is thus a direct function of the distribution of river flows. 
The static permit approach can provide a simple but effective means of evaluating the total 
allowable permits associated with a desired frequency and duration of water quality standard 
exceedance. Even if the load has a high degree of variability, this can be addressed by statistical 
considerations in setting the permit limit. 
However, when the loads are not constant, and particularly when the loads and critical 
conditions are not independent, but correlated, such as precipitation-driven pollution sources 
where the effluent load is positively correlated with dilution capacity or background 
concentration, the analysis becomes more complex. It may not be easy to identify the most 
appropriate critical conditions. Use of the simple steady-state analysis approach can result in 
permit limits that are either under-protective or over protective. An over-protective permit 
imposes unnecessary costs on the dischargers and potential economic costs on the community, 
but incurs no direct environmental costs. An under-protective decision reduces immediate costs 
to the dischargers, but can result in environmental impacts with a cost which may be difficult to 
express in monetary terms. 
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2.2.4.2 Equity issue 
Dynamic permits allow discharge rates to increase and decrease according to changes in river 
quality associated with different flow rates and background concentrations over time. Another 
issue associated with dynamic permits that is rarely mentioned in the literature is equity of 
discharges among the sources along a river. River flow progressively increases downstream as 
more tributaries join the mainstream along a river. Dynamic permits tend to be biased to 
upstream sources on discharge rates. As the background concentration of a conservative 
pollutant is often higher downstream than upstream, however, there is the potential that dynamic 
permits are biased against downstream sources. As these two effects may often interact, the 
sequencing effect on the magnitudes of the biases against discharge sources can only be 
determined on a case by case basis for a whole river. This issue needs to be considered in the 
design of any dynamic permits program. As will be described at length in Section 5.1, PHRSTS 
addressed this issue through using different salinity objectives and flow thresholds for different 
sectors of the river. 
2.2.4.3 Risk 
The risks associated with decisions made about abatement costs that the dischargers would bear 
are different under static and dynamic permits (Eheart et al. 1987). In water pollution control 
programs, each discharger has to face two decisions regarding abatement costs: the abatement 
capacity that needs to be constructed; and the intensity of operating the abatement facilities 
within each time period. Under static permits, because a set of implicit permits has been 
specified in advance, dischargers know exactly what abatement level is required for them at any 
time. So they have a relatively high degree of certainty when undertaking cost-efficient 
investment in waste treatment facilities to meet these abatement levels. Furthermore, the 
dischargers assume no risks are associated with unexpected fluctuations in the natural river 
conditions, in which water quality may become unacceptable even though the pollutant 
discharge below the permits limits, because their discharge rates are fixed. Instead, 
environmental regulators, and hence society, bear the risk (Eheart et al. 1987). 
Under dynamic permits (in particular, conditional permits), however, dischargers' decisions on 
abatement investments have to account for uncertainties in the frequency and duration of critical 
river conditions. Stringent controls must also be placed on pollutant discharges under these 
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conditions. Dischargers have to make the trade-off between the expected abatement costs and 
the penalty for violating the regulations. Thence, the dischargers have to bear the risk when the 
water quality objectives are not met. Without a high degree of certainty in undertaking cost-
efficient investments in pollution control, the dischargers may plan to respond to the more 
severe reduction in discharge permits by attempting to avoid detection or simply by paying the 
penalty, rather than by treating their wastewater at a higher level (Eheart et al. 1987). 
2.2.4.4 Design and implementation 
The efforts required for design and implementation are also different between static permits and 
dynamic permits. A significant barrier to the use of dynamic modelling techniques is the 
additional level of effort and expertise required. In practice, a compromise must be made 
between the technical accuracy and high level of effort needed for dynamic modelling 
approaches and the ease of application and relatively small level of effort needed for static 
modelling approaches. The need for short-term advance notice, sophisticated water quality 
modelling, and great enforcement costs may limit practical applications of the conditional 
permits (Eheart et al. 1987). In many cases, steady-state, design condition analyses are preferred 
by environmental regulators because they are simpler and quicker to implement and manage. 
Noss and Gladstone (1987) proposed a trigger value approach to provide a middle ground 
between the efficient use of quality margins and the simplicity of implementation. In this 
approach, trigger values are used to define flow variable permits based on the ranges of flows 
rather than on individual instantaneous flows. In this case, the discharge permit would be a step 
function and the ambient water quality would have a saw-tooth appearance as illustrated in 
Figure 2.5. As will be elaborated in Section 7.2.1.1, both periodic (dynamic) permits and 
conditional (dynamic) permits are adopted by HRSTS for regulation of saline water discharge 
from industrial sources. This feature makes HRSTS a unique discharge permits program 
throughout the world. 
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Discharge permits and ambient water quality under the trigger value 
system 
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Source: Adapted from Noss and Gladston (1987) 
I end this section by summarising difference between static permits and dynamic permits in 
Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of static and dynamic permits 
Characteristic Static permits Dynamic permits 
Dynamicism of discharge Remain unchanging Vary in response to changes 
permits regardless of changes in river in river conditions 
conditions 
Environmental performance Tend to be over-protective With the risk of being under-
and then create superior protective 
quality 
Economic performance Unnecessary extra costs due Potential cost savings from 
to over-protection of water the less operational and 
quality maintenance costs 
Application conditions Effluent loads are constant, Effluent loads are not constant 
and independent from dilution and correlate with dilution 
capacity of the river. capacity of the river; 
conservative pollutants 
Design condition Worst-case conditions of Real conditions of receiving 
receiving water water 
Effort of design Least Greatest 
Effort of implementation Least Greatest 
Effort of regulation Least Greatest 
Risk bearers Regulators Dischargers 
Sources: Kneese (1964); Kneese and Bower (1968); Reheis et al. (1982); Eheart et al. (1987); 
and Noss and Gladstone (1987). 
2.3 Tradable permits 
2.3.1 Tradable permits versus non-tradable permits 
Traditionally, environmental regulators have relied almost exclusively on command-and-control 
(CAC) approaches to regulate water pollution. One of the most common and straightforward 
CACs to control effluent discharge from industrial point sources is non-tradable permits. Non-
tradable permits are uniformly applied to all firms and are not allowed to be exchanged between 
them. The firms are penalised and fined for non-compliance with their individual discharge 
permits. 
30 
Chapter 2 Overview of Strategies for Water Quality Management 
In contrast to CACs, market-based instruments (MBis) operate through market processes or 
other financial incentives to make polluters voluntarily change their environmental behaviours. 
The most common forms of MBI for water pollution control are pollution taxes (Pigou 1920; 
Baumol and Oates 1971) and tradable discharge permits (Dales 1968; Montgomery 1972). 
Pollution taxes allow the market to determine the total quantity of pollution by means of 
establishing the price (via a tax, fee, charge or levy) to be paid for polluting, while tradable 
permits allow the market to determine the price by means of rationing total quantity of 
government-created tradable (transferable, marketable) discharge (emission, effluent) permits 
(allowance, licences, rights). 
Under a tradable permits system, a total allowable discharge is established and allocated among 
firms in the form of permits. The firms are then allowed to use the permits to discharge or to 
increase effluent in exchange for equivalent or larger discharge reductions at the same or other 
facilities. Tradable permits have a number of economic, environmental and social advantages 
over the non-tradable permits. Theoretical studies (Mongomery 1972; Eheart 1980; Baumol and 
Oates 1988; Xepapadeas 1997) as well as practical experience (Tietenberg 1985; Hahn and 
Hester 1989; Tietenberg 1990; Stavins 1998; Carlson et al. 2000; Kerr et al. 2000; Sterner 
2002) from tradable permit programs have proven their potential value. Tradable permits can 
not only achieve economically ambitious environmental goals, but also safeguard environmental 
quality in the face of industrial growth, as well as offering incentives for technological 
innovation. 
2.3.2 Economic performance 
The main reason underlying the cost saving potential of tradable permits over non-tradable 
permits is the Equimarginal Principle. According to the Equimarginal Principle, the prerequisite 
of attaining cost-effectiveness is to equalise MACs over all firms undertaking pollution control 
in a region. Theoretically, non-tradable permits could satisfy the Equimarginal Principle if all 
firms have the same MAC or as long as permits are chosen for each firm so that the MACs are 
equal over all firms (Baumol and Oates 1988). 
However, in reality, the MACs of individual firms do differ, and enormous efforts are needed 
for collecting sufficient information on the MACs of individual firms and keeping it up-to-date. 
Therefore, rather than setting effluent standards for firms individually, environmental regulators 
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design and apply uniform effluent standards for discharge sources in an industrial sector or a 
region. The option of non-tradable uniform permits, which ignores differences in MACs across 
sources, violates the Equimarginal Principle. Therefore, while non-tradable discharge is capable 
of effectively achieving control targets, it cannot provide a cost-effective allocation of the 
pollution control burden among sources (Baumol and Oates 1988). 
In contrast, a tradable permits scheme allows sources facing higher pollution control costs to 
meet their regulatory obligations by purchasing environmentally equivalent pollutant reductions 
from those sources with lower costs. To this end, tradable permits allocates pollution abatement 
responsibility in an efficient way: firms with relative low MACs undertake most but not all of 
the total abatement efforts, and firms with high MACs undertake less, as long as they 
collectively meet the required pollution control targets. The greater the MACs differ between 
sources, the more cost-saving tradable permits would achieve relative to non-tradable permits 
(Baumol and Oates 1988). 
The cost saving potential of tradable permits has been well demonstrated by its application in air 
pollution control (Tietenberg 1985; Stavins 1998, 2002, 2003, 2007). The cost saving potential 
is also generally supported by a number of simulation studies for management of water quality 
(O'Neil 1983a; Lenee et al.1988; Letson 1992; Hoag and Hughes-Popp 1997; Zhang and Wang 
2002; Hung and Shaw 2005), although the empirical cost saving from real application is still 
anecdotal. 
Another economic advantage of tradable permits is their ability to manage new developments 
while protecting the environment, as stressed by Jarvie and Solomon (1998) and by Bjomlund 
(2003) in the case of irrigators. Tradable permits could provide a practical solution to the 
tensions caused by the need to achieve water quality objectives and the pressures for increased 
discharge from new developments. Under a tradable permits system new developments that 
wish to either create new loads or increase existing loads are allowed to purchase permits from 
the existing sources instead of undertaking load abatement on site. This not only ensures 
environmental objectives can be achieved because of no net increase in discharge of pollutant 
loads, but also may generate substantial cost savings for the new developments compared to 
having to fully abate the discharge on site. However, empirical demonstrations of cost savings 
for new development from permits trading are scarce. 
32 
Chapter 2 Overview of Strategies for Water Quality Management 
2.3.3 Environmental benefits 
As the aggregated load is limited by the total number of permits available to trade, permit 
trading under a cap-and-trade policy scenario can achieve the environmental performance 
approximating to that which can be achieved through a non-tradable permit control system. 
Moreover, a tradable permit system has the potential to achieve a higher environmental 
performance than non-tradable permits system. Once the tradable permit system is installed, 
firms have incentive to sell their permits and gain some revenue. This encourages industries to 
further adopt pollution reduction and take up innovative technologies to reduce pollution 
beyond current limits (Kneese and Bower 1968; Jaffe and Stavins 1995; Jung et al. 1996; Jaffe 
et al. 2002). In addition, tradable permits can engage more NPS in solving water quality 
problems, meaning tradable permits can achieve a higher environmental performance more 
quickly than non-tradable permits (Jarvie and Solomon 1998). 
While the potential environmental benefits of tradable permits are acknowledged, it is 
worthwhile to note that permit trading could also result in less effective environmental 
performance than non-tradable permits (Ng and Eheart 2005) due to its higher technical 
complexity (for example, trading ratios) and managerial uncertainties (for example, 
implementation and monitoring). The key elements that need to be considered in the design of 
tradable permit programs will be presented in Section 2.3.5. 
2.3.4 Tradable effluent permits versus effluent tax 
In addition to being compared with non-tradable permits, tradable permits are often compared 
with their counterpart, effluent or pollution taxes. The comparison made between effluent taxes 
and tradable permits in the literature generally falls into the discussion of "control by price" and 
"control by quantity" (Weitzman 1974). Because pollution tax is not the purpose of this study, 
only a brief comparison between tradable permits and pollution taxes is outlined here for 
completeness. 
In the theoretical setting where (1) the same amount of effluent from different sources has equal 
external costs; (2) there is no uncertainty about the costs and benefits of pollution control; and 
(3) a perfectly competitive market prevails, pollution taxes and tradable permits are equivalent. 
That is, they can both achieve the same level of pollution reduction with minimum levels of 
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aggregate abatement costs (Tietenberg 1985; Baumol and Oates 1988) and provide dynamic 
incentives for the innovation and diffusion of cheaper and better pollution control (Wenders 
1975; Downing and White 1986; Milliman and Prince 1989; Jaffe and Stavins 1995; Jung et al. 
1996; Montero 2002). These characteristics allow tradable permits and pollution taxes to 
achieve larger reductions in pollution than would result from CACs and provide an opportunity 
to address sources of pollution (for example, NPS) that are not easily controlled with traditional 
CACs (Hahn 1989). 
Under some strong simplifying assumptions, these two kinds of instruments are symmetrical 
and hence economically equivalent (Pezzey 1992; Farrow 1995). However, this symmetry 
begins to break down when there is asymmetric information about environmental damage and 
abatement costs (Weitzman 1974; Adar and Griffin 1976; Fishelson 1976; Roberts and Spence 
1976; Baumol and Oates 1988), in the presence of high transaction costs (Stavins 1995; Cason 
and Gangadharan 2003) and/or under other conditions (Watson and Ridker 1984; Moledina et 
al. 2003). These factors offer basic grounds for the choice between taxes and tradable permits 
for pollution control. 
Nevertheless, there are several factors that make tradable permits superior to pollution taxes for 
the control of water pollution. The factors include (1) the risk of missing reduction targets 
appears lower for tradable permits than for pollution taxes because, by design, the tradable 
permits hold environmental quality constant. This is particularly important when environmental 
damage exhibits a threshold effect or irreversibility; (2) tradable permits have an information 
advantage over pollution taxes because the environmental regulators can achieve a given 
aggregate pollution control target cost effectively without knowing anything about an individual 
firm's cost of pollution control; (3) tradable permits can automatically accommodate themselves 
to inflation and economic growth with an increase in pollution, and in turn avoid adjustment 
costs arising from the iteration in charge fees; ( 4) tradable permits tend to address spatial and 
temporal dimensions of a pollution problem in a flexible way; (5) although both taxes and 
permit trading systems increase costs to industry and consumers, permit trading tends to make 
those costs less obvious to both groups and thereby may incur less political resistance; (6) 
tradable discharge permits allow industrial growth and economic development without 
compromising the protection of water quality; (7) tradable permits allow the public and 
environmental groups to actively participate in order to reduce pollution; and (8) effluent 
trading may bring otherwise unregulated pollution sources, such as NPS, under control 
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(Milliman 1982; Tietenberg 1985; Baumol and Oates 1988; Hahn 1989; Howe 1994; Jarvie and 
Solomon 1998; Stavins 1998; Center for Public Leadership Studies 1999; National Wildlife 
Federation 1999; Sterner 2002; Woodward and Kaiser 2002). Tradable permits are therefore 
preferred to pollution taxes in some circumstances. 
In reality the choice that ultimately determines which instrument is used to regulate pollution is 
influenced by many other factors. These factors include, but are not limited to, the nature of a 
pollutant and its geographical setting, the pre-existing regulatory context, market development, 
political acceptability, institutional capacity and social equity (Tietenberg 1985; Baumol and 
Oates 1988; Woodward and Kaiser 2002). 
2.3.5 Key design and implementation issues 
Tradable permits are among the most challenging MBis in terms of both their design and 
implementation. In the setting of a permits trading program, an array of elements needs to be 
considered, including the selection of pollutants, structure of trade, units of trade and minimum 
quantities, eligible traders, size of the trading area, trading ratio, monitoring requirements, 
banking and inter-pollutant trades, calculating loads, assuring real trades, trade approvals, 
enforcement and responsibility, registration system, verification of credits, and public 
information (National Wildlife Federation 1999; Tietenberg 2002; Ning and Chang 2007). In 
the remainder of this section, I will discuss in detail some key design and implementation issues 
associated with development of an effluent trading program, including the initial allocation of 
permits; environmental equivalence, such as geographic or temporal flexibility or restrictions; 
and transaction costs. I discuss these issues based on theoretical guidelines to and empirical 
experience on effluent trading programs and draw conclusions regarding these issues. 
2.3.5.1 Initial allocation of permits 
Initial allocation of permits is the most important and controversial aspect in the design of 
effluent trading programs. Closely related to this issue is the question of whether the initial 
permits should be given away or sold. Under theoretically ideal conditions, the initial 
distribution of permits is regarded as having little effect on the equilibrium allocation of control 
and hence the aggregate costs of control (Montgomery 1972) as long as the permits are 
distributed fairly widely. However, this does not hold when there are transaction costs, 
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uncertainty and market power (Montero 2002). The initial allocation of permits can affect both 
long-run efficiency and equity of final equilibrium, as well as the speed of introduction of new 
production technologies and products (Stavins 1995; Kling and Zhao 2000). 
Generally, the allocation of initial permits may be based on two different basic approaches: 
grandfathering or auction. Under a grandfathered scheme, initial permits are allocated to firms 
without charge, usually based on their historical pollution. Another version of the grandfathered 
scheme is connecting all existing discharge permits to tradable permits when the tradable 
discharge permits program is an "add-on" mechanism to a pre-existing non-tradable permit 
system. The grandfathering approach has a certain initial appeal because it appears to offer a 
great degree of political control over the distributional effects. This approach does not incur 
political resistance from the existing sources as it avoids additional financial burden on firms 
(Tietenberg 2002). The grandfathering approach can also provide incentives for polluters to 
identify themselves and report their discharges (Field 1994 ). 
A grandfathering approach, however, may have several drawbacks. Among these is the 
drawback that receives most serious criticism: grandfathering creates political and economic 
bias against new sources entering the product market, since existing firms do not pay for their 
permits while new firms have to buy them (Howe 1994; Stavins 1998). One way suggested to 
temper the cost advantage created by grandfathering is to hold back a certain proportion of 
initial permits for allocation to any new firm (Hinchy et al. 1998), as it was in the case for the 
PHRSTS to be presented in Section 5.1.3. Grandfathering may also provide a perverse incentive 
to elevate current discharges or over-report discharge records if the allocation is based on 
historical records (Field 1994). For these reasons, in theory auctioning of permits is usually 
preferred to grandfathering for allocation of initial permits. 
Allocation of the permits by means of a regular public auction has broadly similar economic 
effects to a pollution tax in the case of a competitive market (Pezzey 1992). The auction 
approach has a list of attractive features compared with the grandfathering approach. These 
include (1) delivering a signal of the scarcity of resources and embodying the polluter pays 
principle, in tum reducing the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of 
valuable rights; (2) helping to establish a market price for permits and therefore removing any 
uncertainty about the value of permits allocated free of charge; (3) eliminating bias against new 
sources bias; ( 4) providing greater incentives for innovation; and ( 5) providing flexibility in 
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distribution of costs (Hinchy et al. 1998; NSW EPA 2001; Tietenberg 2002). However, the 
auction approach is not perfect: it also has disadvantages. One of its significant disadvantages is 
that auctioned permits may add a financial burden to pollution sources and are thus prone to 
resistance from sources (Tietenberg 2002). This may partially explain why almost all tradable 
permit programs in place, including the PHRSTS, have started with the grandfathering approach 
(OECD 1999). 
A hybrid system, which is a mix of the grandfathering and auction approaches, is often 
suggested for allocating initial permits. Grandfathering and auctioning can be mixed in at least 
two dimensions. Within a given timeframe, a certain number of permits can be distributed free 
of charge, and additional permits could be auctioned. Along a timeline, permits can be given 
away at the initial stage of a trading scheme, and then the proportion of permits auctioned can 
be gradually increased over time, as in the case of the PHRSTS to be presented in Section 5 .1.3. 
A hybrid system is regarded as being superior to either the grandfathering approach or the 
auction approach individually. A hybrid system will weaken any cost advantages created for 
existing firms over potential entrants by grandfathering approach (Hinchy et al. 1998), and 
have a less severe cost impact on firms than the auction approach because firms will not be 
forced to face suddenly increasing costs in adjusting to an abatement regime (NSW EPA 2001 ). 
In addition to the methods of allocating initial permits, the lifespan of the initial permits and 
how to change the number of permits as pollution policies change are other issues that need to 
be clearly defined in the initial allocation of permits. This has been less well researched in the 
literature. Permits can be issued with long or short duration. Permits with a short duration would 
allow the regulators more flexibility in adapting the program to new information on abatement 
technologies or water quality, but may generate uncertain expectations of the firms regarding 
the decision to invest in permits and long-lived capital facilities. Long-term permits allow firms 
to plan capital investments with less uncertainty and more confidence and might allow 
improved cost efficiency in water management (Center for Public Leadership Studies 1999). 
Milliman (1982) suggested that permits be issued with varying maturities when information is 
imperfect, particular when commencing a trading program. The number or lifetime of permits 
can be changed progressively once more information is available. 
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2.3.5.2 Spatial dimension 
Compared to air emissions trading, effluent trading is significantly more complicated due to the 
inherent spatial issue. The environmental impact of a unit of discharge entering the river at one 
location is different to the impact of an equivalent unit discharged at another point along the 
river. Discharges further upstream may have more impact on river quality than discharges 
further downstream where flow is greater. Effluent trading, even though it does not result in an 
increase in total pollutant discharges, may affect the water quality reliability of a whole river 
system (Ng and Eheart 2005) or induce hot spots (Tietenberg 1985) where larger discharges are 
concentrated and in tum cause site-specific impacts. This emphases the need for discounting the 
value of the permits as a function of the location of the pollution sources. 
One approach in this regard is the zonal approach (Tietenberg 1985; Hung and Shaw 2005). 
Under this approach, the designed trading area is divided into a number of zones. An effluent 
cap can be set for individual zones. Trading ratios are employed to indicate the number of units 
of a pollutant that are required to be reduced for a source in order that a single unit of the 
pollutant can be credited for another source. While the sources within the same zone are 
regarded as having a similar environmental impact on a control point and are allowed to trade 
on a one-to-one basis, trades between the sources of different zones are only allowed using 
predefined trading ratios. 
Determining accurate trading ratios is not easy. It requires a solid understanding of the effects of 
pollutant reduction by sources at different points in relation to the river quality. This needs 
substantial study and could be very costly in terms of time, money and effort. Inappropriate 
trading ratios not only influence the environmental effectiveness of the trading programs, but 
also affect the economics of the trades (Jarvie and Solomon 1998). As the trade ratio increases, 
the lower-cost sources' MAC rises, because more water pollution reduction is required. Trading 
programs are designed to bring together high and low cost sources. If a trading ratio is too high, 
it will lessen or eliminate the cost advantages of trading and consequently could prevent effluent 
trades from occurring (Jarvie and Solomon 1998). 
In addition to the challenge of determining the correct scientifically-based trading ratio, the 
zonal approach faces another challenge of increasing transaction costs. The issue of transaction 
costs will be discussed at length in Section 2.3.5.4. 
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2.3.5.3 Temporal dimension 
Permit trading between different periods of time can occur through banking or borrowing. 
Banking allows sources to save permits for future use or sale, and borrowing allows sources to 
use more permits than allowed in one period and pay them back in the future. 
Kling and Rubin (1997) investigated the incentives of individual sources for emission banking 
and borrowing theoretically and showed that a source's choice of banking or borrowing is 
contingent on the conditions of the marginal abatement costs (MACs), production costs, output 
prices, environmental standards and the effect of discounting. In general, when MACs, output 
prices and allowable discharge of a source are stationary over time, the source prefers 
borrowing to banking as a result of the discounting effect. The higher the discount rate, the 
more permits the source should borrow. Nevertheless, in the situation where MACs or output 
prices are rising, marginal production costs are falling or the ceiling of allowable discharge is 
being lowed over time, sources may be prone to banking permits. 
Kling and Rubin's analysis is, however, framed in the context of certainty. In reality, without 
information on costs, a source may bank its permits, perhaps because of the limited spatial 
dimension of the trading market caused by environmental constraints or slow market 
development (Ellerman 2002). Or a firm might use banked permits to cover a period of 
particularly high emission levels because of a sudden increase in the demand for output. In 
addition, the reasons for borrowing can include anticipated changes in production (Ellerman 
2002). There is an increasing body of literature (Rubin 1996; Kling and Rubin 1997; Yates and 
Cronshaw 2001; Phaneuf and Requate 2002) examining the effects of inter-temporal trading 
from different angles. Thus, the conclusions from these studies on the desirability of allowing 
permit banking and borrowing are mixed. 
Borrowing and banking schemes are easier to implement for air quality management as 
emissions (such as, S02 and Greenhouse Gases (GHG)) are "global" in that they disperse 
uniformly across large areas and there is little difference in damage per unit emission across 
locations and time. There is an increasing argument that in water volume trading markets, inter-
temporal trading might well be more valuable than intra-season trading in terms of potential 
economic gains (Zekri and Easter 2005). In a regime of water quality management, however, 
the nature of water pollutants raises several concerns about the application of banking and 
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borrowing. One of the concerns is that banking and borrowing would increase the possibility of 
temporal uncertainty in achieving water quality objectives. Banking or borrowing can lead to 
some variations in effluent load over time, while the water quality standards are required to be 
maintained at all times. This implies the possibility that the water quality standards are 
overachieved or underachieved in one period and underachieved or overachieved in another. 
Another concern is about the implementation of sanction (Kling and Rubin 1997). This explains 
why few effluent trading programs have opened banking and borrowing options to firms. 
2.3.5.4 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs of an effluent trading program refer to those costs required to establish the 
program and those required to manage the program and keep it running. These costs generally 
fall into three main categories: searching for trading partners and acquiring information; 
bargaining and deciding on alternatives; and monitoring and enforcement costs (Stavins 1995). 
In practice, transactions costs may constitute a substantial proportion of the total costs of 
pollution control and become a significant barrier to trading. In the extreme situation where the 
transaction costs faced by the trading sources exceed the abatement-cost differential between 
those sources, that is, the economic benefits of trading, trades will not take place (Hahn 1989; 
Hahn and Hester 1989; Jarvie and Solomon 1998; Gangadharan 2000; Woodward 2003; 
Morgan and Wolverton 2008). Therefore, in the development of an effluent trading program, 
every possible effort should be made to minimise transaction costs. 
One clear indication that the transaction costs are low would be that the market was quite active. 
Stavins (1995) noted that search and information transaction costs would be reduced in markets 
with a relatively large number of potential trading sources because more frequent transactions 
would generate more trading information. There are a number of actions that environmental 
regulators can take to help reduce transaction costs, such as providing an easy means for buyers 
and sellers to transact; providing systematic public information on trading prices; acting as a 
broker; and/or paying for monitoring and enforcement activities (Hoag and Hughes-Popp 1997; 
Jarvie and Solomon 1998; Woodward and Kaiser 2002; Morgan and Wolverton 2008). 
In addition to the size of transaction costs, the spread of the transaction costs burden is another 
important concern, which may affect trade effectiveness. Such issues as who should bear the 
costs and by how much should be fully considered in the design of a trading program (Center 
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for Public Leadership Studies 1999). Transaction costs do not need to be entirely borne by the 
firms or environmental regulators. It is conceptually possible to design programs where all 
parties involved in trading and trading process share the costs, with the primary beneficiary 
sharing a substantial portion (Center for Public Leadership Studies 1999). The method of 
transaction cost sharing for the PHRSTS will be discussed in Section 5.2.3. 
2.3.6 Experience and lessons from effluent trading 
Although the theoretical merits of tradable permits have long been understood, in practice, 
tradable permit systems were implemented only in a few counties and with limited scope 
(Sterner 2002). In the US the tradable permits have received the earliest, dating back to early 
1970s, and most widespread application in its environmental protection programs. These built 
on its pre-existing detailed systems of source-by-source regulations and individual pollution 
permits or licences (Stavins 1998, 2002, 2007). 
Tradable permits in the US are mainly applied to air pollution control, with a clearly increasing 
application in water pollution control since the 1980s. Hahn (1989) and Woodward and Kaiser 
(2002) attributed the growing interest in the inclusion of the tradable permit concept in water 
pollution control to a variety of reasons. The main reasons are (1) the US EPA' s emphasis on 
the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) programs to achieve water quality goals, which 
shifted the center of water pollution control from regulating pollutant loads of individual 
discharge sources to limiting local total pollution loads and allocating the reduction 
responsibilities among the dischargers; (2) the prevalence of NPS problems and the widely 
accepted perception that effluent trading may bring unregulated NPS under control in cost-
effective ways; and (3) being promoted by the success of the Acid Rain program and the 
potential to substantially reduce abatement costs while still meeting air quality goals (Hahn 
1989; Woodward and Kaiser 2002). In 1996 the US EPA released a guideline (that is, Draft 
Framework for Watershed-Based Trading) to the states to assist in evaluating and designing 
effluent trading programs (US EPA 1996). This not only represents a national effort to 
encourage and facilitate the development of watershed-based effluent trading programs, but also 
fosters the popularity of tradable permits in water pollution control. 
By the end of last century, the US EPA had some 3 7 water quality trading programs that were in 
various stages of initiation, development, pilot and implementation stages (Environomics 1999; 
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Rousseau 2005). Morgan and Wolverton (2008) provided a systematic overview of water 
quality trading in the US based on information from a recently compiled database and updated 
the number of water quality programs to 58 (27 programs in operation whilst 31 in proposal). 
Water quality trading programs have been expanding not only in number, but also in diversity. 
The trading programs have expanded from individual facilities, a group of local dischargers 
affecting the same water body to an entire watershed or basin (Environomics 1999; Rousseau 
2005; Morgan and Wolverton 2008). Participants have covered private firms, public owned 
treatment works, farmers, non-point sources (NPS) of cities and countries, government and 
regulatory agencies and non-for-profit organisations (Environomics 1999; Rousseau 2005; 
Morgan and Wolverton 2008). Trades are also various, not restricted to homogeneous 
pollutants, but include cross-pollutant trading, different pollutants which have the same 
environmental impacts (Lenee et al. 1988; Lenee 1991), two pollutant and bi-seasonal pollution 
offsets (Letson 1992) and pre-treatment trading (Environomics 1999). 
Despite the various forms, water quality trading programs in the US generally fall into two 
distinct categories: cap and trade for existing discharges to meet limits and offset for new or 
expanding discharges. The market structures in pollution trading fall into four main categories: 
exchange, bilateral negotiations, clearinghouses and sole-source offsets (Woodward and Kaiser 
2002; Woodward et al. 2002). The most common type of trading program in the US occurs 
between point and non-point sources, and most commonly traded pollutants are nutrients such 
as phosphorus and nitrogen (Morgan and Wolverton 2008). 
In spite of the fact that effluent trading programs have been burgeoning in water quality 
management, it appears that such markets have not been as active as anticipated. According to 
Morgan and Wolverton (2008), by 2005 while trades had occurred in 11 out of 19 water quality 
trading programs in US, only four had experienced a large number of trades. The other 
programs had only one or two trades during more than a decade. Although the reasons for the 
inactivity of effluent trading in the US differ between situations, the following factors have been 
identified as the main causes: (1) low environmental targets and lack of trade demand; (2) 
government interference; (3) difficulties in setting proper trading ratios between PS and NPS 
and defining who is responsible for the risk of the NPS not delivering the credits that the PS 
purchased; ( 4) high transaction costs; (5) the small number of participants; and (6) uncertainties 
in trading policy and rules (Hahn 1989; Jarvie and Solomon 1998; Woodward 2003; Morgan 
and Wolverton 2008). 
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While there is little doubt that well designed and implemented tradable permits can provide the 
opportunity to achieve any given level of water pollution control with substantial cost savings, 
the theoretical cost saving potential of effluent trading has not materialised to the extent 
expected. Some of the programs provided the estimated savings of the trading programs (O'Neil 
1983a, 1983b; Letson 1992; Kramer 1999; Kerr et al. 2000; Keplinger et al., 2004). These 
estimated savings are difficult to compare but appear to be quite substantial. However, there 
have been no insights into the benefits that were truly generated by the programs, nor their 
environmental impacts. Therefore, it is not easy to conclude whether the trading programs have 
been successful or not. This provides the motivation for this study to investigate the PHRSTS, 
in particular to provide comprehensive assessment of it from both environmental and economic 
perspectives. 
A number of factors that may increase the likelihood of successful implementation of effluent 
trading have been identified from the previous research on US water quality trading program 
(Hahn 1989; Hoag and Hughes-Popp 1997; Jarvie and Solomon 1998; Kraemer 2003; Kraemer 
et al. 2004; Morgan and Wolverton 2008). Those include, but are not limited to (1) legislative or 
regulatory underpinning and backing; (2) clearly defined environmental targets and a need for 
discharge reduction; (3) accurate and sufficient information on stream characteristics, discharge 
sources and trading prices; (4) an adequate number of participants with diverse MACs; (5) low 
transaction costs; and (6) support from the local community. These factors have laid the ground 
rules for development of a smoothly functioning effluent trading program. Some of these 
factors in implementation of the PHRSTS will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
2.4 Dynamic tradable permits- a theoretical perspective 
The combination of dynamic permits and tradable permits forms a system of dynamic tradable 
permits (DT). In such a system, dynamic permits provide a platform into which tradable permits 
may be incorporated. Because it builds on the dynamic permits and tradable permits, DT has a 
lot of intuitive appeal. Nevertheless, compared to the large body of literature on tradable permits 
and the considerable amount ofliterature on dynamic permits, the research on DT is limited. 
Among the limited literature on DT, O'Neil (1983b) simulated the total abatement cost 
associated with tradable permits under varying stream flow and temperature conditions for the 
Fox River, Wisconsin, US. The simulation arrived at the general conclusion that worst-case-
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based permit trading program is more costly than a time-variant permit trading program and 
indicated that the magnitude of the cost saving of the dynamic permits depends on the threshold 
of river flow and the temperature on which the permits are based. In addition, Dudley et al. 
(1993) conducted an exploratory analysis to raise awareness of potential benefits of applying 
DT to the management of water quality for Australian rivers, given that most of them are 
characterised by pervasive, highly uncertain and variable river flow conditions. 
So far a limited number of studies have focused on the feasibility of applying DT in the 
management of river quality, but neither the theory nor practice of DT appears to have been 
formally researched to date. Thus, it is appropriate to consider DT theoretically before moving 
on to examine its application in the PHRSTS. The remainder of this subsection will provide a 
theoretical comparison of the environmental and economic performances of various permits 
schemes with the aid of an approximate algebraic model and a simple diagrammatic analysis. 
This comparison not only enriches the theoretical foundation of the cost effectiveness of DT, 
but also builds an analytical framework for examining the environmental and economic 
effectiveness of the PHRSTS in the later Chapters 6 and 7. 
The principle assumption underlying this analysis is that for a conservative pollutant, a mixed 
system involving both dynamic permits and tradable permits is preferable to either dynamic 
permits or tradable permits separately. 
Let 
Any firm in a region. 
n The number of the regulated firms in the region, i = I, ... n. 
t Any day over a period of days. 
T Number of days in the period, t = 1, 2, ... T 
gu Firm i's pollutant load that needs to be discharged on day t (tonnes). 
Then, the whole industry (consisting of i firms)'s aggregated pollutant load that needs to 
be discharged on day t is 
n 
G1 = Lgu (tonnes) 
i=l 
ru Firm i's actual discharge reduction on day t (tonnes). 
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Then, the whole industry's aggregated actual discharge reduction on day tis 
n 
Rt = L 'it (tonnes) 
i=l 
du Firm i's actual discharge of pollutant load on the day t (tonnes). 
Then, the whole industry's aggregated discharge of pollutant load on day tis 
n 
Dt = Ldu (tonnes) 
i=l 
Pu Discharge permits for firm ion day t (tonnes) under dynamic permits system, which vary 
from time to time. 
The total discharge permits for the whole industry on day t (tonnes) 
n 
Pi= LPu (tonnes) 
i=l 
Pi Discharge permits for firm i on any day under static permits system, which remain 
constant over time. 
Then, the total discharge permits for the whole industry on any day is 
n 
P = LPi (tonnes) 
i=l 
c/riJ Firm i's cost function of abatement activities ($/tonnes.day). 
The total abatement cost of the whole industry under static non-tradable permits (SN), dynamic 
non-tradable permits (DN), static tradable permits (ST), dynamic tradable permits (DT), denoted 
TCsN, TCoN, TCsT, TCm respectively, is the resolution to the following equation subject to their 
corresponding constraints as listed in Table 2.2. 
T n 
TC= min L Ici('it) [2.1] 
t=I i=l 
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Table 2.2 Constraints under the four different permit schemes 
Static Dynamic 
Non-tradable (SN) (DN) 
dit ( = gu - ru) :::; P; Vi,t d;1 ( = ga - r;1) :::; Pit Vi,t 
[ 2.2] [ 2.3] 
Tradable (ST) (DT) 
n n n n 
D1(=G1 -~ = Lg;1 - Irit):::;P Vt D((=G( -~ = Lgit - L1i1):::;~ Vt 
i=l i=l i=l i=l 
[2.4] [2.5] 
Constraint [2.2] is set to assure that the discharge of each firm (dit) on any day does not exceed 
its corresponding static permits (pJ, which is defined based on the worst river conditions and 
remains constant throughout the year. The purpose of Constraint [2.3] is the same as that of 
Constraint [2.2], except that the permits for a specific firm (p;1) may vary with the daily local 
river conditions. Constraint [2.4] and [2.5] are set to make sure that the aggregated discharge 
from the firms (D1) does not exceed the total discharge permits (P or P1 ) on any day, although 
the permits under the static and dynamic permit systems are different. The relaxation of 
constraint that occurs moving from [2.2] and [2.4] to [2.3] and [2.5], respectively, reflects the 
dynamicism of permits. The relaxation of constraints that occur moving from [2.2] and [2.3] to 
[2.4] and [2.5], respectively, reflects the tradability of permits. TCDT, as the solution to the 
equation subject to the loosest constraint, will be the least among TCsN, TCDN, TCsr, TCDT. 
Any move from SN to one of ST, DN or DT is a move to a permit control system with a higher 
economic performance but lower or more uncertain environmental performance. Although 
regulators may not always admit it, there is almost always - at least in the long term, once 
laws, institutions and capital equipment can be adjusted - a trade-off between environmental 
and economic performance. Within any permit control system, without reforming the overall 
system itself, the trade-off can be made between tightening or lowering discharge permits, 
which will improve the water quality but drive up the cost, and relaxing or increasing discharge 
permits, which will lower the water quality but reduce the cost. 
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Figure 2.6 shows these trades-off for all four schemes as curves of falling ambient concentration 
as cost rises, or looked at it in another way, falling environmental performance as economic 
performance rises. Curve sn shows the long-term trade-off that was available in the original, SN 
system, and curves st, dn and dt show the trade-offs available under the ST, DN and DT 
systems respectively. The actual distances between these curves are purely arbitrary in the 
Figure, being drawn for diagrammatic convenience. 
Figure 2.6 
Ambient 
concen-
tration 
(mg/L) 
Economic and environmental performance of dynamic and tradable 
permits 
Cost ($/yr) 
~ Economic performance 
This study evaluates the performance of the PHRSTS, a dynamic tradable (DT) control system 
(that is, PHRSTS, see Section 5.1) against the Trickle Discharge (TD), an approximate static 
non-tradable (SN) control system (that is, TD, see section 4.2). Because of trade-offs between 
two dimensions of performance, and because the PHRSTS contains two new elements, 
dynamicism and tradability, just defining the conceptual framework for assessing the PHRSTS's 
performance is quite complex and rather arbitrary. Even if all data before and after the 
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PHRSTS was introduced were available - which they were not - costs and (ambient) 
concentration data would be only about the points labelled in bold on the Figure: 
• the initial, before-PHRSTS point SN, with cost C0 and concentration A 0; and 
• the final, after-PHRSTS point DT, with cost CDr and concentration ADr (which may or may 
not be at society's optimal point*, where the opportunity set dt touches the most desirable 
indifference curve PP', representing society's trade-off of preferences between cost and 
concentration, touches, that can be reached - a theoretical ideal that we are unable to pay 
any further attention to). 
This immediately raises the question of how we can define the (relative) performance of the DT 
system compared to the initial, SN system. There is an almost irresistible temptation to seek a 
single number to measure performance. The single number could be 
[2.6] 
However, probably the best way to find the performance of the DT would be always to give two 
numbers together, by saying: 
• the overall performance ofDT over SN is {C0-CDr, A 0-ADr}, a combined improvement of 
cost and concentration. 
Two conceptual interests would then be what I called in this study: 
• the equivalent economic performance ofDT over SN:= Co-CoDT; or 
• the equivalent environmental performance ofDT over SN:= Ao-AoDT; 
As shown in Figure 2.6, Conr is the hypothetical cost - using a convention throughout the 
Figure that hypothetical rather than actual numbers are shown in ordinary rather than bold type 
- that could in principle have been achieved ifthe DT scheme had been introduced without any 
overall fall in ambient concentration, by setting numerically higher (that is, laxer) effluent 
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standards under DT (but in different times and places than under SN, thanks to dynamic 
tradability). So C0-CoDr is the fall in cost that notionally could have been achieved by DT 
compared to SN. Likewise, AoDT is the hypothetical (ambient) concentration that could have 
been achieved if DT had been introduced without any overall fall in cost, by setting numerically 
lower (that is, more stringent) effluent standards under DT than under SN; so A 0-Aom is the fall 
in concentration achieved. 
Given the unique DT nature of the PHRSTS, it is of considerable interest to decompose its 
overall performance into that achieved by dynamicism and that achieved by tradability. But as 
can be seen from the Figure 2.6, there are several possible decompositions of performance. If 
points ST and DN would have been optimally chosen under ST and DN control system 
respectively, then we could define five pairs of performance measures for tradability: 
• the overall performance of tradability := {Co-Csr, Ao-Asr} or {CDN-CDT, ADJ\IADr} 
(actual falls in cost and concentration that would optimally be achieved by tradability, 
before or after dynamicism is introduced); or separating economic from environmental 
performance: 
• the actual economic performance of tradability := C0-Csr or CDN-CDT (actual falls in 
cost that would optimally be achieved by tradability, before or after dynamicism is 
introduced, both of which allow for simultaneous falls in concentration); 
• the actual environmental performance of tradability := A 0-Asr or ADN-ADT (actual falls 
in concentration that would optimally be achieved by tradability, before or after 
dynamicism is introduced, both of which allow for simultaneous falls in cost); 
• the equivalent economic performance of tradability := C0-Cosr or CoDN -Com (falls in 
cost before or after dynamicism is introduced, holding concentration constant) 
• the equivalent environmental performance of tradability := A 0-Aosr or AoDN -A om (falls 
in concentration before or after dynamicism is introduced, holding cost constant) 
and an analogous set of five pairs of performance measures for dynamic ism: 
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• the overall performance of dynamicism := { Co-CDN, Ao-ADN} or { Csr-Cnr, Asr-Anr} 
(actual falls in cost and concentration that would optimally be achieved by dynamicism, 
before or after tradability is introduced); or separating economic from environmental 
performance: 
• the actual economic performance of dynamicism := C0-CDN or Csr-Cnr (actual falls in 
cost that would optimally be achieved by dynamicism, before or after tradability is 
introduced, both of which allow for simultaneous falls in concentration); 
• the actual environmental performance of dynamic ism := Ao-ADN or Asr-Anr (actual fall 
in concentration that would optimally be achieved by dynamicism, before or after 
tradability is introduced, both of which allow for simultaneous falls in cost); 
• the equivalent economic performance of dynamicism := Co-CoDN or Cosr -C0DT (falls in 
cost before or after tradability is introduced, holding concentration constant) 
• the equivalent environmental performance of dynamicism := Ao-AoDN or Aosr -AoDr 
(falls in concentration before or after tradability is introduced, holding cost constant) 
With so many different performance measures available, it would be easy to lose sight of the 
key conclusion that is immediately obvious from Figure 2.6, which is that DT gives a greatest 
improvement in economic performance. However, which out of DN and ST gives a greater 
economic performance is less obvious, being a case-by-case answer. 
As stated in Section 1.4, this study poses two primary research questions. Those are: (1) Did the 
PHRSTS significantly improve the river salinity of the Hunter River? (2) Did the PHRSTS 
generate substantial saving to its participants in control costs of saline water? Further, can much 
of the actual cost saving generated by the PHRSTS be attributed to the dynamicism or 
tradability of the discharge permits? To address these questions, based on the available 
operational data of the PHRSTS, the study measures (1) actual environmental performance 
represented by Ao -Anr, (2) actual economic performance Co -Cnr, and (3) actual cost saving 
due to tradability represented by ConN -C0nr· A conclusion on the overall performance of the 
PHRSTS will then emerge based on these measures. 
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2.5 Summary 
Control of pollution sources is a dominant strategy for management of river quality. 
Management of point sources is usually achieved using discharge permits, which can be defined 
in two dimensions: dynamicism and tradability. Combinations of these two dimensions form 
static non-tradable permits (SN), static tradable permits (ST), dynamic non-tradable permits 
(DN) and dynamic tradable permits (DT). Any move from SN to one of ST, DN or DT is a 
move to a control system with higher economic performance, but also with less reliable 
environmental performance. DT, a mixed system involving both dynamic permits and tradable 
permits, is more cost-effective than either dynamic permits or tradable permits separately. The 
theoretical foundation developed in this chapter provides an analytical framework for examining 
the environmental and economic effectiveness of the PHRSTS. 
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Chapter 3 Hunter River Salinity and Industrial Saline 
Water Discharge 
This chapter describes the characteristics of the Hunter River based on a review of the available 
literature on salinity, both general and specific, as it applies to the Hunter Catchment. It presents 
the main features of river flow and salinity in the Hunter River, factors affecting the generation 
of industrial saline water, and factors determining the effects of industrial discharge on river 
salinity. This is to aid understanding of the nature and scale of the industrial saline water 
discharge and their implications for saline water management strategies for the Hunter River. 
3.1 Catchment overview 
The Hunter River (the River) is one of the most important river systems in Australia from 
geographic, resource, economic and political viewpoints. Situated on the east coast of Australia, 
the River is located in the State of New South Wales (NSW), between 31.5 ° and 33° south, and 
150° and 152° east. Figure 3.1 shows the Hunter catchment. The River, which originates in the 
Barrington Tops, north of Muswellbrook, flows south-west to where it meets the Goulbum 
River. It then flows east to enter the Pacific Ocean at Newcastle, with a total length of 467 
kilometres (km). The floodplain gradually expands as the river flows to the sea. The floodplain 
in the upper part of the catchment is around 3 km wide, expanding to almost 24 km in width by 
Maitland, and reaching widths of up to 40 km in some places in the lower reaches (NSW 
DL WC 2000; HVRF 2003). 
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The Hunter River Catchment 
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Source: NSW EPA (2001: 3) 
While most of the stream flow comes from the north-eastern part of the catchment, the Hunter 
River is fed by a number of tributaries along its course. The major tributaries, from upstream to 
downstream, are the Pages River, Isis River, Rouchel Brook, Goulburn River, Glennies Creek, 
Wollombi Creek, and the Paterson, Allyn, Chichester and Williams Rivers, together with a 
number of other minor tributaries draining the surrounding sub-catchments. Among them, the 
Goulburn River in the Weston part of the catchment contributes 23% of the river flow while 
draining almost half of the total catchment. In total, the rivers and creeks of the Hunter drain a 
total catchment of 22,000 km2 (NSW DL WC 2000; HVRF 2003). This study focuses on the 
segment of the Hunter River mainstream between Denman and Singleton, to which the 
PHRSTS applies (See Section 5.1). 
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3.1.1 Geology 
A significant feature of the Hunter Valley geology is a major fault line which separates the 
carboniferous rocks exposed along the northern sides of the valley from the coal measures 
sequences of Permian age in the central and south-eastern areas and the Triassic sandstone in 
the south (NSW DLWC 2000). The Permian rock underlying most of the Hunter Valley is one 
of the main factors governing the salinity of both groundwater and surface water. The Permian 
rock consists of conglomerate, sandstone, shale and coal; it derives from ancient marine 
sediments and therefore contains salt. As a consequence, many of the streams that occupy the 
central valley floor are naturally saline. Many groundwater areas are also saline and the land is 
prone to dry land salinity when the salt is brought to the soil surface by rising water tables (NSW 
DLWC2000). 
3.1.2 Rainfall and evaporation 
Maritime influences play an important role in all aspects of the climate in the Hunter catchment. 
Rainfall in the Hunter Valley varies considerably in both temporal and spatial dimensions. 
Average annual rainfall ranges from approximately 1350 mm along the coast margins to about 
550 mm in the upper Hunter Valley (AGC Woodward-Clyde 1992). A seasonal rainfall pattern 
is also observed. Summer months are generally wetter than winter months except in the coastal 
area (NSW DL WC 2000). The average annual evaporation increases from east to west across 
the Hunter Valley, ranging from 1180 mm to 1323 mm (AGC Woodward-Clyde 1992). 
3.1.3 Surface water 
Within the Hunter catchment, approximately 80% of total water flows are unregulated. The 
remainder of water flows is regulated by three major storage dams: the Glenbawn Dam on the 
upper Hunter mainstream, Glennies Creek Dam on Glennies Creek and Lostock Dam on 
Paterson River. These dams regulate 320 gigalitres/year (GL/year) stream flow (NSW DL WC 
2000), accounting for 17.8% of the average catchment flow yield (see Section 3.2). These dams 
are owned and operated by the NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation (DL WC/, 
2 DL WC has changed its names from time to time. Its previous names were NSW Water Resource Commission 
(WRC); Department of Water Resources (DWR). It was then renamed as the Department oflnfrastructure, Planning 
and Natural Resources (DIPNR) and the Department of Natural Resources, in that order. On 27 April 2007 a new 
Department of Water and Energy (DWE) was created, combining divisions of the former DLWC and the former 
Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability (DEUS) 
http://www.naturalresources.nsw.gov.au/aboutus/index.shtml). The acronym DL WC is used in this thesis to reflect 
the fact that it was used for the entire PHRSTS period. 
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the Hunter Water Corporation and the Macquarie Generation to provide a large volume of water 
during low flow periods to meet the requirements of irrigation, industry and town water supply. 
In general, the flow regulation has reduced high flows in the Hunter mainstream due to the 
storage of water in the dams (NSW DLWC 2000). 
Salinity, algal blooms and bacteriological contamination are the main issues of concern in 
relation to water quality in the Hunter River (HVRF 2003). The high salinity in the River can be 
attributed to its prevailing geological conditions, but this has been exacerbated by human 
activities, such as discharge of industrial saline water and agricultural irrigation. The impacts of 
industrial discharges and agricultural irrigation on the Hunter river salinity will be described in 
Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.5.4. Algal blooms result occasionally from excess nutrients in rivers and 
water storage areas in the Hunter. Bacteriological contamination arises from runoff from 
livestock and septic systems (HVRF 2003). 
3.1.4 Groundwater 
Groundwater resources in the Hunter Valley generally fall into one of two categories - alluvial 
aquifers in the Hunter River plains, and hardrock aquifers. These aquifers maintain base flow in 
many streams during dry times (Mackie Martin-PPK 1994 ). 
Alluvial aquifers adjacent to the Hunter River are the principle groundwater storages in the 
Hunter Valley. These aquifers are hydraulically connected to the river and are exploited for 
irrigation water supply in the region, from Glenbawn dam to the confluence of the Hunter and 
Goulburn Rivers. The alluvial deposits act as local river water storage, exchanging waters with 
the river as river levels rise and fall (Mackie Martin-PPK 1994). Hardrock aquifers offer only 
limited groundwater resources. In the northern parts of the valley, Carboniferous rocks provide 
water mostly suitable for stock use. In the central areas, Permian rocks and coal measures yield 
mostly brackish water (Mackie Martin-PPK 1994). 
3.1.5 Social and economic activities 
The Hunter Valley is one of the most highly developed areas in Australia in terms of the extent 
and diversity of the agricultural activities and the significance of industrial activities. The main 
agricultural activities undertaken are cropping, grape cultivation and wine making, sheep 
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grazing and the wool industry, house studs and fishing. These activities directly and indirectly 
support some 5900 people and generated production with a total value of approximately $393.5 
million in 1999-2000 (HVRF 2003). 
Besides farming, the industries of the Hunter region include coal mining, power generation, 
heavy metal smelting and various manufacturing. Among them, coal mining and power 
generation are the most important industries in the region. The coal mining industry employs 
around 8000 people and supplies the export and domestic markets. Black coal mining accounts 
for more than 1% of Australia's GDP (NSW DMR 2002). The Macquarie Generation operates 
two coal fired power stations in the mid Hunter catchment, contributing more than 15% of the 
electricity in the National Electricity Market (Macquarie Generation 2003). Detailed 
descriptions of the coal mining and power generation in the Hunter Region will be provided in 
Sections 3.4.1and3.5.1. 
3.1.6 Principle water uses and discharges 
The coal mines and power generation, along with agricultural activities, smaller industries and 
urban areas, rely on the Hunter River and its tributaries for water supply, wastewater discharge 
or both (HVRF 2003 ). DL WC supplies water to each of these groups of users on the basis of a 
security rating - high security and low security through extraction licences that specify the 
allocated volume of water. High security supply ensures some level of guaranteed supply 
throughout the worst droughts while low security supply is subject to water availability during 
very dry periods. Users of the water for irrigated agriculture are generally consumers of low 
security water, while many industrial users and town water suppliers receive high security water 
(NSW DL WC 2000). 
Point source discharge of pollutants including from coal mining and power generating industries 
can potentially occur in all weather and river flow conditions, and non-point source pollutant 
runoff from groundwater discharge and agricultural activities occurs in wet weather when river 
flow is generally higher. While the former is regulated by the discharge licenses and various 
NSW EPA regulations, the latter is not regulated (NSW EPA 2001). 
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3.2 Hunter River flow 
River flows within the Hunter catchment result from a number of sources, including rainfall 
runoff, groundwater seepage, regulated discharge from Glenbawn and Glennies Creek dam, 
mine water releases and other sources (NSW DL WC 2000). While rainfall runoff and 
groundwater seepage are natural processes, regulated dam releases and mine water releases are 
not. 
Average runoff from the Hunter catchment is 1800 GL/year or about 12.5% of the total 
catchment rainfall. Of the total runoff, 42% actually comes from the Paterson, Allyn and 
Williams Rivers where the annual rainfall is more than double the average rainfall over the 
whole of the Hunter (NSW DL WC 2000). Discharge of shallow groundwater, primarily found 
in the river alluvia along the length of the Hunter, is the key contributor to river flows during 
dry periods (NSW DL WC 2000). 
The monitoring of the Hunter River mainstream and its tributaries has a long history. The NSW 
DLWC maintains an extensive gauging network throughout the Hunter Valley. Figure 3.2 
indicates the locations of major gauging stations in the study area. The oldest gauging at 
Singleton (Point 15) was established in 1891, but most gauges were installed in the late 1950s or 
1960s. Early flow information was collected by visual observation of staff gauges with low 
frequency (for example, monthly) but suffered from considerable discontinuity. Later records 
were obtained by continuous recording with float gauges or pressure gauges with an increasing 
frequency (M. Simons [Resource analyst, NSW DNR] 2003, pers. comm., 7 July). Recent 
records have been collected through newly developed radio telemetry with high frequency down 
to 5 to 10 minute intervals since 1993 (NSW DLWC 2000). As will be described in Section 5.1, 
Denman (shown as Point 2 in Figure 3.2), confluence of the Glennies Creek and Hunter 
mainstream (denoted Glennies/Hunter, shown as Point 14 in the Figure) and Singleton (shown 
as Point 15 in the Figure) are the control stations for defining river flow periods (such as Low, 
High and Flood) and salinity standards for the river sectors under the HRSTS. 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of gauging stations in the Hunter Valley 
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Source: Hunter Water Quality Task Group (1994: 9); point 14 = "Glennies/Hunter" 
Stream flows within the Hunter Valley exhibit a high degree of both inter-year and intra-year 
variability. Flows are also seasonally variable with highest flows occurring during summer 
months when highest rainfall receipts and more intense storms tend to occur. This characteristic 
has been well documented in the literature, such as, Croft & Associates 1983; Day 1986; AGC 
Woodward-Clyde 1992; NSW DLWC 2000. 
Examination of the available daily flow records at Singleton for the period 1993 to 2002 in this 
study has confirmed this characteristic. The annual average daily river flow for this period 
varied by a factor of 7 for Denman, 12 for Glennies/Hunter and 19 for Singleton. The extreme 
daily flows of the River also present a huge range of dispersion. In the same period, the 
maximum daily flows varied from the minimum daily flows by the factors of 32~1860 for 
Denman, 32~1489 for Glennies/Hunter and 60~1416 for Singleton. Figure 3.3 presents the 
daily river flow at Denman, Glennies/Hunter and Singleton gauging stations. It illustrates 
considerable variations in river flow in the Hunter mainstream. 
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Daily river flow at the Hunter main gauging stations 
Daily river flow at Hunter mainstream 
during 1993-2002 
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Day (1986) attributed the large variability of river flows to a number of natural factors, 
including considerable spatial variations in altitude, geology, landform, soils, rainfall, runoff 
and land use in the Hunter catchment, and to the great differences in periodicity of flow and 
runoff contributions per unit of catchment area of the major tributaries to the Hunter 
mainstream. In addition to these natural factors, human activities, such as direct extraction from 
and discharges into the river systems, as well as flow regulation through the construction of 
dams, may also have had effects on river flows through changing frequency of large events, 
volume and seasonality. 
Another important characteristic of the river flow is that while the flow is higher in the middle 
and lower river sectors than in the upper sector, the flow in the middle sector is higher than in 
the lower sector, as the major tributaries join the mainstream in the middle sector. For example, 
based on the river flow data provided by the NSW DL WC, during the period 1993 to 2002, the 
average daily flow at Denman, Glennies/Hunter and Singleton gauging stations were 843 
ML/day, 1427 ML/day and 1297 ML/day, respectively. 
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3.3 Hunter River salinity 
Salinity refers to ambient concentrations of salts, such as sodium chloride, magnesium and 
calcium sulphates and bicarbonates, present in soil and water. Salinity can be measured in 
milligrams per litre (mg/L) of Total Soluble Salt (TSS) or Total Dissolved Salts (TDS). A 
common way to find the salinity level of water is by measuring its surrogate, electrical 
conductivity (EC), given that the concentration of salt in water affects the electrical resistance of 
the solution, and 1 EC = 1 micro Siemens per centimetre (µs/cm) at 25° C; typically a 
conversion factor of 0.6~0.68 is applied to convert EC (in µs/cm) to TDS (in mg/L) for the 
calculation of salt load. That is, 1000 EC = approximately 600~680 mg/L of TDS. Salt load, the 
mass of salt passing a particular location within a given time frame, is generally measured in 
tonnes per day or tonnes per year. 
River salinity can develop naturally. Rainwater that falls into a catchment, surface runoff and 
seepage of groundwater all contribute salt to river streams (see Figure 3 .4 ), though the 
contributions of each are disproportionate. Among the contributions, surface flows from salt-
affected land and saline groundwater discharges to streams are the two main factors resulting in 
high salinity concentrations in river systems. 
The water quality of the Hunter River is naturally saline due to its geological features described 
in Section 3.1.1. The NSW EPA (1994a) estimated that approximately 80% of the salt load in 
the River comes from natural sources. High salinity levels in the River are mainly attributed to 
natural seepage of saline groundwater to the surface. AGC Woodward-Clyde (1992) estimated 
that the direct groundwater accession of salt to the Hunter streams over the whole catchment 
above Singleton is 16,3 00 tonnes per year, based on an average concentration of groundwater of 
4650 mg/L. 
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Causes of river salinity3 
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The history of observation of river salinity in the Hunter River is not as long as that of river 
flows. Although the NSW DL WC started to record river salinity at some key gauging stations in 
the 1970s, the sampling methods and frequency of records have not been constant over time. 
Early sampling was done via a hand-held probe or by a water sample being sent to laboratories 
for analysis. Only sporadic samples were taken at a selected number of stations when salinity 
became a concern. In the early 1980s, the DL WC installed four automatic salinity recorders at 
Muswellbrook, Liddell, Singleton and Greta (see Figure 3.1 for locations) to continuously 
monitor salinity levels in the River. Monthly readings have since then been supplemented by 
weekly or daily observations (M. Simons [Resource analyst, the former NSW Department of 
Natural Resources] 2003, pers. comm., 7 July). Since 1993, the monitoring coverage increased 
and the frequency and quality of river salinity observations dramatically improved with the 
installation of radio telemetry (NSW DLWC 2000). Monthly salinity observations of 1980-2002 
and daily salinity observations of 1995-2002 at Singleton are used in this study to examine the 
environmental performance of the PHRSTS (Chapter 6). 
3 Recharge refers to the process of water entering the groundwater system from the surface. Discharge refers to the 
process of groundwater rising to the soil surface in low-lying areas or on the break of a slope, or flowing directly into 
stream (NSW DLWC 2001). 
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With the increasingly frequent observations and wide spatial monitoring network, a better 
understanding of the salinity in the Hunter River was also developed. Two main characteristics 
of the Hunter salinity became better understood, as discussed below. 
The first is that salinity concentrations have a general inverse relationship with river flows. A 
number of factors account for the high salinity level during low flow from dry weather 
conditions. Those are: (1) the highly saline groundwater, which is the main source of the River's 
base flow; (2) limited or non-existent surface runoff to dilute groundwater salinity; and (3) high 
evaporation rates, which concentrate salt in surface water NSW EPA 1994a). I t has been 
reported that regulation of the River (through water release from the dams) has ensured 
reasonable flows in all years. This in tum has removed the threat of extremely high salinities in 
periods of drought (NSW DL WC 2000b ). During rainfall runoff events, salinity in the River 
varies with time. After initial flushing of runoff when a salt spike 4 may occur, the river salinity 
decreases gradually with fresh rainfall runoff. This complexity makes it difficult to establish a 
precise quantitative relationship between river salinity and flow (see Section 6.2.2 for further 
discussion of this phenomenon). 
Another important characteristic regarding the river salinity is that salinity progressively 
increases downstream, because water draining from the upper part of the catchment is of 
relatively low salinity. For example, the water in the Glenbawn Dam located in the upper 
Hunter River (Figure 3.2) is within the range of 350~400 EC. Upstream of Muswellbrook, 
salinity remains below 700 EC most of the time and only exceeds this level under extremely 
low flow conditions (NSW DL WC 2000). Further downstream, salinity steadily increases. 
Salinity at Glennies/Hunter is considerably higher than that at Denman (Figure 3.1), with few 
exceptions. However, on most occasions salinity at Glennies/Hunter tends to be slightly more 
saline than that at Singleton. This situation is attributed to high salinity water inputs from the 
tributaries, notably from the Goulboum River and lower Wollombi Brook, which merge with 
the Hunter mainstream between Denman and Glennies/Hunter (Croft & Associates 1983). The 
Goulboum River and lower Wollombi Brook, which are incised into saline geologies and flow 
through the saline rocks of the valley floor, are regarded as major sources ofriverine salinity in 
the Hunter River (Croft & Associates 1983). 
4 A salt spike is a sharp increase in the river's salinity at the beginning of a storm event after a long drought period, 
caused by storm water flushing accumulated salt from the river streams. 
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Although most of the salt in the Hunter River comes from natural sources, discharges from 
human activities can periodically cause significant short-term increases in river salinity. The 
principal human activities that release salt into the Hunter River are coal mining, power 
generation and agricultural practices. The following sections describe the characteristics of the 
wastewater discharged from each of these activities and discuss their impacts on the water 
quality of the Hunter River. 
3.4 Mining and Hunter River salinity 
3.4.1 Coal mines 
As noted Section 3.1.1, the Permian system dominates the geologic structure of the Hunter 
Valley. This system contains marine strata, which includes rich coal measures. As a result, 
underlying most of the Hunter region are numerous seams of black coal of various thicknesses 
and at various depths (Creelman 1994). It was estimated that recoverable coal reserves in the 
Hunter Valley account for approximately 63% (6,011 million tonnes) of the total coal in NSW 
(9500 million tonnes) (HVRF 2003). 
The Hunter Valley has had a long history of coal mining, over 200 years. Early mining activities 
in the region can be traced back to 1799, begun under the auspices of the colonial government 
(HVRF 2003). The importance of the coal mining in the region is shown by the original name of 
the Hunter River, "Coal River" (Marsden 1999). Coal mining is also the reason for the 
settlement and development of Newcastle, which was called "Coalopolis" (meaning Australia's 
only coal port) in the late 19th century (Marsden 1999). Though having a very long history, 
only in the 1980s did the mining industry start to experience its rapid growth. This was driven 
by two factors: increase in the demand for coal from overseas markets; and increase in domestic 
demands as a result of construction and development of coal-fired thermal power stations in the 
Hunter Valley, notably Liddell power station (NSW Minerals Council 2001). 
Nowadays, the Hunter Valley possesses one of the best-developed coal mining industries in the 
world, and coal mining has become one of the key industries in the region. The following 
statistics provided by the NSW Department of Mineral Resources (NSW DMR 1991; 1992; 
1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003) indicate the industry's 
importance in the region's development and economy. During the period 1991to2003, the coal 
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production of the Hunter area increased steadily, at an average annual growth rate of 7%. As a 
result, the share of NSW production from the Hunter coalfield increased from 50.7% in 
1992/1993 to 94.4% in 2001/2002. Approximately 75% of coal produced in the Hunter Regions 
supplied the export markets, and the rest was consumed by domestic users, primarily by local 
electricity generators. 
Open-cut (or surface) and underground (or deep) mining are the two main methods used for coal 
mining. The choice of mining method is largely determined by the geology and depth of the 
coal seam below the surface. Where the coal seam is relatively close to the surface, open-cut 
mining is economical. Where the coal seam is too deep for open-cut methods, underground 
mining is the only suitable method. An illustration of open-cut and underground coal mining 
methods is in Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5 Comparison of open-cut and underground coal mining methods 
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In the Hunter coalfield, vast coal reserves lie at comparatively shallow depths. Open-cut is 
therefore the dominant mining method employed in this region. Of the total saleable coal in 
1992-2002, 87% was produced by open-cut mines, and only 13% was from underground mines 
(NSW DMR 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002). 
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Up to 2002, 22 coal mines operating in the study area (Table 3.1) participated in the PHRSTS. 
In terms of their geographic distribution (Figure 3 .6), ten mines were concentrated in the middle 
segment of the Hunter River, and the rest were equally distributed across the upper and lower 
Hunter. Among these 22 coal mines, 15 were open-cut, five were underground, and two were 
combined open-cut and underground operations. 
Table 3.1 Basic data on PHRSTS mines (the main mines of the Hunter coalfield) 
Coal mines 
Bengalla· 
Bulga/South Bulga 
Camberwell 
Cumnock No. I 
Dartbrook 
Drayton 
Glennies Creek 
Hunter Valley Operations north 
Hunter Valley Operations west (Howick) 
Lemington 
Liddell 
Mount Owen 
Mount Thorley 
Mt Arthur Coal 
Muswellbrook No.2 
Nardell 
Ravensworth-east 
Ravensworth-N arama 
Rixs Creek 
United 
Wambo 
Warksworth No. 1 
U =upper sector of the Hunter River. 
M =middle sector of the Hunter River 
L =lower sector of the Hunter River 
0 = open-cut mines 
U = underground mines 
* = new development during PHRSTS 
Ownership 
Coal & Allied 
Xstrata Coal 
Camberwell Coal 
Xstrata Coal 
Anglo Coal 
Anglo Coal 
Glennies Creek 
Coal & Allied 
Coal & Allied 
Coal & Allied 
Xstrata Coal 
Xstrata Coal 
Coal & Allied 
BHP Billion 
Muswellbrook Coal 
Resource Pacific 
Xstrata Coal 
Xstrata Coal 
Rixs Creek 
Xstrata Coal 
Wambo Coal 
Coal & Allied 
Location Minin2 methods 
u 0 
u O!U 
M 0 
M u 
u u 
u 0 
M u 
M 0 
M 0 
L 0 
M 0 
M 0 
L 0 
u 0 
u 0 
M u 
M 0 
M 0 
L 0 
L u 
L O!U 
L 0 
Sources: NSW DMR (2002) and P. Smith ([Assistant Director, Environment, NSW Minerals 
Council] 2003, pers. email. 16 September) 
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Figure 3.6 Distribution of the coal mines in the Hunter Coalfield 
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In 2002, the total raw production and saleable production of coal amounted to 93.62 Mt and 
69.55 Mt respectively, almost double that for 1992/1993 financial year (NSW DNR 1993; 
2002). The growth of production can not only be attributed to the increase in demands from 
overseas, but also to the significant improvements made in mining technology, which have 
enabled large tonnages of coal to be exploited cheaply and thus competitively in the world 
markets (NSW Minerals Council 2001 ). 
One noticeable feature of the Hunter coal mining industry is its high number of cross-company 
ownerships, though the ownership of some mines has changed over the past two decades. As 
shown in Table 3 .1, by 2002, 14 out of the 22 mines actually belonged to two big companies: 
Xstrata Coal Pty (eight mines) and Coal & Allied (six mines). This has implications for the 
FHRSTS credit trading (discussed in Chapter 5). 
The contribution of these mines to regional social development is illustrated by the following 
statistics. In 2002, the 22 mines employed a total of 5213 people (compared to 5487 people 
employed in agriculture in the whole Hunter Region), and generated some $430 million in local 
wages income (NSW DMR 2002). While 84% of these people were employed by the open-cut 
mines, the remainder worked for the underground mines. The percentages of employees 
working in the mines in the upper, middle and low Hunter region were 33%, 42% and 25%, 
respectively (NSW DMR 2002). 
Open-cut mining tends to be capital rather than labour-intensive. Statistical data for 1999-2002 
(NSW DMR 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002) show that the average annual saleable output per 
employee for open-cut mines (14340 tonnes) was 1.5 times that of underground mines (8244 
tonnes). Although underground mining is usually more expensive and labour-intensive than 
open-cut mining, the geology of coal deposits is likely to result in a mine's continuation long 
after open-cut seams have been exhausted (NSW Minerals Council 2001 ). This may partly 
explain the fact that in recent years the annual production growth rate from underground has 
been twice that of the production of open-cut mines. 
As noted in Table 3 .1, Bengalla Coal Mine is one of the two new developments (another new 
development is Redbank Power Station) under the PHRSTS. Detailed information about this 
mine is not readily available, but some general relevant information is obtained from its publicly 
accessible website (Rio Tinto 2008). For example, Bengalla Coal Mine is located four 
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kilometres west of Muswellbrook in the upper Hunter region. Although its proposal as a project 
goes back to 1990, it did not start its operation until 1999. In 2007, Bengalla produced a total 
5.2 million tonnes of saleable production and had a total of 233 employees. The freshwater use 
rate was 102 litres per tonne of coal produced. 
3.4.2 Water demand and supply 
Despite the significance of the coal mining industry in terms of its contribution to the region's 
economic and social development, it is relatively insignificant in terms of its consumption of 
river water. The industry uses a small proportion (some 5%) of the regulated river water 
allocation while generating large financial returns on this water usage (NSW Minerals Council 
2001 ). The figures for economic returns of per unit water usage for the Hunter coal industry are 
not available, but the State's average can be used as an indication. Based on the statistics 
provided by NSW Minerals Council (2001), the economic return on the same level of water 
usage for the mining industry in the State is one thousand times that of agriculture. The modest 
consumption of river water by the coal mining industries is attributable to two related factors. 
On one hand, the coal industry, by its nature, is able to use poor quality water that may not be 
suitable for most other purposes. On the other hand, considerable improvements have been 
made in the efficiency of water recycling and reuse in the industry (NSW Minerals Council 
(2001). 
The main demands for water on a mine site are for coal washing, dust suppression on haul roads 
and coal stockpile areas (NSW Minerals Council 2001). The demand for coal washing varies 
with the amount of coal production. The demand for dust suppression, however, depends not 
only with the length of haul roads and area of hardstand that need to be watered, but also varies 
with regional prevailing climatic conditions. For example, dust suppression on haul roads and 
other areas was estimated to have risen from 1.2 ML/day to more than 1.6 ML/day for the 
extension of W arkworth Coal Mine (Mackie Environmental Research 2002). Other uses of 
water on a mine site include wash-down of industrial facilities and ablution, irrigation on 
rehabilitated land and fire fighting, but these activities only account for a small volume (NSW 
Minerals Council 2001). 
The water used on a mine site can originate from a range of sources, divided into four categories 
based upon the source, quality and management requirements: potable water, clean water, dirty 
water and mine water (NSW Minerals Council 2001). Potable water, which is used for drinking, 
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administration office supplies and bathhouses, is the highest category and quality. It is supplied 
from off-site sources, such as pumping water from the Hunter River under extraction licences, 
connection to a town water supply, or periodic delivery by tanker. Potable water is tested 
regularly for occupational health reasons (NSW Minerals Council 2001). 
Clean water comes from the rainfall runoff from undisturbed, vegetated parts of a site. It is 
diverted around or away from the areas affected by mining by means of drains and diversion 
banks. While this water can be discharged off-site subject to no controls, the prevailing practice 
is withholding the water in dams to augment the mine supply (NSW Minerals Council 2001 ). In 
contrast to clean water is dirty water, which is the runoff from so-called disturbed areas, the 
areas affected by mining activities. The water of this category usually contains suspended silt 
material and is drained to holding dams and sediment ponds for settling. The runoff from 
disturbed and undisturbed areas has little impact on river salinity because of the general low 
level of soluble salts. Discharging of this water is subject to the limits set down in the 
Australian Water Quality Guidelines for Fresh and Marine Waters (NSW Minerals Council 
2001). 
The last category is mine water, which is the water collected within the mine workings as a 
result of groundwater seepage, dewatering and rainfall accumulation (NSW Minerals Council 
2001 ). This water is usually saline and can be discharged only under the discharge licenses and 
in compliance with NSW EPA regulations (NSW EPA 1994a). Mine water is the focus of this 
study. The ways in which coal mines generate mine water and the impacts of mine water 
discharge on river quality will be discussed in the next section. 
The amount of water used varies among mine sites and depends on their on-site operations and 
environmental conditions. In general, the water demand of underground operations is less than 
that of open-cut operations, as the latter need more water for dust suppression (NSW Minerals 
Council 2001). Over the last ten years, improvement in self-sufficiency has become a central 
aim of water management systems for the coal mining industry. The overall objectives of a 
water management system are to reduce the demand on external sources and reduce the need for 
disposal of any excess through maximizing on-site water recycling and reuse. To achieve these 
objectives, the dirty water and mine water stored in on-site dams are used as priority sources for 
coal washing and dust suppression. Wastewater from coal washing is, in turn, stored and 
recycled to limit the demand on external water supplies (NSW Minerals Council 2001). 
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Information from the NSW Minerals Council (2001) shows that considerable improvement has 
been made in the efficiency of water use in the coal mines of the Hunter region. The average 
amount of water consumed dropped from 283 litres per tonne of coal in 1978 to 193 litres per 
tonne in 1999-2000. Consequently, despite the increase in coal production over that time of 
almost 800%, the proportion of licensed entitlements of water use held by the mines has only 
risen from 1 % to 5.5% of total entitlements across the whole Hunter Valley (NSW Minerals 
Council 2001). 
3.4.3 Generation of mine water 
Groundwater seepage dewatering of mine workings and rainfall accumulation are the two 
primary sources of mine water. The ways in which coal mines generate mine water is depicted 
in Figure 3.7, which uses an open-cut mine as an example. 
Figure 3.7 Generation of open-cut mine water 
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As noted in Section 3.1.1, marine sediment deposits dominate the geology of the Hunter Valley. 
While they contain substantial coal reserves, they also contain salts, which render the 
groundwater very saline. Moreover, for geological reasons, the best coals are usually found in 
rocks with the highest solute contents (Creelman 1994). Pit groundwater inflow/seepage is a 
constant product for both open-cut and underground coal mines, and its volume progressively 
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increases over the life of the mine as the mine excavation increases in depth and in area and 
after regular dewatering. For example, URS Australia (2000) predicted that the total 
groundwater seepage at the Mount Arthur North Coal Mine would rise from zero to a rate of 3 
ML/day over the first 10 years and increase further to 3.6 ML/day over the next 10 years. Also, 
Mackie Environmental Research (2002) projected that the groundwater seepage, with a salinity 
concentration ranging from 2900-18400 EC, would rise from an initial rate of 0.64 ML/day to a 
rate of 4.2 ML/day at the Warkworth Coal Mine after 18 years of operation. 
While both open-cut and underground mines experience groundwater seepage, open-cut mines 
may accumulate rainfall from the floor and side slopes of the workings in the pits. As coal 
seams alternate with a conformable series of marine sandstones, siltstones and mudstones, open-
cut mine works expose substantial areas of salt-bearing rocks and liberate the saline 
groundwater at much higher rates than would occur naturally. As a result, the accumulated 
water in the mining pits becomes very saline. Though part of this water can be lost by 
evaporation, salt cannot. The residual water, whose saline content is highly concentrated and 
gravitates to the low points of the pits, has to be pumped out of the pits so that mining activities 
can continue (Croft & Associates 1983). 
Mine water in the Hunter coal mines therefore exhibits two special characteristics. First, 
although the groundwater is a constant product of mine operations, the overall amount of mine 
water generated on a mine site depends not only on rainfall features (that is, duration and 
intensity), but also on the catchment area of the site, which varies over the mine's life. In 
general, open-cut mines tend to accumulate more mine water than underground mines, and tend 
to accumulate mine water at higher rates in wet years and at lower rates in dry years. Because of 
this characteristic, unlike other industrial or municipal wastewater treatment plants whose 
effluent flows are continuous and relatively predictable, the generation of mine water is 
unpredictable and the discharge of mine water tends to be discontinuous. 
The second characteristic of mine water, which is closely related to the first, is that the salinity 
of mine water, even for the same mine, may vary significantly over time. In general, compared 
to the average rainfall condition, the salinity of mine water in a dry period is higher, as it mainly 
consists of the highly saline groundwater seepage. Conversely, the salinity of mine water in a 
wet period is lower because of the dilution from rainfall runoff. AGC Woodward-Clyde (1992) 
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estimated that the mean salinity of mine water discharged from all operating mines in the 
Hunter was about 5000 EC. 
3.4.4 Discharge of mine water 
The requirements to maximise the reuse of mine waters for mine water supply, minimise the 
external mine supply demand, and minimise the discharge of mine water from the site are the 
three key considerations in development of appropriate on-site water management strategies in 
the mining industry (NSW Minerals Council 2001 ). The prevailing water management 
strategies of the coal mines in the Hunter region are summarised in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Mine water management strategies for the coal mines in the Hunter Valley 
Type of water Characteristics Mana2ement strate2ies 
Pit water from open- Sourced from groundwater Stored in on-site dams 
cut mines access Used as mine water supply source 
Dependent on the depth of Controlled discharge of any excess 
mining pits 
to the Hunter River in accordance 
Too saline to allow with NSW EPA regulations 
uncontrolled discharge to the 
Hunter River 
Pit runoff from open- Dependent on pit catchment Stored in dams on site 
cut mines area and rainfall conditions Used as mine water supply 
Controlled discharge of any excess 
to the Hunter River in accordance 
with NSW EPA regulations 
Water from Predominantly groundwater Stored in dams on site 
underground mines High salinity concentration Used as mine water supply 
Controlled discharge of any excess 
to the Hunter River in accordance 
with NSW EPA regulations 
Surface runoff from Natural runoff water Diverted around areas disturbed by 
undisturbed areas mining activities and allowed to 
discharge from the site without 
control 
Active mining Likely to contain elevated Runoff collected in catch drains 
overburden levels of suspended sediment and directed through sediment traps 
emplacement and and settling dams 
establishing After removal of suspended 
rehabilitation areas 
sediment, allowed to drain from the 
site 
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Mine infrastructure Likely to contain elevated Isolation of mine infrastructure area 
areas levels of suspended sediments catchments with diversion drains 
Potential for contamination Use of sediment traps and oil 
from hydrocarbon and other separators to remove suspended 
chemical spills sediments, and oil and grease, prior 
to collection in dams 
Collection of runoff in catch dams 
located immediately downstream of 
infrastructure area 
Transfer of the water in catch dam 
to other dams for use as mine water 
supply 
Mine infrastructure Likely to contain elevated Development and implementation 
construction areas levels of suspended sediments of an erosion and sediment control 
plan in accordance with the DL WC 
requirements 
Sewage effluent Likely to have elevated levels Treated on site prior to discharge 
of suspended solids, nutrients from the site 
and BOD 
Not suitable for discharge from 
the site without treatment 
Sources: Adapted from URS Australia (2000); Gilbert & Associates (2003) 
For most coal mines, on-site water management operates predominantly as a closed system, 
shown schematically in Figure 3.8. In this system, mine water is not discharged from the 
wastewater system off-site. Instead, mine water is pumped from the mine pits to on-site storage 
dams and used as one of the priority water sources for coal washing and dust suppression. 
For individual mines, a water balance that captures all inflows and outflows on site needs to be 
developed to provide the basis for the on-site water management system. The water balance 
includes water demand and discharge in response to the level of coal production, size of the pits 
and rainfall, and in tum determines the capacity of mine water storage required to meet most 
mine site operational conditions. Detailed explanation and discussion of this will be provided in 
Section 7 .2.1.1. As the on-site water balance fluctuates with climatic conditions, and as the 
extent and status of the mining operation evolve over time, there may be periods when the 
availability of water on site is insufficient to meet the demand. Under these circumstances, 
water would be imported from external sources, either opportunistically from adjacent mining 
operations, or from the Hunter River mainstream and its tributaries in accordance with the 
extraction licenses (URS Australia 2000). 
73 
Chapter 3 Hunter River Salinity and Industrial Saline Water Discharge 
Under "normal" weather conditions mines are net water users, supplementing on-site water 
needs with the water from clean water diversion systems. During prolonged wet periods, 
however, there may be times when the quantity of mine water exceeds that required on site and 
the excess cannot to be stored indefinitely on site due to the limitations of storage capacity 
(NSW EPA 1994a). This situation would be exacerbated by mining to greater depths (where 
groundwater inflow rates increase) and the development of additional and larger mines (where 
more rainwater accumulated in the pits and voids). In these circumstances, excess mine water 
has to be removed off site. 
There are several options open to a mine with excess mine water, such as transferring it to 
adjacent mines that could benefit from additional water or temporarily storing it in the lower 
levels of open-cut pits contingent upon the mining operations (Gilbert & Associates 2003; 
Mackie Environmental Research 2002). When these options are not available, excess mine 
water has to be discharged to the Hunter River. Therefore, the need for a mine to discharge mine 
water to the Hunter River not only depends on the amount of mine water generated, but also 
relates to the efficiency of on-site water use and the storage capacity of on-site dams. 
AGC Woodward-Clyde (1992) estimated the excess water from the 14 mines operating in 1991 
under different climate conditions over the period 1990-1995. It was estimated that the total 
amount of excess water required to be discharged would be in the range of 8000-12000 ML/year 
in 1 :20 wet year conditions, with an average of 2800-6500ML/year. These figures were later 
updated by NSW EPA (1994a), which estimated that 6280 ML of saline water would be 
generated in 1994, of which 3302 ML saline water containing 12,872 tonnes of salt would have 
to be removed so that mining could proceed. This is a substantial amount of saline water to be 
disposed of in terms of both volume and cost. 
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Figure 3.8 Water use and wastewater discharge of an open-cut coal mine 
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Sources: Adapted from AGC Woodward-Clyde (1992); URS Australia (2000); NSW Mineral Council (2001); Gilbert & Associates (2003); NSW EPA (1994a). 
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3.4.5 Impacts of mine water on river salinity 
The impacts of mine water on salinity in the Hunter River depend on several factors. Generally, 
discharge of saline water from coal mines can be easily accommodated when the river flows are 
high. This is because high river flows are usually associated with periods of above-average 
rainfall; when in-river salinity is relatively low, coal mines need to dispose of the large 
quantities of mine water accumulated, and irrigators have low demands for river water. 
However, the typical rainfall pattern in the Hunter Valley is a succession of wet years followed 
by one or two dry years. Even within one year, dry periods and wet periods occur alternately 
(NSW EPA 1994a). Thus, there may be excess mine water carried over from a series of wet 
periods into a dry period. In such a situation, discharge may be required even though the excess 
water is not generated then. 
However, during dry periods the average flow in the Hunter River falls considerably. The 
background or natural salinity then rises because river flow is sustained by groundwater inflows 
that commonly have conductivities of 1000-3000 EC (AGC Woodward-Clyde 1992). As a 
result, the river salinity levels are more likely to be affected by mine discharges in dry periods 
than in wet periods. However, demands on river water for irrigation and other uses are at their 
highest during dry periods. Although the volume of excess water requiring disposal in dry 
periods may be substantially lower than in wet periods, the impacts of one unit of mine 
discharge on river salinity in dry periods would be expected to be greater than in wet periods. 
In addition to discharge of mine water, mining activities potentially contribute to river salinity 
in some other ways. Surface water runoff from mine landforms and disturbed areas may contain 
soluble salts and discharge them via overland flow to the streams. Also, when coal mines use 
mine water for spray irrigation and road dust suppression, the salt can eventually find its way 
back to the river. As well, the wastewater storage dams on coal mine sites, which are used to 
trap particulate matter and store excess mine water before it enters streams, may overflow in wet 
weather. While the salt load entering the Hunter River in these ways is analogous to non-point 
sources (NPS), the contribution to and impacts on river salinity by overflows are not significant 
in comparison with those generated by mine water. 
Other than the above impacts, mining activities could have long-term profound effects on the 
quality of the Hunter River. As mining operations permanently remove coal and change the 
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structure and morphology of the coal removed, they make permanent alterations to the natural 
soil, rock strata and the groundwater regime. These alterations create new connections between 
separate aquifers and change flow paths and permeability, which may have far-reaching effects 
on the river system and groundwater salinity for a century or more after mining ceases (Healthy 
Rivers Commission of NSW 2002). So far, the understanding of long-term consequences of 
mining operations is extremely limited due to the lack of research on these issues. 
3.5 Power generation and river salinity 
Hydroelectric power production in Australia is limited to mainly the Snowy Mountains and 
Tasmania due to the dry nature of most of the continent. Despite continuing development in the 
wind and solar power generation sectors, over 85% of electricity produced in Australia today is 
still from coal-fired thermal power stations (Australian Coal Association 2008). There are three 
main power generation stations in the study area: Liddell, Bayswater and Redbank. Liddell and 
Bayswater power stations have had a long history in the area and had been PHRSTS participants 
since 1995. Redbank was established only in 2000 and is the other new development under the 
PHRSTS (the first being Bengalla coalmine). The remainder of this section will provide 
background to these power stations and their relationships with the coal mining industry in the 
Hunter Valley. The focus will be on the saline water generated by the power stations and its 
impact on the Hunter River salinity. 
3.5.1 Macquarie Generation 
3.5.1.1 General background 
Macquarie Generation owns and operates the Liddell and Bayswater power stations which are 
located close together in the upper Hunter Valley (see Figure 3.6). They have been in service 
since the early 1970s and in the middle of 1980, respectively. In 1991 the two power stations 
formed a company called 'Pacific Power", which was taken over by Macquarie Generation, a 
state-owned corporation, in 1996 in line with reforms in the NSW electricity industry. With a 
combined generating capacity of 4,640 MW5 (2,640 MW from the Bayswater Power Station and 
2000 MW from the Liddell Power Station), Macquarie Generation has become the largest power 
5 For comparison, the electricity generating capacity of the Snowy Mountains Scheme is 3756 MW (Snowy Hydro 
Limited 2007). 
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generator in Australia, meeting 42% of NSW's electricity demand (Macquarie Generation 
2003). 
Macquarie Generation is also the main contributor to the National Electricity Market. Since the 
Market began in 1998, all the electricity output from power generators in Queensland, NSW, 
Victoria, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania has been pooled 
(NEMMCO 2003). This includes outputs from Liddell and Bayswater power stations. The 
generators compete by providing offers and making bids for electricity supplies. When demand 
for electricity is low, the most cost-effective generating units are in operation. When demand 
starts to increase, the more expensive generating units are put into operation. This means that 
the generators have to constantly change their output, depending on whether or not their bid has 
been successful (Fetscher 2001). Also, the spot price of electricity (that is, the clearing price to 
match supply with demand) can change considerably for each half-hour period during the 
trading day. For example, the spot market price varied from a high of $113/MWh to a low of 
zero and averaged $22/MWh in 1996-1997 (Fetscher 2001). In 2001-2002, Macquarie 
Generation produced approximately 15% of the electricity consumed in the National Electricity 
Market (Macquarie Generation 2003). 
3.5.1.2 Water consumption and salinity generation 
Macquarie Generation is the largest single user of the flow of the Hunter River, at a rate of some 
60,000 ML per year (approximately 25,000 ML per year for Liddell's operations, and 
approximately 36,000 ML per year for Bayswater's operations), for steaming, cooling and other 
purposes (Macquarie Generation 2006). Macquarie Generation is restricted to extracting water 
from the Hunter River corresponding to the flood pulses in the River, or through special releases 
from Glenbawn dam in drought times. Although the Macquarie Generation's water needs 
represent just over 5% of the total average annual flow available (100 year average) of the 
Hunter River, it is comparable to the total abstraction by all irrigators from the River (NSW 
EPA 1994a). 
In addition to extracting water from the Hunter River, Macquarie Generation has the option of 
taking water from adjacent coal mines and pre-treating it or pumping it into Lake Liddell. 
However, at an operational cost of $100 per ML (excluding capital investment in pumps and 
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pipes for the coal mines) this option is regarded as too expensive to be economically viable 
(NSW EPA 1994a). 
Salinity in the Hunter River has implications for the power stations' water treatment practices 
and therefore the overall cost of using water withdrawn from the Hunter River and discharging 
wastewater to the Hunter River. By using a large volume of water withdrawn from the Hunter 
River for cooling and for producing steam for electricity generation, the power stations bring 
large quantity of salt into their systems. As described in Appendix 3, Macquarie's two power 
stations use a desalinisation process to remove the salt from the water. The products of this 
process are treated water and extracted salt. While the treated water returns to the cooling tower 
for re-circulation and becomes more saline again, the salt accumulates on site. Creelman (1994) 
estimated that each day Macquarie Generation's two stations have to store approximately 60 
tonnes of salt, equivalent to around 20,000 tonnes of salt annually. Thus, if the power stations 
could uptake water with less salt, they would accumulate less salt. Conversely, if salinity 
increases in their uptake water from the Hunter River, they will be forced to handle greater 
volumes of salt. The NSW DL WC (2003: 29) estimated that the cost to Macquarie Generation 
of an increase of 10 EC in the salinity of the water extracted from the Hunter River would be in 
the order of $180,000 per annum. 
Based on the above discussion, it may not be fair to regard the Macquarie Generation as a 
polluter, as the power stations actually reduce the net salt in the Hunter River through their 
water treatment process, and because the nature of the salt discharged from the power stations is 
exactly the same as that occurring naturally in the Hunter River. For example, in the 1999/2000 
financial year Macquarie Generation reduced the net salt in the Hunter River by more than 5700 
tonnes through its water treatment process (Macquarie Generation 2000). While it is unclear 
what happened to the solid salt produced by desalinisation, the prevailing methods for 
desalination plants dealing with the extracted salt include producing salt products or filling in 
land after it has dried out (see Appendix 3). Therefore, the main issue confronting the power 
stations is the salt load, that is, disposal of the extracted salt and discharge of the concentrated 
saline water off site. This is in contrast with the coal mines, where the main concern is the 
disposal of excess water with little concern about the salt load. 
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3.5.1.3 Discharge of saline water 
Discharge of saline water from Macquarie Generation's two power generations to the Hunter 
River (via Bayswater Creek) is currently regulated by the NSW EPA discharge licencing system 
and the HRSTS. In general, controlling the saline water from Lake Liddell is much easier than 
controlling the mine water of coal mines because of its 152 GL of storage capacity. As a 
comparison, Macquarie Generation discharged a total of approximately 27 GL6 of saline water 
into the Hunter River during the whole PHRSTS period from 1995 to 2002 (NSW DLWC 1995; 
1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 200la; 2002), which is far less than the storage capacity of 
Lake Liddell. The large capacity of Lake Liddell makes the withholding of saline water for 
Macquarie Generation flexible. 
Also, in regard to the concentrated saline water, Macquarie Generation has the technical 
capacity to operate without discharging saline water off site. For example, based on the HRSTS 
Annual Report (NSW DL WC 2002), no salt was discharged by Macquarie Generation to the 
Hunter River in 2002. Even so, discharge of saline water could bring Macquarie Generation a 
significant benefit. The NSW EPA (2001: 6) estimated that the discharge of saline water could 
save Macquarie Generation between $100/ML and $400/ML in treatment costs. 
3.5.2 Redbank power station - a new development under the PHRSTS 
Redbank Power Station is a new development that has occurred since the inception of the 
PHRSTS. Joining the power generating industry in 2000, Redbank Power Station is the 
youngest coal-fired power station in the Hunter region. The normal capacity of electricity 
generation of Redbank Power Station is 130 MW (Redbank Power Station 2007). Redbank 
Power is also important to local development, producing over $10 million a year to the local 
economy and providing more than 250 employment opportunities (Redbank Power Station 
2007). 
The water needed for the operation of Redbank Power Station is sourced from controlled release 
of the Glenbawn and Glennies Creek dams, and this water is purchased from the DLWC. 
Similar to the Liddell and Bayswater power stations, Redbank also relies on the Hunter River 
6 This is estimated based on a total of 43154 tonnes salt into the Hunter River during the period of 1995 to 2002 
(NSW DLWC 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 200la; 2002) and average discharge concentration of3833 
mg/L reported in Macquarie Generation's Annual Return during the same time. 
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for water supply and wastewater discharge. The river water is pre-treated to produce clean water 
for Redbank' s operational uses. This water is recycled many times before it is discharged into 
the Hunter River. While the total treatment capacity is not known, it is known that cooling water 
is cycled throughout Redbank power generator at 400 ML/day, and the water is recycled as 
many as 14 times (Redbank Power Station 2007). Like the two Macquarie power stations, the 
salt that Redbank discharges to the Hunter River is the same salt that it draws from the Hunter 
River; nevertheless, the quantity of the salt discharged is less than that received from the River 
due to the salt being removed by the water pre-treatment. According to the HRSTS Annual 
Report (NSW DLWC 2001a; 2002), Redbank Power Station discharged a salt load of 227.8 
tonnes in 2001 and 354 tonnes in 2002, accounting for 1 % and 62%, respectively, of the total 
salt load discharged by the Hunter industries in the corresponding years7• 
Because it is a new development, information about the operation of Redbank Power Station is 
sparse. Despite some innovative features in this Station, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
basic operation system used by the Macquarie power stations also applies to Redbank Power 
Station, and therefore that the new Redbank Power Station will also receive significant benefits 
if it discharges the saline water to the Hunter River instead of treating it on site. 
3.5.3 Relationship between coal mines and power stations 
The power generating and coal mining industries in the Hunter Valley have a long-term, close 
relationship. This relationship can be viewed from the following two perspectives. 
Firstly, the coal needed for the power stations is all sourced from the mines in the Hunter 
region. A demand-supply relationship between the power stations and the local mines has been 
maintained for many years. Macquarie Generation is the biggest coal consumer in the Hunter 
region. As a general rule for black coal generators, dividing GWh of electricity produced by two 
will give an approximate number of millions of tonnes of coal consumption (J. Devine [Public 
Affairs Manager, Macquarie Generation] 2003, email comm., 15 Dec). For example, 20 GWh is 
produced from approximately 10 million tonnes of coal. In 2006, 13 million tonnes of coal were 
consumed for the generation of electricity at its Liddell and Bayswater power stations 
(Macquarie Generation 2006). Statistical information from NSW DMR (1991; 1992; 1993; 
1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003) shows that the coal used to 
7 The total salt discharged by the PHRSTS participants in 2001and2002 amounted to 22337 tonnes and 571 tonnes, 
respectively. 
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produce electricity by the Liddell and Bayswater power stations is sourced from nearby coal 
mines. Five coal mines, Bayswater, Cumnock No. 1, Drayton, Hunter Valley Operations and 
Ravensworth-Narama, were the major coal suppliers during 1993 to 2002. Several other coal 
mines, such as Nardell, Ravensworth-east, Muswellbrook No.2 and Mt Arthur Coal, have 
entered the supply chain in recent years. 
Secondly, the power stations and coal mines have combined to make a joint effort in water 
management. One example is that Macquarie Generation takes excess mine water from adjacent 
coal mines and treats the water to supplement their own water intake from the Hunter River. In 
this way, the coal mines reduce the need (and maybe the cost) for discharging saline water into 
the Hunter River, and the power stations obtain extra water for their operations when the river 
flow is too low to be extracted (Macquarie Generation 2003). Another example is Redbank 
Power Station delivers its treated water to the Warkworth Coal Preparation Plant for 
Warkworth's operations (Redbank Power Station 2007). This relationship between the power 
stations and coal mines has had some effects on the PHRSTS credit trading, which will be 
discussed in detail in Section 5.3. 
3.5.4 Agricultural effects on river salinity 
In addition to industrial sources, agricultural activities can also result in saline water intrusion 
into river systems. In the case of the Hunter catchment, due to its specific soil and hydraulic 
conditions as noted in Section 3.1.1, this is likely to occur through dryland salinity and 
irrigation salinity. Dryland salinity occurs in non-irrigated areas where native vegetation has 
been replaced with smaller leaf canopy and shallow-rooted annual crops and pastures, or has 
been lost due to clearing, overgrazing or erosion. Irrigation salinity is usually caused by excess 
irrigation, inefficient water use and poor drainage in agricultural practices. In spite of the 
different causes, both dry land salinity and irrigation salinity have the same direct result of 
raising water tables and in tum have implications for river salinity. As water tables rise, more 
salt will be discharged into river systems and then carried downstream. Both dryland and 
irrigation salinity could contribute to increases in salinity in the Hunter River (NSW DL WC 
200 lb). 
Irrigation practices in the Hunter Valley mostly rely on the main surface water, but much 
alluvial groundwater is also used to supplement surface water in dry periods (Creelman 1994). 
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This groundwater will enter into the river system with rainfall runoff, and in tum increase the 
likelihood of river salinity problems developing. This discharge, along with discharge from 
natural causes and dry land and irrigation salinity described, are the diffuse discharges of salt in 
the Hunter region. As these diffuse discharges are not currently regulated and not included in 
the PHRSTS (NSW DLWC 2001b), they are beyond the scope of this study. 
3.6 Social impacts of the Hunter River salinity 
Salinity in the Hunter River has negative impacts on agricultural production, urban and other 
industries' water uses and aquatic ecosystems. 
Natural river salinity has few effects on aquatic ecosystems and human health. However, in the 
presence of elevated salinity, some negative impacts appear. Although understanding of the 
effects of salt on natural systems is generally poor, it has been recognised that adverse impacts, 
particularly on irrigated agriculture, are likely to occur when salinity concentrations reach 1500 
EC over certain periods of time (NSW DL WC 2003). For some sensitive plants, such as rice 
and horticultural crops, the yield is affected by saline water at levels as low as 700 EC (Croft & 
Associates 1983). This may explain why 700 EC was used as the threshold of river salinity 
standard under the TD system (NSW EPA 1994a). Higher salinity will also restrict the potential 
uses of river water for livestock watering and human consumption. As well, higher salinity will 
incur additional water treatment costs for municipal and industrial water users. The costs of 
infrastructure operation and maintenance will rise due to increased corrosion and wear on 
facilities caused by high salinity (AGC Woodward-Clyde 1992). 
Prior to the late 1970s, little was known about the impacts of mining activities on the water 
quality of the Hunter River. Though some knowledge was acquired in the course of preparing 
the Environmental Impact Statements for the mines (for example, Coal & Allied Operation 
1980; Croft & Associates 1984) and from sporadic government surveys, it was only in the early 
1980s that substantive studies (for example, Croft & Associates 1983; AGC Woodward-Clyde 
1992; NSW EPA 1994a; Hunter Water Quality Task Group 1994) were undertaken. From these 
studies, it was recognised that industrial saline water discharged to the Hunter River without 
restriction could result in elevated salinity concentrations in downstream reaches and in tum 
cause negative impacts on agricultural production, urban and other industries, as well as aquatic 
ecosystems. It is difficult to separate the impacts of discharges from individual sources, but two 
studies have estimated the overall social cost of higher salinity. 
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The earliest attempt at estimating the cost relating to the elevated salinity in the Hunter River 
was that undertaken by Croft & Associates (1983 ). However, the focus of the study was solely 
on the impacts of salinity on agricultural outputs. It concluded that although the threshold 
tolerance level, the maximum level of salt that plants can tolerate without causing a reduction in 
yield, varied among different crops and growth stages, water with conductivity between nil and 
700 EC can be used for irrigation of most crops on most soils with little probability of damage. 
The study also found that increases of 10% to 20% above these values may have little effect if 
accompanied by favourable weather conditions and appropriate irrigation management. These 
findings formed the basis for setting up salinity objectives for the Hunter River before 1995, as 
will be described in Chapter 4. 
AGC Woodward-Clyde's study (1992) was a subsequent attempt to estimate the damage costs 
of incremental salinity for the Hunter River. It used the damage parameters from the Murray-
Darling Basin Commission's SALTCOST model and proportioned them by the number of 
urban, non-urban and irrigation users of the Hunter River (AGC Woodward-Clyde's study 
1992). The study estimated that the annual cost of an increase of 1 EC, starting from a 
conservative threshold of 600 EC, was $10,000 in 1992 prices for the Hunter River, of which 
$7000 was from urban users, $1200 from non-urban users and $1800 from irrigation (AGC 
Woodward-Clyde's study 1992). 
While identification of the salinity impacts reported in the AGC Woodward-Clyde's study 
(1992) seems more complete than that of Croft & Associates' (1983), the evaluation of these 
impacts appears oversimplified in the AGC Woodward-Clyde's study. For example, AGC 
Woodward-Clyde assumed a linear marginal social damage (MSD) function for the impact of 
river salinity. While this linear MSD function is appropriate when the river salinity is lower than 
a threshold of 1500 EC, beyond this threshold the MSD function may increase significantly due 
to catastrophic failure. Also, according to AGC Woodward-Clyde's estimation, the cost of 
higher salinity to urban users is far more than that to non-urban users and irrigation. However, 
only the conflict between industries and agricultural irrigations has been widely documented in 
the literature (see Section 4.2). The possible explanation for this could be that the effect of 
salinity represents a higher cost per person for irrigators than for urban users. 
There is still a substantial gap in the knowledge of the costs associated with elevated salinity in 
the Hunter River, and more research in this area is needed. Estimation of social cost associated 
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with Hunter River salinity will require substantial studies involving identification of damages 
and estimation of their market and non-market values. These studies will require extensive data 
and information and thus are well beyond the scope of this thesis. This study uses AGC 
Woodward-Clyde's estimation to calculate the social benefits derived from the improvement of 
river salinity under the PHRSTS, as will be discussed in Section 6.5. 
3.7 Summary 
The Hunter River exhibits a high degree of variability in its stream flows. The River also 
displays a high level of salinity due to the catchment's geological features. Whilst most of the 
salt in the River comes from natural sources, the discharge of saline water from mining and 
power generating industries contributes to the river salinity periodically. Salinity and volume of 
industrial effluent from coal mines in particular, flow and background salinity of the Hunter 
River and the impact of industrial effluent on other water uses of the River are all direct or 
indirect functions of rainfall. As such, they have an interactive and complex relationship. This 
has implications for management of industrial discharge, that is, both load of discharge and time 
of discharge need to be considered. 
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Chapter 4 Historical Perspective of Water Quality 
Management in the Hunter River 
The last chapter described the features of saline water discharged from the coal mines and 
power stations in the Hunter Region and their impacts on the river quality of the Hunter River. 
This chapter will review how some of the water quality management strategies discussed in 
Chapter 2 have been applied in the management of industrial discharge in the Hunter region. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the origins, evolution and institutional arrangements 
of the pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS). 
Section 4.1 gives a synopsis of the historical policies and initiatives for management of 
industrial saline water discharge in the Hunter region, and refers to some important events. It 
not only documents the history of people's understanding of the Hunter River, but also to some 
extent reflects the evolution of people's concepts of river quality management. Six main 
historical policies and initiatives will then be described in greater detail in Section 4.2 to Section 
4.7. This helps understand the features of the PHRSTS and identifies the conditions of 
alternative management strategies against which the PHRSTS can be compared in this study. 
4.1 Overview of strategies for water quality management in the Hunter 
River 
The strategies for managing industrial saline water discharge in the Hunter region have evolved 
over many years and have involved many entities, from local industries up to and including 
state authorities. At least four significant historical phases are apparent: the inclusion of quality 
management in quantity management; the domination of direct regulation; the exploration of 
flexible management strategies; and the application of economic instruments and regulations. 
4.1.1 Inclusion of quality management in quantity management 
Australia is a drought-prone continent. For decades prior to the 1970s, water management 
Australia-wide focused exclusively on water supply to meet the demands of various water 
needs. Water resources planning and development meant looking only for alternatives to 
increase supply through managing droughts and floods. There was no, or certainly little, attempt 
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to investigate what variables actually affect water uses. Management of river quality received 
scant attention until the late 1960s (Day 1986). 
The practices of managing water resources in the Hunter River reflected the trend nation-wide. 
Before 1970 emphasis on water quality problems in the Hunter River was not as strong as on 
droughts and floods, and little was known about the characteristics of surface and groundwater 
in the Hunter River. There was neither a specific administrative authority nor any legislation 
dealing with water quality issues in the Hunter Valley. Although the State Planning Authority 
(SPA)8 was established under the State Planning Authority Act 1963, its major responsibility 
was limited to static and detailed land use, and it had less concern for environmental outcomes 
caused by changes ofland use (Day 1986). 
In the late 1960s, with the increasing demand for water, the emphasis on water quality for 
diverse uses increased and legislation relating to the environment was separated from the 
planning legislation. The Clean Water Act 1970 was enacted: as the first legislation prescribing 
standards for ambient river quality and discharge limits of pollutants at outfalls, this Act 
represented a milestone, in highlighting water quality management in addition to water quantity 
management. It was then replaced by the Clean Water Act 1975 (Day 1986). At the same time, 
the State Pollution Control Commission (SPCC) was established and initially given 
responsibility for environmental impact assessments related to the administration of the Clean 
Water Act. Responsibility for administering the function of environmental impacts was then 
taken over by the Department of Environment and Planning (DEP) (Day 1986). 
4.1.2 Domination of direct regulations 
The 1970s and 1980s saw the domination of Command and Control (CAC) approaches in policy 
regimes for environmental quality management, at international, national and state levels. That 
was also the case for water quality management for the Hunter River. Subject to the Clean 
Water Act since the 1970s, the SPCC started to adopt a traditional licensing strategy to regulate 
industrial wastewater discharge to the Hunter River (Day 1986). This licensing system is 
known as Trickle Discharge (TD) because it is allowed industrial wastewater to be discharged 
into the nearest watercourse on a continuous, low-rate basis all year around, but with little 
dynamicism, that is, with little regard to changing river flow and background salinity conditions 
8 State Planning Authority (SPA) was replaced by the Department of Environmental and Planning (DEP), then by 
NSW EPA and now by the NSW Department of Environment and Climate Change (DECC). 
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(NSW EPA 1994a; Smith 1995). The TD gradually incorporated dynamicism into the system as 
it evolved over time from volume-based control to load-based control and incremental control, 
but was still an approximate static non-tradable permit (SN) program in the notation of Table 
1.1 in Chapter 1 of this thesis. The TD is used as a base against which the PHRSTS is compared 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
4.1.3 Exploration of flexible management strategies 
In the 1980s, enormous effort was put into exploring flexible strategies for managing the 
salinity of Hunter River as knowledge of the implications of the discharge of industrial 
wastewater for the river quality increased. A concept with a strong dynamic dimension, Staged 
Discharge, was developed. The underlying philosophy of Staged Discharge is to use the natural 
dilution capacity of the river to reduce the impact of industrial wastewater discharges on other 
water uses of the river (Croft & Associates 1983). Cost factors and conditions of the river, for 
the first time, were considered in the development of salinity management strategies. Staged 
Discharge will be described in Section 4.3. 
Several initiatives built on the concept of Staged Discharge were subsequently developed. These 
included Dilution Discharge (see Section 4.4), which was to reduce the impact of industrial 
wastewater discharge via river flow augmentation; the Three-tier Scheme (see Section 4.5), an 
integration of Staged Discharge, Dilution Discharge and Trickle Discharge; and Prioritised 
Discharge (see Section 4.6), a supplementary option which was to rank the firms' discharge 
priorities and allow them to share their discharge entitlements. The concepts of all these 
initiatives laid the foundations for the development and design of the later PHRSTS. 
4.1.4 Application of economic instruments 
PHRSTS represents a milestone of salinity management strategy moving from a traditional 
regulatory system to a market-based instrument (MBI). It is therefore important to examine 
what caused this movement. 
One of the major factors that catalysed a shift of policy focus from a regulatory system to a MBI 
was the influence of parallel international trends of application of MBis in environmental 
management regimes, instruments which gained popularity in the US where trading schemes 
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and other market-based programs gained credibility as an efficient way of delivering 
environmental improvements (Hahn et al. 2003). At the national level in Australia, the shift to 
including MBis in the field of environmental management reflected the same trend. The 1990s 
saw MBis begin to attract unprecedented attention of governments in Australia, both at federal 
and state levels, as potential tools for managing environmental problems (Brunton 1999; 
Environment Australia 1997; Whitten et al. 2003; Henderson and Norris 2008). Efforts were 
made to develop environmental policies that satisfied government and community aspirations 
for higher environmental standards without constraining economic development. 
At the same time and under the same influence, an interest grew in NSW government in 
application of MBis to achieve environmental objectives at reduced cost (Environment 
Australia 1997; Action Salinity & Water Australia 2002). The application of tradable permits in 
water quality management in the US generated strong interest in using tradable permits as part 
of the mix of instruments to manage the industrial saline discharge for the Hunter River. 
Another major factor that provided the necessary impetus for introduction of the PHRSTS was 
the desire of governments to solve the long-standing and increasing tension between local 
agriculture and industries over water quality in the Hunter River, and their recognition of the 
ineffectiveness of the existing regulatory system of the Trickle Discharge (TD). Governments 
expected the PHRSTS to achieve the environmental objectives in a cost-effective way for the 
overall community. 
A third major factor that further stimulated the development of PHRSTS was the Murray 
Darling Basin Salinity Scheme, a limited form of a tradable permits program managing the river 
salinity through salt credits and debits (Environment Australia 1997). In fact, a number of 
design elements of the PHRSTS were borrowed from the Murray Darling Basin Salinity 
Scheme (NSW EPA 1994a). 
A fourth contributing factor was the growing body of quantitative information about the Hunter 
River flows and salinity, as discussed earlier. This information helped provide a better and 
broader understanding of the implications of industrial discharge for the river salinity and its 
impacts on other water users, which in tum helped identify a range of water quality objectives. 
This information was a preliminary step towards designing the PHRSTS, which is a hybrid 
system that incorporates a tradable permits system into a dynamic permits system on the basis 
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of a regulatory system (see Chapter 1). Initiation of the PHRSTS will be described in Section 
4.7. 
Table 4.1 shows where the historical strategies and initiatives fit into the classes of discharge 
permits that were set out in Table 1.1. 
Table 4.1 Classification of the water quality management strategies for the Hunter 
River 
Static permits 
Dynamic permits 
SN= static non-tradable permits 
ST= static tradable permits 
DN = dynamic non-tradable permits 
DT = dynamic tradable permits 
Non-tradable permits 
(SN) 
Trickle Discharge 
Prioritised Discharge 
(DN) 
Staged Discharge 
Dilution Discharge 
HRSTS =Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
4.2 Trickle Discharge 
Tradable permits 
(ST) 
(DT) 
HRS TS 
Trickle Discharge (TD) was the dominant control system that was used to regulate industrial 
saline water discharge in the Hunter region from the 1970s to 1994. The licence conditions for 
industrial saline water discharge evolved over time as the NSW EPA increasingly recognised 
and gathered more knowledge about the effects of industrial saline water discharge on the water 
quality of the Hunter River. This evolution was also motivated by the growth in industries' 
applications for discharge licences, prolonged periods of drought, and uncertain prospects for 
future water quality changes in the Hunter River (Day 1986). Three stages were apparent in the 
licence conditions: limits on discharge volume; limits on discharge volume and concentration; 
and ambient and incremental limits (Smith 1995). The durations of these stages are displayed in 
Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Evolution of license conditions under the Trickle Discharge system 
Limits 
Discharge volume 
Discharge volume and concentration 
Ambient and incremental concentrations 
Sources: Adapted from Smith (1995) and D. Collins ([Executive Director Economics of the 
then NSW EPA] 2005, pers. comm., 30 Nov). 
4.2.1 Limits on discharge volume and concentration 
Initially, licenses only put a limit on the maximum daily discharge volume or/and discharge rate 
from a mine site. The reason for these limits was given as a need for reusing saline waters on 
site to reduce discharge. The actual limits were usually based on installed control capabilities, 
and were negotiable between the mines and the EPA individually (Day 1986). 
The licence conditions evolved further to include the control of discharge load, which is a 
combination of the limits of discharge volume and concentration. Licences stipulated not only a 
maximum daily discharge volume, but also the maximum salinity concentration of discharge. 
This was to ensure river salinity levels did not exceed the defined value immediately 
downstream of the discharge points. Limits on the discharge concentrations were set to prevent 
the discharge of highly saline wastewater produced by successive recycling in coal washeries 
(D. Chapman [Catchment manager, Hunter Catchment Trust] 2004, pers. comm., 1 March). The 
actual defined value of the river salinity immediately downstream of the discharge points for 
licensing purposes, nevertheless, was determined on a site-by-site basis in discussion between 
the EPA, DLWC (then the Department of Water Resources) and individual mines (Smith 1995). 
Up to then, the TD was a static non-tradable permits (SN) program (according to the notation of 
Table 1.1 in this thesis). 
However, one problem arose with the operation of the load control: although the licensees were 
entitled to discharge saline water to the river on a continuous "trickle" basis, the discharge was 
done with insufficient regard for the dynamicism of river flow, and ambient salinity status of 
contiguous or adjacent hydrological systems or of the cumulative effects. As shown in Section 
3.2, the Hunter River experiences large variations in river flow and in-river background salinity. 
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At times of very low flow when the Hunter River itself presented a naturally high salinity 
background and the need for agricultural irrigation was high, the discharge from industries 
formed a significant proportion of the total flow of the river, and river salinity could increase 
above the level recommended for irrigation. 
Throughout the 1980s, many farms reported significant reductions in pasture growth and even 
crop failure following irrigation with water drawn from the Hunter River. As this coincided with 
the growth phase of intensive mining activities in the Hunter region (see Section 3.4.1), the 
farmers believed that the mining industries should take the blame. The effects of increased 
salinity and the limits on the use of river water for agricultural activities brought local industries 
and the community into conflict (Harris 1998). In the late 1980s there had been increasing 
pressure from agriculture on industries and government to find ways of resolving the conflict. 
As the expansion of mining activities in the Hunter region continued, local agricultural and 
environmental organisations even called for a policy of Nil Off-Site Discharge to be applied to 
the new industrial developments. Considerable debates revolved around entitlement of 
discharge rights to the industries (E. Harris [Manager, Resource Assessment & Planning, Hunter 
Region, the former NSW Department of Natural Resources] 2003, pers. comm., 7 July). 
In the meantime, mining industries in the Hunter region were also confronting a dilemma. 
While some of the more modem mines had a water management system that would be able to 
comply with Nil Off-Site Discharge, this was not possible at all mines in the area. Such factors 
as high groundwater seepage into mine workings, on-site coal washing, dust suppression and 
limited capacity to build storage dams meant that these mines had more water than they could 
use or recycle at the mine sites (NSW EPA 1994a; Smith 1995). Croft & Associates (1983) 
estimated that 11 of the 19 coal mines in the Hunter Catchment at that time needed to 
periodically discharge excess saline water off-site into the Hunter River. In this situation, the 
industries called for practical and equitable arrangements for their wastewater discharge (Harris 
1998). 
The responses of various parties to this call were animated. Among others, three events in this 
regard were notable throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. One was that substantial research 
was conducted on the effect of industrial wastewater discharge on river salinity. In the early 
1980s, the NSW Minerals Council (then the NSW Coal Association)9 commissioned Croft & 
9 NSW Minerals Council is an industry association representing mineral exploration and production in the State. 
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Associates to carry out a study of salinity problems in the Hunter River and to find possible 
solutions for managing the industrial saline water discharge. The general conclusion of the 
study recognised the strong linkage between geology and salinity. The significant contribution 
of Croft & Associates' study (1983) was that it represented the first attempt to quantify the 
salinity inputs that come from excess mine water, natural salt discharge and agricultural 
irrigation. It was found that the contribution by the coal mines to the total salt load of the Hunter 
River was not significant overall, but the timing of saline water discharge was of concern. Based 
on this finding, Croft & Associates (1983) concluded that Staged Discharge, which was to 
schedule salt discharge at times of higher flow when the salt dilution capacity of the River was 
greater and the environmental and social impacts were minimal, was a cheap and viable means 
of disposing of excess saline water. Croft & Associates' study (1983) was one of the earliest and 
most influential studies of addressing the salinity associated with mining. It was also the first 
time that the concept of dynamic permits appeared in literature on the Hunter salinity 
management. The findings of Croft & Associates' study and the proposal for Staged Discharge 
became an important stepping stone for later studies and strategies for management of industrial 
saline water discharge in the Hunter River, including the HRS TS. 
Another notable event was that the NSW DLWC (then DWR) began research into salt 
behaviour in 1990, aiming to gain an understanding of agricultural practices and the 
implications of industrial discharge for river salinity (Harris 1998). The research made at least 
two main contributions to water quality management of the Hunter River. One of which is the 
detection of salt spikes. Previously it had been believed that a linear relationship existed 
between river flow and river salinity. As part of the research, probes were installed at key 
locations to record salinity continuously. Detection of salt spikes from the observations helped 
explain the cause of the high salinity of the irrigation water; this information helped improve the 
relationship between mines and water users. Since then, both parties have realised that they have 
a common goal: management of salt (Harris 1998). The other contribution was helping identify 
the value of real time monitoring, which in tum promoted the development of a more extensive 
salinity monitoring network in the Hunter catchment that provided complete daily salinity 
records in the key gauging stations (Harris 1998). 
The third important event that occurred in response to the conflict between the local agriculture 
and industries was that the NSW EPA (then SPCC) refined the licence conditions for discharge 
of industrial saline water over time. As each new industrial development was proposed, the 
NSW EPA set tighter limits on their saline water discharge, while existing industrial 
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developments were permitted to continue to discharge with less rigid restrictions (M. Bennett 
[Head of Regional Operations Unit, Newcastle Office of the former NSW EPA] 2003, pers. 
comm., 8 March). Bias against new market entrants was apparent. 
4.2.2 Ambient and incremental limits 
In the early 1990s, the NSW EPA started to impose ambient and incremental controls on new 
industrial developments. The new licences specified: 
• the limit of maximum river salinity after discharge as 700 EC, and 
• the limit of maximum allowable increase in river salinity caused by the discharge as 40 
EC (NSW EPA 1994a). 
The explanation for these changes was that setting an incremental limit was to prevent 
dischargers in the upper reaches of the River consuming the available discharge opportunities 
prior to the water reaching those downstream (NSW EPA 1994a). 
Although the ambient and incremental limits were introduced into the licensing system, they did 
not completely replace the initial limits placed on discharge volume and concentration. Rather, 
the ambient and incremental limits were among the components of the licensing system (as 
Table 4.2 illustrates). Consequently, by 1994 the licensing system was not really a coherent 
system, but an accumulation of historical licence conditions made for various firms at many 
different times, and which had generally not been changed over time. Even if all new licences 
comprised ambient and increment limits, most licences were still subject to the limits of 
discharge volume and concentration (D. Collins [Executive Director Economics of the then 
NSW EPA] 2005, pers. comm., 30 Nov). Therefore, the overall licensing system was still close 
to a static non-tradable (SN) control system. Only very few licences contained ambient and 
incremental limits and these were related to river flow. Any one particular firm may be subject 
to any components of the licence conditions. The Trickle Discharge (TD) will be used as a base 
against which the PHRSTS is compared in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The introduction of ambient and incremental controls was the first time in the history of Hunter 
River water quality management that quantitatively related the allowable discharge to the river 
flow conditions. Ambient and incremental control can clearly be seen as a version of dynamic 
discharge permits. However, this appears not to have been well recognised by the regulators. 
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For example, the NSW EPA (2001 :7) noted that " .... there was the system of combined ambient 
and incremental limits, known as the trickle discharge system: licences entitled licensees to 
discharge a small volume of saline water to the river at all times, regardless of river flow and 
salinity conditions." This gives an impression that the ambient and incremental control is a kind 
of static permit system. In order to clarify the nature of ambient and incremental control, I 
examined it in a rigorous way (see Appendix 4). This examination revealed that although limits 
of ambient concentration (700 EC) and incremental concentration ( 40 EC) are static in number, 
because river ambient conditions change, their effects on allowable discharges may be highly 
variable. Therefore, the control of ambient and incremental concentrations virtually embodied 
the nature of dynamic discharge control. 
The design of ambient and incremental control seemed conceptually appealing. However, 
further examination of the system reveals that it had at least two operational problems. The first 
problem is in regard to the equity of discharge. The ambient and incremental limits imply that 
when the in-river salinity had already exceeded the threshold of 700 EC, discharge was not 
permitted. Such a constraint did not reflect the actual flow conditions of the Hunter River and 
therefore resulted in few opportunities for discharge. This was particularly the case for those 
mines located in the lower reaches in which periods when background salinity of less than 700 
EC occurred were not long. By examining daily observations of river salinity of the Denman (in 
the upper sector of the Hunter River), Glennies/Hunter (in the middle sector of the Hunter 
River) and Singleton (in the lower sector of the Hunter River) gauging stations from 1995 to 
2002, I found that while a period of river salinity of less than 700 EC occurred at Denman more 
than 89% of a year, the periods at Glennies/Hunter and Singleton occurred approximately 40% 
and 50% of the year, respectively. Caution needs to be applied in the interpretation of these 
figures, however, because the daily salinity observations examined were actually the ambient 
salinity in the river after the input of industrial discharges, rather than the natural background 
salinity in the Hunter River. Even so, it is apparent that the opportunities for saline water 
discharge in the lower river sectors are far fewer than those in the upper river sectors. Thus, the 
equity of discharge entitlements for the industries is an issue. 
A second operational problem, which was identified by the NSW EPA (1994a), is in relation to 
the difficulty of monitoring and detecting non-compliance. Due to the limited monitoring of the 
Hunter River and the time delay between discharge into tributaries and full mixing in the river, 
it was almost impossible to accurately establish the size of the salinity increase caused by a 
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particular discharge. Thus, the ambient and incremental controls were difficult to regulate 
effectively. 
In spite of these problems, from the standpoint of river quality management, the evolution from 
the initial limits placed on discharge volume and concentration to the later ambient and 
incremental controls represented a forward step, from a static permit system towards a dynamic 
permits system. 
4.3 Staged Discharge 
As noted in Section 4.2, an increasing concern in relation to mining water discharge gave rise to 
Croft & Associates' study (1983) on the generation, treatment and disposal of saline mine 
water. The study examined various technological options available for either treatment or 
disposal of saline water, such as a pipeline to the sea, evaporation basins, deep well injection, 
and desalination, and concluded that all these options were either too costly or would produce a 
highly concentrated brine solution as a by-product, whose disposal off-site would still pose 
problems. Accordingly, Croft & Associates (1983) advocated tackling the impact of industrial 
wastewater discharge on river quality with a strong dynamic dimension. Thus, the strategy of 
Staged Discharge was initiated. 
Under the Staged Discharge scheme, mine water was proposed to be discharged in a controlled 
manner so that all the irrigation requirements of agricultural activities, reservoir releases, 
discharges of coal mines and water extraction of power stations would be coordinated with 
rainfall, river flow and in-river salinity. The study by Croft & Associates (1983) claimed that 
the Staged Discharge would be the most economically and environmentally efficient solution to 
dispose of saline water from coal mines among all the other options mentioned above. However, 
the study did not provide any in-depth cost analysis of the various technical options to 
substantiate the claim. 
Following the recommendations of Croft & Associates' study, in 1983 the NSW Minerals 
Council (then NSW Coal Association) approached the NSW EPA (then the SPCC) with a 
proposal for a joint study with the DLWC (then Water Resources Commission) to develop an 
operational scheme of Staged Discharge. However, the proposal did not proceed because it was 
decided at that time that the relatively insignificant contribution by the mines to river salinity 
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did not warrant the effort and expense of developing the scheme (D. Chapman [Catchment 
manager, Hunter Catchment Trust] 2004, pers. comm., 1 March). 
In the early 1990s, the need to develop strategies for the disposal of excess mine water was re-
emphasised, driven by a number of factors. On one side, mining in the Hunter region, at both 
existing and proposed mines, especially for the open-cut mines, was continuing to expand since 
the rapid growth in the 1980s. The proportion of open-cut mines to the total number of mines in 
the Hunter Valley increased from 26% in 1980/81 to 47% in 1992/1993 (NSW Minerals 
Council 2001). As noted in Section 3.4.3, open-cut mines are more prone to production of 
excess saline water than underground mines. With the general trend of existing open-cut mines 
going to greater depths, higher groundwater inflows were being encountered. The situation was 
further exacerbated as the whole Hunter catchment experienced above-average rainfall in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (AGC Woodward-Clyde 1992). The coal mines thus faced increasing 
difficulty in managing saline water on site and were eager to find a resolution to disposing of 
the saline water off site. One the other side, the then dominant application of Trickle Discharge 
(TD) was not curtailing the increase of the river salinity (see Section 4.2). The environmental 
effectiveness of the TD was questioned and the more effective strategy of managing industrial 
discharges, such as Staged Discharge, was invoked. 
In this context, the NSW EPA approached the NSW Minerals Council (then NSW Coal 
Association) to commission AGC Woodward-Clyde to assess the feasibility of Staged 
Discharge of saline water from the mines (AGC Woodward-Clyde 1992). AGC Woodward-
Clyde (1992) concluded that Staged Discharge would be feasible if there were no incremental 
limits on river salinity placed on the firms. Given the difficulties in meeting both ambient and 
incremental limits on river salinity by Staged Discharge alone, the study also conducted an 
investigation into the effectiveness of Dilution Discharge, which was to use releases from the 
Glenbawn Dam to dilute mine water discharges. The study asserted that the diluting effects of 
Glenbawn Dam water would increase the opportunities for discharging saline water (AGC 
Woodward-Clyde 1992). 
Both Staged Discharge and Dilution Discharge are versions of Dynamic Discharge, whose 
underlying philosophy is to allow more wastewater to be discharged when river flow is high. 
The only difference is that, while Staged Discharge uses the natural dilution capacity of the 
river, Dilution Discharge increases the diluting effects of the river by artificially increasing the 
river flow. 
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4.4 A trial of Dilution Discharge 
In spite of AGC Woodward-Clyde's study indicating the effectiveness of Dilution Discharge, 
the Hunter's farming community was suspicious about the applicability of this option in practice 
(Harris 1998). Coincidently, almost at the same time (late 1992), several mines expressed 
concerns that they would not have the capability to store their excess mine water under the 
existing TD system if a significant rainfall event occurred (Harris 1998). Both the suspicions 
and this concern gave rise to a trial of Dilution Discharge organised by DLWC (then DWR) for 
one month from January to February 1993 (NSW EPA 1994a; Harris 1998). The following 
description of the Dilution Discharge trial is summarised from the post-trial report produced by 
the Hunter Water Quality Task Group (1994). 
The objectives of the trial were multiple. The foremost objective was to test the feasibility of the 
method of hands-on control of mine water discharge combined with the release of clean water 
from the storage dams in the catchment. Other objectives included testing the accuracy and 
effectiveness of procedures being developed in the Hunter Valley to monitor and forecast water 
quality factors such as salinity, and encouraging community involvement in developing 
solutions to regional water quality problems (Hunter Water Quality Task Group 1994). 
The trial was designed to coordinate the releases from Glenbawn Dam, the rate of water 
extraction by the two power stations owned by the Macquarie Generation (then Pacific Power), 
and the discharge of saline water from coal mines, so as to keep river salinity at the Singleton 
gauging station below a threshold of 900 EC (Hunter Water Quality Task Group 1994). This 
threshold was set as a result of extensive community consultation. It later became the river 
salinity objective in the FHRSTS (see Section 5.1). Benefits were anticipated for both power 
stations and coal mines. Because the releases from the dam have a relatively low level of 
salinity compared to the Hunter tributaries, this would allow the power stations to access water 
at times oflow salinity, and in tum reduce the cost of water treatment and the cost of disposal of 
salt residues. For the coal mines, this could dilute the high-salt mine water, allowing mines to 
discharge excessive amounts of water and thence reduce on-site storage to manageable levels. 
The releases of fresh water from Glenbawn Dam began on 20 January 1993 (Hunter Water 
Quality Task Group 1994). The water was jointly paid for by mining companies. Macquarie 
Generation also ordered a high volume of water from Glenbawn Dam, which coincided with the 
trial, to assist with dilution of the saline mine water. Extensive rainfall occurred after these 
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releases in the Hunter tributary catchment. This resulted in an excess of water within the system. 
The trial started with all mines discharging to maximum capacity, and gradually reducing as the 
flows from the tributaries fell (Hunter Water Quality Task Group 1994). To facilitate the trial, 
the NSW EPA relaxed the restrictions on daily discharge rates, and ambient and incremental 
limits as specified in the discharge licenses for the duration of the trial (Harris 1998). 
The trial helped elucidate the impact of industrial wastewater discharge on river quality and 
greatly improved understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship of river salinity. A salt 
spike was clearly observed in the trial: at the beginning, the storm plus the release of dilution 
water flushed accumulated salt from the river streams, resulting in short, sharp increases in 
salinity levels. As the trial progressed, the dilution of in-river salt became more effective, since 
the water flows gradually stripped salt out of the river (Harris 1998). This observation indicated 
the best timing of purchasing dilution water, suggesting that a significant amount of dilution 
water could be saved if it was used to extend the time of natural high flow events, called 
"freshes", instead of being used at the time of low river flow events (E. Harris [Manager, 
Resource Assessment & Planning, Hunter Region, the former NSW Department of Natural 
Resources] 2003, pers. comm., 7 July). 
The trial also indicated that the Dilution Discharge approach was very promising from an 
environmental perspective. It allowed 1005 ML of mine water, equivalent to 2233 tonnes of 
salt, to be discharged. This represented 15% of the total mine water that needs to be discharged 
into the Upper Hunter every year10 (Hunter Water Quality Task Group 1994). Notwithstanding 
the fact that the strategy was environmentally promising, the operational feasibility of Dilution 
Discharge depended upon a number of factors. 
One of the factors was the amount of water required for the dilution versus the amount of water 
available from the dam. AGC Woodward-Clyde (1992) estimated that a release of some 30,000 
ML from Glenbawn Dam (15% of the annual demand for water from the reservoir for all uses) 
would be required to dilute a discharge of 1,500 ML of mine water (33% of the total annual 
requirement for all coal mines). Smith (1995) estimated that an additional 100% and 160% over 
total water allocation in 1995 would be required to dilute the industrial discharge to a salinity 
level of 900 EC at the Singleton gauging station. This volume of dilution water would not be 
reliably available. 
10 Based on this figures, I calculated that the total saline water the mines need to discharge is approximate 6700 
ML/year with an average salinity concentration of 3703 µSiem. 
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Another factor is weighing up the value of the reservoir water for diluting flows to coal mines 
against other alternative water uses. Dilution water is only needed when river flow is low and 
background river salinity is high while the industries have to discharge excess saline water. This 
is often the time when agricultural activities have a high need of water. Although there is no 
information on the value of the dam water to coal mines versus that to other alternative water 
users, there is no doubt that the use of water for diluting industrial wastewater during droughts 
itself could be politically sensitive. Even if the required volume of dilution water is available, 
concerns could arise that water downstream of mine discharge points would be unsuitable for 
higher value uses. 
Even if the above two factors were not in question, the cost of the provision of dilution water to 
the industries could become problematic. It was estimated that the firms could incur costs in the 
range of $0.36 million/year (NSW EPA 1994a) to $3.35 million/year (Smith 1995), contingent 
upon the security of water supply, as well as threshold of the river salinity to be achieved and 
the inclusion of power stations. For these reasons, both the NSW EPA and the industries 
believed that Dilution Discharge could only be used as a supplementary component of a broad 
salt management strategy. 
Even so, the trial had a number of merits. It helped shift the community's opinion into accepting 
the concept of real time management for river quality, which consequently promoted the 
development of a monitoring network across the whole Hunter catchment (Harris 1998; NSW 
DL WC 2000b ). The result of the trial also made the community agree to a higher salinity 
threshold in higher river flows (see Section 5.1.1). The salinity target of 900 EC (instead of 
previous 700 EC) at Singleton has been adopted since then. In addition, the continuous 
monitoring records collected in the trial provided an invaluable scientific base for the 
development of an Integrated Quantity and Quality Model (IQQM) for the Hunter River (Hunter 
Water Quality Task Group 1994). The IQQM is now used to predict discharge events and 
estimate the daily salt discharge permits in operation of the HRSTS, as will be discussed in 
Section 5 .1. 
4.5 Three-tier Scheme 
Immediately after the trial of Dilution Discharge, as one of a wide range of options for mine 
water disposal investigated by the coal mining industry, the NSW Coal Association (1993) put 
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forward a proposal for a Three-tier Scheme in the coal mines of the upper Hunter. The Three-
tier Scheme was not put into force for unknown reasons, but as many of its design elements 
form the basic design of the latter PHRSTS, it is worth describing this schetne here. Much of the 
remainder of this section is drawn from the proposal by the NSW Coal Association (1993). 
The underlying consideration of the Three-tier Scheme was to allow site-specific regulations to 
be set according to the location and nature of the discharge points, through integration of a high 
rate of discharge, Trickle Discharge (TD), and Dilution Discharge. In the Three-tier Scheme, 
TD was proposed for those mines with a relatively small volume of excess saline water and 
which therefore had a small capacity in their existing storage dams. For those mines with 
substantial discharge requirements, the rule of "high rate of discharge during freshes" would be 
applied (NSW Coal Association 1993). 
The definition of discharge rate and flow threshold of a "fresh" thus becomes the central issue 
of this rule. In principle, a "fresh" should be defined in a way that, when it occurs, dilution 
capacity is high, background river salinity is low, and little use of river water is required for 
agricultural irrigation, so that discharge of substantial amounts of saline mine water will not 
significantly affect river quality. Clearly, the higher the river flow rate chosen, the less frequent 
and reliable its recurrence interval will be, and the fewer will be the discharge opportunities. In 
other words, river flow rates with more frequent recurrent intervals will provide greater 
reliability and a higher safety factor for the disposal of industrial wastewater, while rates with a 
lower recurrence will cause greater reliance upon other disposal options. Therefore, a balance 
needs to be found that will provide a reasonable degree of reliability, but still accord with the 
basic tenet of mine discharges during periods when irrigation demand is low. 
In the proposal for the Three-tier Scheme, two criteria for defining the threshold of a "fresh" 
were recommended. First, a river flow rate was to be chosen so that it would recur at least three 
times per year in average rainfall years. Correspondingly, a high discharge rate was to be set to 
ensure that mines have the opportunity to dispose of all excess water on at least three occasions 
per year in an average year (NSW Coal Association 1993). Second, a high river flow rate was 
required to ensure that mine discharges could be carried to the sea within a relatively short time 
and would not pool or back up in the estuary region (NSW Coal Association 1993). Based on 
these criteria, a river flow rate of 2000 ML/day at Singleton gauging station, along with 
corresponding flow rates at other key control points, was proposed as the threshold to define a 
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"fresh" for the purpose of industrial discharge. These thresholds of river flows were later 
adopted by the PHRSTS to define the High flow periods (see Section 5.1). 
In using this design, the frequency of freshes should be sufficient to permit total discharge three 
times per year in average rainfall years. During extended drought periods, however, the 
frequency of freshes is reduced, and this may not meet the requirements of industrial discharge. 
That is where the third element, Dilution Discharge, was proposed to be brought into the Three-
tier Scheme. Dilution Discharge was included to serve as a safety valve during extended periods 
of low river flow. This would allow the mines to plan an overall site water management strategy 
with the degree of certainty necessary to justify the capital expenditure (NSW Coal Association 
1993). Based on the proposal, two ways of managing dilution water were proposed for the 
Three-tier Scheme, building on the observations of the trial of Dilution Discharge. One way 
allowed mines to coordinate their discharges with special releases of water from the Glenbawn 
Dam, to meet the supply requirements of the two power stations of Macquarie Generation (then 
Pacific Power) (NSW Coal Association 1993). The other way allowed mines to purchase 
dilution water to extend the duration of naturally occurring freshes, to provide sufficient time 
for the mines to discharge all excess water. Dilution water could be purchased by either a group 
of mines acting in concert or by a single mine, provided that the mine(s) could demonstrate a 
need for wastewater disposal that could not be met in any other way (NSW Coal Association 
1993). Either way, the timing and flow rate of individual mine discharge needed to be carefully 
managed by the DL WC (then DWR) on the basis of the information generated by the 
monitoring network. 
4.6 Prioritised Discharge 
The proposition of Prioritised Discharge, described in the following, had little direct relevance 
to the PHRSTS. I cite it here for completeness, and to show the exploration of alternatives and 
the broadening orientation that occurred to address the salinity issue for the Hunter River. 
The proposition of Prioritised Discharges was as an alternative to Dilution Discharge if a long 
interval between events of high river flow were to take place whilst the mines were incapable of 
managing their saline water on site (NSW EPA 1994a). It was initially suggested by an irrigator 
in a meeting of stakeholders organised by the Hunter Catchment Management Trust in early 
1990s (D. Chapman [Catchment manager, Hunter Catchment Trust] 2004, pers. comm., 1 
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March). This idea might have arisen as a result of the extraction licences regulating water uses 
of the Hunter River. While the water is supplied on a security basis, the priority of wastewater 
discharge for this option was proposed to be based on the degree of reliability of use of the 
discharge permits. That is, coal mines with high priority permits were allowed to discharge first. 
If the level of river salinity is still below a specified ambient limit or an incremental limit, those 
coal mines holding the next level of priority permits can then follow. The process continues on 
until the river salinity reaches the limit. Noticeably, mines with high priority permits with no 
immediate need to discharge could transfer their permits to other coal mines (NSW EPA 
1994a). 
The Prioritised Discharge conveyed the idea of sharing the entitlements of discharge. However, 
it left a series of design and operational questions open. For example, how many salt load (for 
example, tonnes/day) is a firm allowed to discharge? How can the order of discharge priority be 
determined? How do mines transfer their permits of higher priority to those with lower level of 
priority permits? Clearly, answers to these questions are closely associated with the issues of 
discharge rights: defining discharge rights; allocating discharge rights; utilising discharge rights; 
and transferring discharge rights. As will be described in Section 5.1, PHRSTS provided 
answers to these questions. 
4.7 Initiation of the pilot HRSTS 
The scope of any environmental policies is determined to a large extent by the political views of 
the key governments of the time. With the PHRSTS, there exists arguably a political impetus to 
establish a water quality trading scheme. The international and domestic trend of the increasing 
application of market -based instruments (MBls) in the regime of environmental management 
gave the NSW governments a strong interest in introducing the PHRSTS. The NSW Cabinet 
Office coordinated a study by NSW EPA (1994a) to investigate the potential use of tradable 
discharge permits to manage industrial discharge in the Hunter Region. In early 1994, the NSW 
EPA conducted a scoping study to examine the applicability of an effluent trading scheme for 
managing salinity of the Hunter River. The scoping study clarified the aim of the HRSTS. 
Borrowing the operational information from the Murray-Darling Scheme, the scoping study also 
developed the framework for the HRSTS. Six months later, a draft operational plan for the 
PHRSTS followed (NSW EPA 1994b). The concepts from all the strategies described 
previously were taken into the draft operational plan and blended to produce the comprehensive 
mechanisms of the PHRSTS, which will be elaborated in Chapter 5. This made the PHRSTS a 
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unique dynamic tradable permits (DT) control system. After some refinements of the draft 
optional plan, a Guideline and Rulebook (NSW EPA 1995) was released, and the PHRSTS was 
established. 
The PHRSTS started on 1 January 1995. It was initially designed as a one-year pilot program. 
The purposes of the one-year trial were multiple, including allowing the participating firms to 
become familiar with the Scheme and enabling them to make necessary alterations in response 
to the new regulatory system, testing the technical requirements of the Scheme and trialling the 
salinity credits (NSW DL WC 1995). However, it was expected from the outset that the Scheme 
would continue beyond the one-year pilot period subject to the modifications set down by the 
review of its operation (NSW DL WC 1996). When the operation of the Scheme in its first year 
was reviewed, it was decided that the pilot period would be for an additional year, given that 
there had been no high rainfall periods to adequately test the Scheme in 1995 (NSW DLWC 
1996). 
After that, the mechanisms of the PHRSTS were reviewed and further refined, and the pilot 
period of the Scheme was extended several times. On 1December2002, the PHRSTS was made 
permanent via the Protection of the Environmental Operation Hunter River Salinity Trading 
Scheme Regulation 2002 [Regulation 2002] (NSW EPA 2002). The PHRSTS thus ran from 1 
January 1995 to 30 November 2002. 
4.8 Summary 
The strategies of water quality management for the Hunter River have evolved over time as 
people's understanding of the Hunter River and the needs of industry developed. Before the 
inception of PHRSTS in 1995, the industrial saline water discharges in the Hunter River were 
predominately regulated by the Trickle Discharge (TD) system. This system allowed industrial 
wastewater to be discharged on a continuous and low-rate basis, but with little regard to the 
river conditions and cumulative effects of salinity. Although the TD evolved over time 
incorporating dynamicism into the system, it still approximated a static non-tradable permits 
(SN) control system. TD provides a base against which the PHRSTS is compared in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
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Over time, a number of strategies were proposed for management of river salinity of the Hunter 
River. These include Staged Discharge, which was to utilise the natural dilution capacity of the 
river to reduce the impact of industrial discharge; Dilution Discharge, which was to reduce the 
impact of industrial discharge via river flow augmentation; the Three-tier Scheme, an 
integration of Staged Discharge, Dilution Discharge and TD; and Prioritised Discharge, which 
was to rank the firms' discharge priorities and allow them to share their discharge entitlements. 
Although these strategies were never put into force, they laid the foundations for development 
and design of the PHRSTS. 
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Chapter 5 Mechanisms and Operations of the PHRSTS 
This chapter consists of three sections. Section 5 .1 describes and interprets the main 
mechanisms and rules of the PHRSTS. Section 5.2 examines the operational aspects of the 
PHRSTS. The focus of this section is the analysis of the credit trading market, drawing on the 
evidence on trading volumes and on the pattern of PHRSTS participants' trading activities. 
Section 5 .3 describes two credit auctions conducted in 2004 and 2006, and provides a 
preliminary analysis of the implications of the PHRSTS participants' behaviour in the auctions 
and the credit trading markets 
5.1 Mechanism of the PHRSTS 
The PHRSTS began operating 1 January 1995. Its stated objective was ''to manage the saline 
water discharges so as to minimise impacts on irrigation, other water uses and on the aquatic 
ecosystems of the Hunter River catchment, at least overall cost to the community; in an 
equitable and flexible manner; and in a way that provides ongoing financial incentives to further 
reduce pollution" (NSW EPA 1995: 1 ). To achieve this objective, the PHRSTS was designed to 
take the concepts from the strategies described in Chapter 4 and blend them to produce a 
comprehensive mechanism. PHRSTS rules have been well documented in the Guideline and 
Rulebook of Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (NSW EPA 1995). This section outlines 
and explains the main elements of these rules. 
5.1.1 Main elements in the PHRSTS rules: sectors, flow periods and blocks 
As stated in Section 3.4.5, both the amount and timing of industrial discharges are important to 
the salinity level in the Hunter River. Thus, discharge permits are ideally defined in a 
heterogeneous way over space and time. The PHRSTS achieved this by regulating the industrial 
discharges from both spatial and temporal perspectives, which are summarised in Table 5.1. A 
worked example of how the industrial discharge controlled by the PHRSTS is illustrated in 
Appendix 6. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of PHRSTS salinity targets and discharge rules 
River Location Control River Flow (ML/day) Salinity 
Sector stations Low High Flood target 
(EC) 
Upper Muswellbrook - Denman <600 600-2,000 > 2,000 600 
Denman 
Middle Denman- Glennies < 800 1,800- > 6,000 900 
Glennies /Hunter 6,000 
Creek/Hunter 
River junction 
Lower Glennies Singleton < 2,000 2,000- >10,000 900 
Creek/Hunter 10,000 
River junction -
Singleton 
No Dynamic Effectively 
Discharge rules discharge tradable unlimited 
(see Section 5.1.3) discharge discharge 
(subject to (subject to 
the river the 
salinity maximum 
objectives volumetric 
being met) discharge 
rates being 
met) 
Source: Adapted from NSW EPA (1995) 
In regard to the spatial perspective, the river is divided into three sectors: Upper, Middle and 
Lower; the gauging stations at Denman, Glennies/Hunter River and Singleton are the control 
stations for these river sectors, respectively. 
Each of the river sectors has different salinity objectives (NSW EPA 1995). There is no detailed 
discussion in the literature justifying these threshold values. NSW EPA (1994b) noted that the 
salinity objectives being built on the long-term averages of river salinity were derived from 25 
years of monitoring records, advice from the NSW EPA and State Fisheries, and consultation 
with water users and the community. The limit of 900 EC on river salinity at Singleton, the 
furthest downstream control station, was established to ensure it would not exceed values that 
could detrimentally affect riverine ecosystem and irrigated crops grown within the area. 
Obviously, these objectives were set up based on Marginal Social Damage (MSD) function 
alone as discussed in Section 2.1.3. The apparent (but not real) relaxation in environmental 
standards that the 900 EC limit entailed, compared to the 700 EC limit under TD mentioned in 
Section 4.2, is discussed in Section 5.1.2. 
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The salinity objective of the Upper river sector (600 EC) is lower than that of the Middle (900 
EC) and Lower sectors (900 EC). The rationale for this is two-fold: firstly, the ambient salinity 
at the reference point of the upper sector is the background salinity of the downstream sector. A 
stricter salinity objective is set for the upper sector to ensure that upstream releases will not 
restrict discharge opportunities for downstream locations (NSW EPA 1994b). In this way, 
environmental bias towards the downstream sources (see Section 2.2.4.2) could be avoided. 
Secondly, because of a comparatively lower salinity background in the upper sector, restrictions 
on the industrial dischargers would be easier than the restrictions on the dischargers further 
downstream (NSW EPA 1994b). 
In regard to flow perspective, the river flows are divided into three periods: Low, High and 
Flood flow periods, the rules for which are explained in Section 5 .1.3. The threshold flows that 
define these periods vary by river sectors (NSW EPA 1995), as shown in Table 5.1. The NSW 
EPA (1994b) explained that these threshold values were developed in close consultation with 
water users and the community. The values for High and Flood river flows, during which 
industrial discharges are permitted, were determined based on advice from irrigators that flows 
of this magnitude usually follow general rain in the catchment and that irrigation was thus not 
needed. It is documented in the HRSTS Annual Report (NSW DL WC 1995) that, initially, the 
threshold value of High flow at Singleton was set at 3000 ML/day. After observing the flow 
events, some farmers commented that 3000 ML/day was too high and could be lowered. The 
comments were then examined at the end of 1995 by the NSW DL WC, and the threshold of the 
High flow period for Singleton was reduced to 2000 ML/day (NSW DLWC 1995). Since then, 
this figure has been kept for the remainder of the period of the PHRSTS. 
In regard to the temporal perspective, the river flow is divided into blocks. A block is the 
amount of water that the Integrated Quantity and Quality Model (IQQM) predicted will pass the 
Singleton gauging station during a 24-hour period (NSW EPA 1995). Thus, there are 365 blocks 
within a year. As flows combine from different tributaries along the course of the Hunter 
mainstream, blocks will not be consistently Low, High or Flood flow as they move down the 
river, and may last more or less than 24 hours. For example, a block classified as Low flow in 
the Upper sector could be classified as High flow in the Middle sector and then as Flood flow in 
the Lower sector as the river gains water going downstream. 
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5.1.2 Why are some salinity objectives laxer under PHRSTS than TD? 
As noted above following Table 5.1, from the increase of the salinity ambient limit from 700 
EC under the Trickle Discharge (TD) to 900 EC under the PHRSTS, it appears paradoxically 
that the salinity objective could be regarded as being laxer under the PHRSTS than under the 
TD. But this is not actually the case, for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the salinity objective of 900 EC only applies to some river sectors (for example, the 
Middle and Lower river sectors) at particular periods (for example, the High and Flood periods). 
Whilst the limit on discharge of industrial saline water during the Low flow period is much 
stricter under the PHRSTS (that is, no discharge was permitted) than the TD (that is, continuous 
low-rate discharge was permitted), the salinity objective for the Upper river sector (that is, 600 
EC) is stricter under the PHRSTS than the TD (that is, 700 EC). 
Secondly, relaxing some salinity ambient limits from 700 EC under the TD to 900 EC under the 
PHRSTS does not mean a major increase in social damage cost. Figure 5.1 below depicts how 
the social costs change in response to river conditions. It shows marginal social damage (MSD) 
functions under different river flow periods: MSDL applies to Low river flow periods, and MSDH 
and MSDFapply to High and Flood river flow periods, respectively. MSDL lies above MSDH and 
MSDF, showing that for any given level of ambient salinity in the River, social damages are 
greater in Low flow than in High and Flood flows because there are more water users (for 
example, irrigation) in the lower river flows than in the higher river flows. Furthermore, MSDL 
is steeper than MSDH or MSDF, showing that the impact of the increase of one unit of salinity in 
the River in Low flow period will be greater than in High and Flood flow periods. This Figure 
helps understand the movement of river salinity standard from 700 EC all year round under the 
TD to 900 EC in High and Flood flow periods under the PHRSTS. While the social cost of 700 
EC under Low flow might be much greater than under High/Flood flows, the difference in 
social costs of High/Flood flows between the river salinity of 700 EC and 900 EC could be 
modest. 
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Figure 5.1 Social costs of elevated salinity in the Hunter River 
MSDL =marginal abatement cost at low river flows 
MSDH = marginal abatement cost at high river flows 
MSDF =marginal abatement cost atjloodriver flows 
MSD1.. 
5.1.3 Rules of discharge for Low, High and Flood flow periods 
The PHRSTS's embodiment of the nature of dynamic permits is implemented through defining 
different discharge rules in three flow periods: no discharge in the Low flow period; limited 
discharge in the High flow period; and potentially unlimited discharge in the Flood flow period, 
as already shown in Table 5.1 and now explained in more detail. 
For any High flow block, the PHRSTS limits the industrial salt load discharges at two levels. At 
the aggregated level, total allowable discharge (TAD) in tonnes/day is introduced to specify 
"the maximum amount of salt which, if discharged, would result in the river not exceeding 900 
EC at Singleton" (NSW EPA 1995:13). The TAD is dynamically determined by the flow 
conditions and in-river salinity levels and thus varies on a daily basis. At the individual firm 
level, the salt load discharge is subject to the salt credits held by the firm, which will be 
discussed in detail in Section 5.1.4 below. 
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Although the PHRSTS itself allows its participants to discharge an unlimited amount of salt 
load into any Flood flow block, the discharges are still required to meet a prevailing condition 
set down in each discharge licence that is formally called the maximum discharge rate (NSW 
EPA 1995). This can be confusing, and we call it here the maximum volumetric discharge rate, 
because it is measured in ML/day, and specifies only the maximum daily volume of saline water 
that is allowed to be discharged by a licence holder from each licensed point, but does not limit 
the salt load in that volume. Maximum discharge rate is usually set for mines as several mines 
usually discharge into the same tributary. The discharges could come simultaneously from the 
mines and the upstream catchment. The maximum discharge rate is set in accordance with the 
physical features and capacity of the river or tributary stream at the discharge point to avoid 
erosion and flooding problems (M. Bennett [Head of Regional Operations Unit, Newcastle 
Office of the former NSW EPA] 2003, pers. comm., 8 March). The maximum discharge rate 
overrides the PHRSTS rules (NSW EPA 1995). This means, no matter what flow period the 
river is in and how many credits a discharger holds, the maximum discharge rate cannot be 
exceeded. 
In addition to the discharge rules presented above, licensed dischargers are also allowed to 
purchase dilution flow, termed a bonus discharge entitlement, to supplement their discharges 
under the PHRSTS (NSW EPA 1995). This is a special release of water from the NSW 
DLWC's storage that creates an additional discharge opportunity for those dischargers who 
have extra discharge needs. To ensure the normal discharge opportunities are not diminished 
and the salinity objectives of each sector are not breached, the minimum amount of an 
entitlement should be sufficient to dilute the extra discharge (NSW EPA 1995). To this end, 
while the bonus discharge will not affect credit holders who are not involved in the purchase, 
the full benefit will only accrue to those who have paid for it. 
5.1.4 Initial allocation of salt credits 
The total allowable discharge (TAD) is a key determinant of the aggregate level of discharges 
from all the PHSRTS participants. The way that it is allocated can potentially change the way in 
which the participants operate on a day-to-day basis and affects decisions regarding 
investigation into saline water reduction. Under the PHRSTS, salt credits are used to facilitate 
the sharing of the TAD. In 1995, NSW EPA created 1000 credits in total for the whole river, 
each of which entitles discharge of0.1% of the total allowable salt load discharge into a specific 
block of river flow (NSW EPA 1995). Based on the discharge rules stated above, credits are 
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only required for the discharges into High flow blocks, but not for Low and Flood flow blocks. 
Moreover, because the TADs of High flow blocks are themselves dynamically determined by 
the river flow and in-river salinity conditions, the currency of a credit, defined here as the 
amount of salt load that one unit of salt credit allows the PHRSTS participants to discharge, also 
varies from time to time. 
As discussed in Section 2.3 .5 .1, the method of allocating the initial permits is the most 
important and controversial aspect in the design of an effluent trading program. Like most 
environmental trading programs (OECD 1999), the NSW EPA also adopted the grandfathering 
approach to allocate initial discharge permits at the beginning of the PHRSTS in order to 
increase industries' acceptance of the program and to ensure a high degree of government 
control over the distribution of the allocation. There were 20 participants (19 coal mines and 
two power stations of Macquarie Generation11) at the start of the PHRSTS (NSW EPA 1994b). 
The NSW EPA allocated 800 of the total credits (80%) to these participants using the 
grandfathering approach (NSW EPA 1995). Rather than using historical discharge records as 
the criteria for allocating the credits to the participants, the NSW EPA developed a 
comprehensive score system that took into account the production outputs, the social 
contribution (that is, employment), environmental performance, discharge needs and the control 
capacities of each participant (NSW EPA 199 5). 
The distribution of initial allocation of salt credits is set out in Appendix 5 and summarised in 
Table 5.2. Among these 800 credits, 571 credits (57% of the grand total) were allocated to the 
coal mines and 229 credits (23%) to the two power stations. The NSW EPA reserved the 
remaining 200 credits (20%) for future use for new developments (NSW EPA 1995). By doing 
so, according to the NSW EPA's point of view, the economic bias against new sources was 
avoided (NSW EPA 2001). The NSW EPA did not accept the alternative point of view that 
since all dischargers, existing or new, have to pay the same opportunity cost for a credit, there is 
no marginal bias against new sources. The reserved 200 credits also served as a buffer for safety 
provision to ensure the achievement of the river salinity objectives by the PHRSTS. 
The NSW EPA has since then allocated 70 out of these 200 reserved credits to two new 
developments (33 credits to Bengalla Coal Mine in 1998, and 37 credits to Redbank Power 
Station in 2001) free of charge under the PHRSTS. Also, during the period of the PHRSTS the 
11 Two power stations of Macquarie Generation are treated as one participant. 
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NSW EPA allocated a total of 43 extra credits to some existing participants, such as Nardell 
Coal Mine and Hunter Valley Coal Mine, due to their progression to advanced mining stages. 
As a result, by 30 November 2002 (end of the PHRSTS), NSW EPA only held 87 reserved 
credits. This had a potential for a net increase of salt discharge from the industries into the 
Hunter River, in turn diminishing the environmental effectiveness of the PHRSTS. 
Table 5.2 Initial allocation of credits 
Entity Allocation Year of allocation 
Coal mines 571 1995 
Macquarie's two power stations 229 1995 
Redbank Power Station 37 2001 
Bengalla Coal Mine 33 1998 
To some existing participants 43 2001 
EPA in hand 87 30/11/2002 
Total 1000 
Sources: Compiled from data from NSW EPA (1995); NSW DLWC (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 
l 999a; 2000a; 2001 a; 2002). 
Importantly, when the credits were allocated, not all of the coal mines that participated in the 
PHRSTS held discharge licences. The mines without discharge licences were the modem mines 
whose water management systems were able to manage excess saline water on-site and thus did 
not need to discharge it off-site (EPA 1994b). However, these mines were still allocated the 
same amount of credits as the smallest positive discharge source (NSW EPA 1994b). Based on 
the information provided in HRSTS Annual Report (NSW DLWC 1995), among the initial 800 
salt credits, 599 were allocated to licensed mines and power stations, and 201 to mines without 
discharge licenses. This had an immediate effect on the utilisation rate and value of salt credits, 
which will be discussed at length in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.4.3. 
As stated in Section 2.3.5.l on the design elements of a tradable permit program, the life of the 
permits ideally needs to be clearly defined when they are initially allocated. However, the 
lifetime of the initially allocated salt credits appeared ambiguous and uncertain, at least for the 
first few years of the PHRSTS. The main reason for this was that the pilot period of PHRSTS 
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itself was uncertain when it was introduced and involved several extensions over time. 
Uncertainty over the lifetime of the initial salt credits may have had an effect on the 
performance of the credit trading market: this will be examined in depth in Section 5 .3. 
5.1.5 Rules of credit trading 
Tradability of the salt credits is the other principal component of the PHRSTS, in addition to 
their dynamicism. While each PHRSTS participant is entitled to discharge a share of total 
allowable discharge (TAD) according to the number of salt credits that they hold, they are 
allowed to trade their credits with others subject to NSW EPA approval. Thus, the salt credits 
traded in the PHRSTS trading markets represent a one-time right to discharge saline water into a 
certain water block of the Hunter River. This differs from the salt credits in the Formalised 
Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (FHRSTS) auction markets, which represent an ongoing 
discharge right to the Hunter River over a ten- year period (see Section 5.4.2). Based on the 
HRSTS Guideline and Rulebook (NSW EPA 1995), participation in trading by individual firms 
is voluntary. Trades can be permanent (for the remaining life of the credits) or temporary (for a 
specified number of blocks), but must be of whole credits and for whole blocks. There are no 
specifications related to banking or borrowing in the PHRSTS rules. 
As described in Section 2.3.5.2, effluent trading has the potential to induce the risk of "hot 
spots" where discharges are concentrated. The PHRSTS applied a sector credit discount factor 
(NSW EPA 1995) to ensure that the credit trading does not result in the salinity objective being 
exceeded in any river sector. As the currency of a credit (that is, permits) is dynamically 
changed in response to the actual river flow conditions and in-river salinity and is defined in a 
combined time (that is, a block of water) and space (that is, river sectors) unit, the salinity 
objectives are binding at every point in time and at any place. 
To sum up, the PHRSTS represents a mix of conventional command-and-control (CAC ) 
regulations and market-based instruments (MBis): while the dynamicism of discharge permits 
defines the time of discharge and the amount of total allowable discharge within the time frame, 
their tradability determines both who can discharge and the amount of discharge from 
individuals through an exchangeable permits system. At the same time, licence conditions 
specify the volume limits of discharge, and the option of bonus discharge allows extra discharge 
through the augmentation of river flow. The integration of all these components distinguishes 
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the PHRSTS from any other water quality trading programs throughout the world, such as Fox 
River Wisconsin, Tar-Pamlico North Carolina and Lake Dillon Colorado, Cheery Creek 
Colorado and Chesapeake Bay (Jarvie and Solomon 1998; Woodward and Kaiser 2002; 
Kraemer et al. 2004 ). 
5.1.6 Monitoring and reporting 
Administration of the PHRSTS involved the NSW DL WC, NSW EPA and HRSTS Steering 
Committee 12 , each playing a different role in the operation of the PHRSTS. The DL WC 
provided river monitoring, modelling and registering. The NSW EPA provided licensing 
regulation, the credit register and an exchange facility. The main rules of the Steering 
Committee included overseeing the financing of the Scheme, technical issues related to 
discharge monitoring, review of scheme performance, and integration of the Scheme with other 
water management programs (NSW EPA 1995). 
As noted in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the DLWC now has an extensive monitoring network in the 
Hunter River. To manage the PHRSTS, the DL WC developed a comprehensive real time 
monitoring system, known as the Hunter Integrated Telemetry Scheme (HITS). Four basic 
parameters, river flow, river salinity, water temperature, and rainfall intensity, at 24 gauging 
stations throughout the Hunter catchments were monitored in 5-10 minute intervals. These data, 
along with the integrated Quantity and Quality Model (IQQM) developed by the DL WC, were 
used in the PHRSTS to assess and forecast tributary inflow routing to predict river flows and 
salinity and to identify discharge events and calculate the total allowable discharge (TAD) of 
High flow blocks. This information was promptly communicated to the firms through an 
electronic communication system (NSW EPA 2001). 
The DL WC also measured the rates and salinity concentrations of the industrial discharges at 
the discharge points of individual fi"rms. In the meantime, the PHRSTS participants were 
required to continuously monitor their discharge volume and salinity concentration at discharge 
points in the event of discharge. They were also required to monitor river flow and salinity 
upstream and downstream of the discharge points in the Hunter mainstream and tributaries 
(NSW EPA 1995). Supply of these monitoring data to the DL WC was compulsory to assist 
river modelling calibration and discharge opportunity predictions. 
12 The steering committee comprised the representatives from licence holders, irrigators, NSW EPA; DLWC and the 
Hunter River Catchment Management Trust. 
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In addition to these monitoring data, each participant was required to submit Annual Returns to 
the NSW EPA for recording and auditing purposes. The Annual Returns consist of: (1) a 
Discharge Worksheet for each block into which discharge was made, which records the block 
number, number of credits available, salt discharge permitted, volume discharge limit, actual 
discharge starting and ending time, and actual discharge volume and concentration; (2) a Credit 
Transfer Form and Trading Record Sheet for each trade made, which document trading date, 
the number of river blocks, number of credits traded, and trading partners; and (3) a Discharge 
Record Sheet for each discharge, which contains information on block number, TAD of the 
block, number of usable credits, duration of the discharge, discharge volume, and salinity 
concentration (NSW EPA 1995). 
The NSW EPA reserved the right to refuse to approve any credit trade that could lead to an 
excessive concentration of credits in any one sector of the river. The EPA was able to punish 
PHRSTS participants who failed to abide by the Scheme rules or the licence conditions relating 
to the Scheme by revoking, suspending or reallocating their credit holdings (NSW EPA 1995). 
However, no punishment has been documented in the HRSTS Annual Reports (NSW DL WC 
1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999;2000a;200la;2002). 
It is important to note that the costs for the credits traded, if any, are not required to be reported. 
As will be discussed in Section 5.3 and 5.4, because the information on trading prices was not 
available, this study has used other information, such as the auction prices of salt credits 
generated from the 2004 and 2006 auctions under the Formalised Hunter River Salinity Trading 
Scheme (FHRSTS), to examine the PHRSTS trading market. Under the FHRSTS, trading prices 
are still not disclosed. The information on trading prices of salt credits, along with the 
information on auction prices, is important to be able to understand the PHRSTS trading market 
and the FHRSTS auction market. So it is in the public interest to make this information publicly 
available. 
5.2 Operation and implementation of the PHRSTS 
This section examines the operational performance of the PHRSTS over its lifespan from 1 
January 1995 to 30 November 2002, focusing on occurrences of Low, High and Flood river 
flow periods, the distribution of the salt load discharges, transaction costs, and the credit trading 
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market. Specific examination of environmental and economic performances of the PHRSTS 
will be presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, respectively. 
When undertaking the formalisation of the HRSTS, the NSW EPA (2001) reviewed the 
PHRSTS from a number of aspects, including environmental outcomes, new developments and 
credit trading. However, the NSW EPA's review only focused on the facts, rather than 
analysing the reasons behinds the facts. The examination of the PHRSTS in this section focuses 
on various aspects of the trading market. The new additional findings from this study will enrich 
the evidence on the PHRSTS operation and contribute to the continuing development of the 
Formalised Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (FHRSTS). They will also help to interpret 
the research findings from Chapters 6 and 7. 
For the examination, the hydrological and water quality data, such as daily river flow and 
salinity at the Singleton gauging station, were obtained from the NSW DL WC. The discharge 
data (that is, daily total allowable discharge permits and daily salt load discharge of each 
PHRSTS participant) and credit trading data were all obtained from the HRSTS Annual Reports 
of 1995-2002 (NSW DLWC 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001a; 2002). 
5.2.1 Occurrences of river flow periods 
Examination of the PHRSTS operation in this study starts with an evaluation of the accuracy of 
Integrated Quantity and Quality Model (IQQM)'s prediction of river flow periods. This is 
important as the operation of the entire Scheme is based on the accurate and reliable 
measurement of river flow and salinity, from which the prediction of discharge opportunities 
and issue of discharge permits is derived. 
The qualitative flow periods (Low, High and Flood) chosen for the PHRSTS operation on the 
basis ofIQQM predictions over the period January 1996 to November 2002 (that is, 2526 days 
in total) are available in the HRSTS Annual Reports of 1995-2002 (NSW DLWC 1995; 1996; 
1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001a; 2002). Comparing these data with the actual monitoring flow 
data obtained from the DLWC, this study found that, as shown in Tale 5.3, during 1996-2002, 
the average accuracy rate of river flow prediction was 93.7%. In other words, the error rate of 
river flow prediction was as low as 6.3%. Among these errors, 3.4% comprise those that 
predicted Low flows, but where the actual events were either Flood or High flows. Though 
reducing the discharge opportunities, such errors guaranteed river salinity objectives will not be 
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breached. In comparison, 1.8% of errors comprise those that predicted High or Flood flows, 
where the actual events were Low flows. Such errors are of concern because they are likely to 
cause the exceedance of river salinity objectives. Closer examination of the monitoring data of 
river salinity reveals that none of exceedance of the salinity objectives was caused by such 
prediction errors. 
From the above discussion, the IQQM model is considered accurate in a qualitative sense. As 
the forecasted river flow data is not available, this study is unable to make any comment on its 
quantitative accuracy. 
Table 5.3 Comparison of predicted and actual daily river flows at Singleton gauging 
station 
Predicted river flows Actual river flows Number of % Accuracy /Errors 
days 
Flood 46 1.82 Accurate 
Flood High 11 0.44 Riskv error 
Low 4 0.16 Riskv error 
Flood 17 0.67 Safe error 
High High 172 6.81 Accurate 
Low 42 1.66 Riskv error 
Flood 4 0.16 Safe error 
Low High 81 3.21 Safe error 
Low 2149 85.08 Accurate 
Total 2526 100.00 
Source: Compiled from data provided by the NSW DL WC in 2003 
This study has examined the daily observations of river flow at Singleton provided by the NSW 
DLWC in 2003. It shows that over a total of 2891 days in January 1995 to November 2002, 
approximately 88% of the time (2545 days) the River was in the Low flow period, during which 
no industrial discharge was allowed. Industrial discharge was allowed for only 12% of the time, 
of which 2.33% (68 days) was in the Flood flow period and 9.58% (278 days) in the High flow 
period. The days of Flood, High and Low flow periods in each year from 1995 to 2002 are 
summarised in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 Distribution of river flow periods against years 
Flood flow High flow Low flow Total 
Portion Portion Portion 
Days (%) Days % Days % Days 
1995 1 0.27 14 3.84 350 95.89 365 
1996 8 2.19 12 3.28 346 94.54 366 
1997 5 1.37 11 3.01 349 95.62 365 
1998 26 7.12 84 23.01 255 69.86 365 
1999 1 0.27 32 8.77 332 90.96 365 
2000 21 5.74 58 15.85 287 78.42 366 
2001 6 1.64 58 15.89 301 82.47 365 
200213 0 0.00 9 2.69 325 97.31 334 
Total 68 2.35 278 9.62 2545 88.03 2891 
Sources: Compiled from date from NSW DLWC (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001a; 
2002) 
5.2.2 Salt load discharge 
This study also examined the discharge of salt load from individual firms documented in the 
HRSTS Annual Report of 1995-2002 (NSW DLWC 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 
2001a and 2002). It found that during January 1995 to November 2002, the PHRSTS 
participants discharged an aggregated amount of 93420 tonnes salt load to the Hunter River. 
This represents 5.74% of the total salt in the River during the same period. The total salt in the 
River, denoted SR, is calculated based on the monitoring data of daily river salinity and flow 
provided by the DL WC, using the following formula: 
2891 
SR= /~)ec1 x flow 1 ) [5.1] 
t=I 
where/ is the conversion factor between EC and mg/L. In general, 1EC=0.6~0.68 mg/L. For 
the Hunter River,/= 0. 6 applies (NSW EPA 1995). ec1 is daily river salinity at Singleton (EC), 
and flow 1 is daily river flow at Singleton (ML/day). t refers to any day during the PHRSTS. 
There were 2891 days in total during the PHRSTS from 1 January 1995 to 30 November 2002. 
13 2002 refers to the period from 1 January 2002 to 30 November 2002. 
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The distribution of the aggregated salt load discharged from the PHRSTS participants among 
the river flow periods and across the years is provided in Table 5.5. Within this aggregated salt 
load, 53% was discharged in the Flood flow period, 43% in the High flow period and 4% in the 
Low flow period. The occurrence of industrial discharge in the Low flow period was due to the 
errors of flow event prediction shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.5 Actual salt discharge versus allowable salt load discharge 
Actual salt discharge (tonnes) Total 
allowable 
discharge 
of High Utilisation 
flow rate of 
Low flow High flow Flood flow Total (tonnes) credits 
Year (L) (H) (F) (L+H+F) (TAD) =HITAD 
1995 1050 1985 453 3488 13264 15% 
1996 1140 487 2580 4207 2403 20% 
1997 0 1315 2634 3949 5752 23% 
1998 36 8642 25055 33733 66573 13% 
1999 734 3837 894 5466 32152 12% 
2000 280 7572 11817 19669 66239 11% 
2001 80 16185 6071 22337 44562 36% 
2002 55 517 0 571 6204 8% 
Total 
(tonnes) 3375 40541 49504 93420 237149 17% 
% 4% 43% 53% 100% 
Source: Compiled from data from the NSW DLWC (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 
200la; 2002). 
Comparing the daily total allowable discharge (TAD) and daily actual salt load discharge during 
the High flow period documented in the HRSTS Annual Reports of 1995-2002 by NSW DL WC 
(1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001a; 2002), this study calculated the utilisation rate of 
credits, which is defined as the percentage of the actual aggregated salt discharged by the 
PHRSTS participants on any High flow day over the TAD issued by the NSW EPA on that day. 
The result is presented in Table 5.5, showing that the average utilisation rate of credits during 
the PHRSTS was only 17%. The low utilisation rate may explain the low credit auction prices, 
which will be discussed in Section 5 .4.3. 
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The low utilisation rate can be attributed to a number of factors. First, as the NSW EPA 
reserved 20% of the credit at the initial credit allocation (see Section 5.1.3), even if the PHRSTS 
participants had used their credits to their full extent, their utilisation rates of the total credits 
would have been only 80%. Second, as noted in Section 5.1.3, among the credits (800 credits) 
that were initially allocated to the PHRSTS participants, 25% (201 credits) were allocated to 
mines without discharge licences due to having no need for discharge. Some of these credits 
were not used during discharge events. This fact might be responsible for the low utilisation rate 
of credits to some extent. The above two factors are the result of the method used to allocate 
initial salt credits. The third factor is that the TAD was only required for discharges into High 
flow periods. As the majority (53%) of the salt discharges occurred in Flood flow periods when 
unlimited discharges of salt were allowed, the need for discharging salt load in a High flow 
period was reduced. This further decreased the utilisation rate of credits. 
The low utilisation rate of salt credits eventually led to an initiative by the NSW EPA to 
reallocate the credits, which were initially allocated to the firms using the grandfathering 
approach, through periodic public auctions after 2002 under the FHRSTS (NSW EPA 2001; 
NSW EPA 2002). Section 5.3 will review the credit auctions in detail. 
5.2.3 Transaction costs 
As discussed in Section 2.3.5.4, information searching, bargaining and decision-making, and 
monitoring and enforcement are the three main sources of transaction costs associated with 
environmental trading programs. In the case of the PHRSTS, the major part of the transaction 
costs arose from the initial cost of setting up the monitoring network and installing an electronic 
communication system, as well as the continuing operational costs associated with all the 
administration activities described Section 5 .1.6, such as monitoring, information flow and 
reporting. 
In the first three years of the PHRSTS, the DL WC notified the PHRSTS participants of the 
discharge events and TAD through radio and telephone systems. NSW EPA processed credit 
trading based on paper-work (NSW DLWC 1995; 1996; 1997). Since 1998, the information 
about discharge events and TAD was released in a daily River Register maintained on the 
HRSTS official website, enabling participants to promptly identify their needs for discharge 
against their permitted discharge (NSW DLWC 1998). The EPA also developed a 24-hour on-
line credit exchange programme. This assisted the firms in identifying potential trading partners 
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quickly and easily and enabled the firms to trade their credits at any time in response to 
changing river flows and the need to discharge (NSW EPA 2003a). Provision of the on-line 
credit exchange programme has reduced the search and information transaction costs and in tum 
contributed to the active PHRSTS trading market. 
The NSW DLWC and EPA bore the initial cost of setting up the monitoring network and 
installing the electronic community system, but information on these costs is not available. The 
PHRSTS participants were required to share the continuing operational cost in the form of a 
contribution fee based on their credit holdings (NSW DLWC 1995). Table 5.6 provides a 
comparison of contribution fees paid by the PHRSTS participants and the actual cost of 
operating the PHRSTS from 1997 to 2002. The contribution fee then moved from cost-sharing 
toward cost-recovery with the formalisation of the HRSTS. In line with the Regulation 2002, 
the operational cost of the Scheme has been shared equally between credit holders and discharge 
licence holders since 1 December 2002. The contribution fees in relation to savings in the 
damage costs and total control cost derived from the PHRSTS will be discussed in Sections 6.5 
and 7.2.4. 
Table 5.6 Sharing of transaction costs under the PHRSTS 
Finical year Contribution Total credits Cost per Actual cost of Cost recovery 
fee($) ofPHRSTS credit operating the (%) participants ($/credit) scheme($) 
1997/1998 125,000 833 150 168,524 74% 
1998/1999 125,000 833 150 179,175 70% 
1999/2000 167,000 833 200 NA NA 
2001/2002 355,996 913 390 NA NA 
2002 200,200 913 219 200,200 100% 
Total 973,196 221.8 NA NA 
/average (total) (avera2e) 
NA =not available 
Source: Compiled from data provided by the NSW DL WC in 2003 
5.3 Credit trading market 
An important reason for using discharge trading rather than conventional command-and-control 
(CAC) regulation of individual firms is that the flexibility provided by trading can reduce the 
overall cost of achieving the required reduction in aggregate discharge. The key to a successful 
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water quality trading market is the existence of a large number of pollution sources whose costs 
of pollution abatement vary from relatively low to very high for participating in the trading 
activities in a competitive manner. Accordingly, in examining the PHRSTS trading market in 
this study, two main questions are posed in relation to the functioning of the trading market: 
• Did the PHRSTS trading appear active? 
• Did the PHRSTS appear efficient? In other words, did the pattern of trades on the PHRSTS 
credit trading market appear to shift from the firms with higher MACs to those with lower 
MA Cs? 
To answer the first question, this study examined the PHRSTS credit trading market from three 
aspects: volume of trades; the number of trading participants; and pattern of the trades. The 
analysis in this section was based on data drawn from the HRSTS Annual Reports of 1995-2002 
(NSW DLWC 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001a; 2002). However, it is difficult to 
accurately trace individual participants' trading behaviour for several reasons. One important 
reason is the inconsistency in the names of trading participants. The names of some participants 
documented in the trading records varied from year to year. While the parent companies' 
names14 were used in some years, the firms' names were used in other years. This situation 
became more complicated as from time to time some participants changed ownership, some 
changed their names, some merged with others and some ceased operations. 
Another reason is the unclear documentation of credit movements in the trading records. Based 
on the trading rules stated in Section 5.1.5, credit trades can be permanent (for the whole life of 
the credits) or temporary (on the basis of blocks). While the vast majority of the actual trades 
were temporary ones between participants, some permanent credit transfers occurred between 
firms owned by the same parent company. In addition, while new firms were free to enter into 
the PHRSTS trading market through private negotiations directly with other firms, NSW EPA 
allocated 70 out of its 200 reserved credits to two new developments (37 credits to Redbank 
Power Station; 33 credits to Bengalla Coal Mine) free of charge (see Table 5.2). Also, during 
the period of the PHRSTS the NSW EPA allocated a total of 43 extra credits to some existing 
participants (see Table 5.2). The fact that these credit movements were not explicitly indicated 
in the trading records increases the difficulty of using the data for this analysis. 
14 A parent company may own several firms. 
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This study made every attempt to reconcile inconsistencies with the data and to present the most 
accurate portrait of the PHRSTS trading behaviour. For example, the changes of names and 
ownership of participants were clarified through cross-checks with documents in the NSW Coal 
Profile (NSW DMR 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2001), their annual reports and website, as 
well as the NSW Minerals Council (P. Smith [Assistant Director, Environment, NSW Minerals 
Council] 2003, pers. email. 16 September). Some "suspicious" trading records were cross-
checked with the original trading data spreadsheet obtained from the NSW DL WC and the 
participants' Annual Returns stored at the NSW EPA Newcastle office. 
Before moving on to the detail of the analysis, note that in this analysis of the trades, a single 
trade refers to one transfer of credits from one participant to another. Various trading activities 
were shown on the trading records. For example, there were cases where one participant 
transferred a group of credits belonging to more than one block (known in the trade as "bulk" of 
credits) to another participant. In these cases, it is defined as one trade. There were also 
occasions where one participant transferred credits on the same block to several other 
participants. On these occasions, this is defined as several trades. In this analysis, a permanent 
credit transfer is also treated as one trade. Table 5. 7 presents the number of trades and credits 
traded in each year during the whole lifespan of the PHRSTS, based on data drawn from the 
HRS TS Annual Reports of 1995-2002. The numbers of High-flow and Flood-flow days are also 
included in the Table for comparison purposes. 
Table 5.7 Trading records in 1995 -2001 
Year Number of trades Number of credits traded Flood flow days High flow days 
1995 1 1 1 14 
1996 2 55 8 12 
1997 0 0 5 11 
1998 20 904 26 84 
1999 18 953 1 32 
2000 31 1540 21 58 
2001 69 2638 6 58 
2002 16 720 0 9 
Total 157 6811 68 278 
Sources: Compiled from data from NSW DLWC (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001a; 
2002). 
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The above table shows few trades occurring during the first three years of the PHRSTS. This 
observation has been explained by the participants' lack of experience with the Scheme (NSW 
EPA 2001 ), which is generally supported by the experience of Australian water trading market 
where trading activities in initial years were inactive and increased rapidly as irrigators gained 
familiarity of the market (Young 2004 ). However, at least other two possible reasons exist for 
this inactivity of the credit trading market of the PHRSTS. One is the participants' uncertainty 
about the lifetime of salt credits in the initial years and about the evolution of regulatory rules, 
as noted in Sections 4.7 and 5.1.4. The experience of Dutch Nutrients market has suggested that 
policy uncertainty in the early stage of the Nutrient Quota System, such as the uncertainty of 
continuance of the quota system and of future constraints on quota use, led to a wait-and-see 
attitude of the participants, limiting the tradability and impeding the efficient functioning of the 
quota market (Wossink 2004 ). The uncertainty of the salt credits and the Scheme itself in the 
first three years of the PHRSTS could inspire caution of the participants towards the trading 
market. 
The other reason for the inactivity of the credit trading market at the initial stage of PHRSTS 
could be the lack of the need to discharge. An evaluation of Australian water trading market 
(Bjomlund and Rossini 2005) has shown that the volume of water allocation trades for 
temporary water rights heavily depended upon seasonal conditions, such as rainfall and river 
flow. The rationale for this factor in the case of the PHRSTS is that the few Flood-flow and 
High-flow days between 1995 and 1997 suggest fewer high rainfall events in the Hunter region 
over this period. Fewer High-flow days could lead to a lower generation of saline water, in 
particular for the open-cut mines and thus less need for industrial discharge. 
No trade in 1997 is also noticeable in Table 5.7. NSW EPA (2001) commented that a lack of 
discharge opportunities in 1997 accounted for no trade occurring in that year. However, a closer 
examination of river flow data of 1997 in this study, which shows 11 days of High flow period 
in that year (compared to 9 High-flow days with 16 trades in 2002), does not support the NSW 
EPA's assumption. 
From Table 5.7, it appears that the number of trades and credits traded has substantially 
increased since the fourth year of the Scheme. At least three factors have contributed to this 
increase: participants' increasing experience with the Scheme; the establishment of an online 
trading system, which has lowered the transaction costs and time delay and in tum induced 
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more trades (see Section 5.2.3); and the increasing need for discharge from the industries due to 
higher rainfall events, for example, in 2000 and 2001. 
The implication of the number of High-flow and Flood-flow days for the number of credits 
traded is of interest. Intuitively, the number of credits traded may have an inverse relationship 
with the number of Flood-flow days. The intuition is that the longer the duration of a given 
Flood flow period, the fewer trades would occur in the following High flow period, due to 
unlimited discharge in Flood flow and thus less need of discharge in High flow period. 
Conversely, the number of credits traded may have a positive relationship with the number of 
High-flow days. More trades would be expected over a longer duration of High flow. However, 
closer examination of Table 5. 7 reveals that the number of transactions is neither related to the 
number of High flow days nor to the number of Flood flow days. This reflects the complexity of 
the factors determining the needs for discharge of the industries as discussed in Section 3.4.3 
In total there were 157 trades involving 6811 credits traded during the seven-year span of the 
PHRSTS, which is on average 45 credits per trade and approximately 22 trades per year. The 
most successful US water quality trading programs in terms of the number of trades have been 
the Grassland Area Farmers (39 trades over a two-year period, that is, approximately 20 
trades/year), Long Island Sound (63 trades over a two-year period, that is, approximately 32 
trades/year), Truckee River (33 trades over an eight-year period, that is, approximately 4 
trades/year) and the Red Cedar River (22 trades each year since 2001) (Morgan and Wolverton 
2008). Compared with these programs, the number of trades in the PHRSTS may not be very 
impressive. However, considering that during 1995-2002, on average less than 10% of the time 
(278 days) was a High flow period, in which both discharges and trades were allowed, the 
PHRSTS trading market appeared quite active. 
Another indicator of the activity of the trading market is the number of participants. The trading 
records showed that by 2002, 20 out of 22 PHRSTS participants15 had been involved in credit 
trading activities, as shown in Table 5.8, which also gives further information about the trading 
participants. This shows that the majority of firms (ten mines) were involved in credit trading 
only as sellers and never as buyers. Only one firm was a buyer but never a seller of credits: the 
new entrant, Redbank Power Station. A significant proportion of firms (eight mines and one 
power station) were both sellers and buyers, of which five were net sellers (more credits sold 
15 The initial 20 participants in 1995 plus two later new developments 
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than bought), three were net buyers (more credits bought than sold), and one bought and sold 
the same amount of credits. 
Table 5.8 Information about the PHRSTS credit trading participants 
Only Only Both Neither Total 
sellers buyers sellers and sellers nor 
buyers buyers 
PHRSTS 10 1 9 2 22 
participants (mines) (power (8 mines (mines) (20 
station) and 1 mines & 
power 2 power 
station) stations) 
River Upper 2 0 2 2 6 
sectors Middle 4 1 5 0 10 
Low 4 0 2 0 6 
Mining Open-cut 7 0 7 0 14 
methods Underground 2 0 1 2 5 
Open- 1 0 0 0 1 
cut/underground 
Sources: Compiled from data from NSW DLWC (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001a; 
2002). 
Table 5.8 also shows the distribution of the trading participants among river sectors. All the 
firms located in the middle and lower river sectors participated in the credit trading activities. 
Two firms that were never involved in trading were the mines located in the upper river sector. 
This suggests that the firms located in the middle and lower river sectors tend to have more 
difficulty in managing their wastewater on site and thus tend to derive more benefit from the 
trading market. 
A closer look at the mining methods of the 20 coal mine participants in Table 5.8 shows that all 
the open-cut mines had participated in credit trading. The two mines that had never been 
involved in any trading activity were underground mines. This observation reflects the situation 
noted in Section 3.4.3, that open-cut mines tend to generate more saline water on-site than 
underground mines, and thus experience more difficulty in managing saline water on-site than 
underground mines. This observation also suggests that open-cut mines might have derived 
more advantages from the trading market than underground mines. 
In terms of the relationships between the trading parties, trading in the PHRSTS market can be 
grouped into three categories: intra-company trades, which refers to the trades between the 
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mines owned by the same parent company16; arm-relationship trades, which occur between the 
power stations and their coal suppliers; and inter-company trades, which refers to trades 
between the mines owned by different companies, and those between the power stations and the 
mines that had no supply relationship with the power stations. Among the total 157 trades 
during 1995-2002, half were intra-company trades, followed by inter-company trades (44%) and 
arm-relationship trades (6%). The high proportion of intra-company trades can be attributed to 
high cross-company ownerships of the coal mines. As noted in Section 3.4.1, more than 63% of 
the coal mines belonged to two big companies: Xstrata Coal and Coal & Allied. 
To answer the second question of "did the pattern of trades on the PHRSTS credit trading 
market appear to shift from the firms with higher MACs to those with lower MACs", obtaining 
information about saline water control cost at individual firm level is essential. However, this 
information was not available and thus prevented this study from examining the implications of 
firms' control cost for their behaviours in the credit trading market. As an alternative, the study 
attempted to use the auction prices of the credits to conduct the examination because the auction 
prices at least provide an indication of the magnitude of the firms' saline water control costs. 
For this reason, although FHRSTS is mostly beyond the scope of the study, the next section will 
conduct a preliminary analysis on the credit auctions of 2004 and 2006. A credit auction was 
also conducted on 2 April 2008; however, the information on this auction was not available 
until 18 September 2008, after this cut-off date for detailed analysis, so only brief notes on the 
2008 auction are included below. 
5.4 Analysis of the 2004 and 2006 Credit Auctions 
The Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) faced a number of risks and 
pressures in its later stage of implementation. Availability of the credits and efficiency of the 
credit use was the main concern. On one hand, the NSW EPA faced a high possibility of 
running out of credits for new developments within a short time ifthe grandfathering system for 
credit allocation continued to be used (NSW EPA 2001). For example, by 30 November 2002 
NSW EPA only held 87 reserved credits, comparing with the initial 200 reserved credits (NSW 
DL WC 2002). On the other hand, a large number of credits, which were initially allocated to 
those mines without discharge licences, remained unused during discharge events, and some 
16 See Section 5.1.3, salt credits were allocated to firms (that is, coal mines and power stations) rather than companies. 
There are a number of large companies that operate more one firm. 
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were never used at all (NSW EPA 2001). The utilisation rate of credits during the period of 
PHRSTS was as low as 17%, as found in Section 5.2.2. 
One of the key changes that accompanied the introduction of the Formalised Hunter River 
Salinity Trading Scheme (FHRSTS) by the Regulation 2002 was a re-allocation through 
periodic public auctions of the salt credits that were initially distributed to the PHRSTS 
participants by means of grandfathering. Another key change was increasing the Flood flow 
thresholds in the Upper and Middle river sectors to address the anticipated impacts of the 
increasing industrial growth in the upper Hunter River on the attainment of river salinity 
objectives in these sectors (NSW EPA 2002). 
This section provides a preliminary analysis of the credit auctions held in 2004 and 2006 under 
the FHRSTS. The purpose is to use this analysis to explain firms' behaviours in relation to the 
PHRSTS credit trading market and to help interpret the findings reported in Chapter 7 on the 
economic performance of the PHRSTS. This section contains three subsections. Section 5 .4.1 
will provide a brief overview of the key formats for auctioning multiple units of homogeneous 
items and compare their properties, drawing on the auction literature. This subsection provides 
knowledge to help understand the FHRSTS credit auctions. Section 5.4.2 will outline the key 
elements of the FHRSTS credit auctions. Section 5.4.3 will provide a simple analysis of the 
outcomes of FHRSTS auctions. Instead of analysing firms' behaviour in the actions (such as, 
strategic bidding and market domination), which falls into the field of game theory, this 
subsection focuses on the implications of the observations on the auctions for those in credit 
trading markets. This subsection will also discuss the implications of auction prices for market 
prices and firms' marginal abatement costs (MA Cs) of saline water control. 
5.4.1 Key auction formats 
Auctions have been used as a form of economic transaction for a long time. Auctions are being 
increasingly used as an economic instrument in natural resource and environmental 
management. Such auctions have included a diverse array of rights, such as timber harvests, for 
example, US. Forest Service timber auctions (Athey and Levin 2001); resource extractions, for 
example, fishery and water (Chan et al. 2003); emission allowances, for example, US S02 
emission permits (Svendsen and Christensen 1999), carbon permit auctions (Cramton and Kerr 
2002); and discharge permits, for example, FHRSTS salt credits (NSW EPA 2002). Auctions 
have also been used by governments to meet conservation goals. Examples include the US 
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Conservation Reserve Program Auctions (Vukina et al. 2006) and Australian Bush Tender Trial 
in Victoria (Stoneham et al. 2003). 
For any auction, achieving allocative efficiency and maximising revenues are the two 
fundamental goals, where allocative efficiency is measured by whether or not the auction results 
in the items auctioned being distributed to those who value them the most. The efficiency and 
revenue-raising capacity of an auction are closely related. It is often the case that an auction 
with a high level of efficiency will also generate high revenues, and vice versa (Chan et al. 
2003). For an environmental auction where an active spot market for an environmental resource 
does not exist or where the information on market values or user costs of resources is not readily 
available, as in the case of HRSTS, price discovery is often an additional primary goal of the 
auction. The auction prices could provide an indication of these values and costs (Chan et al. 
2003). 
Auctions can be one-sided where there is one seller or two-sided where there are several buyers 
and sellers. The items auctioned can be a single indivisible unit; or multiple homogeneous or 
heterogeneous units. In a multi-unit auction, the bidders confront more complicated decisions 
than in the single-unit auction settings. Rather than simply deciding whether to buy and at what 
price, the bidders must decide which goods to buy, how many of each and at what prices 
(Klemperer 1999). Since a fixed number of identical salt credits are sold in each single FHRSTS 
auction, the following review focuses on the multi-unit homogeneous auctions. 
The approaches of conducting multi-unit homogeneous auctions can be categorised in two basic 
dimensions. The first dimension is the number of auction rounds. In a single-round auction 
(known as a sealed-bid auction), there is only one round of bidding in which the bidders 
simultaneously submit their demand quantities at one or more price levels without knowing the 
bids of other bidders. These bids are added to form the aggregated demand curve. The 
intersection between the demand curve and available supply determines the clearing price and 
allocation. In a multiple-round auction (known as open auction), an open, iterative bidding 
procedure allows bidders in each bidding round to express a series of bids, taking into account 
the information revealed by other earlier bids. Ascending price and its ascending-clock variant 
are the most prominent open bidding procedure. In this type of auction, the price is raised until 
the final round is reached or the demand meets supply (Klemperer 1999). 
131 
Chapter 5 Mechanisms and Operations of the PHRSTS 
The second dimension is pricing rules. There are two common pricing rules. Uniform pricing 
requires all the winners to pay the same price, that is, the clearing price, for every item they 
acquire, while discriminatory pricing (also called pay-as-you-bid) requires successful bidders to 
pay their own bid prices (Klemperer 1999). Combinations of these two dimension forms four 
common auction formats: uniform price sealed-bid, discriminatory sealed-bid, uniform price 
open and discriminatory open. These auction formats have different ranks against the criteria of 
achieving economic efficiency, raising revenue and revealing the true values of the auctioned 
items in the setting of incomplete information (Klemperer 1999). 
Incomplete information is a key characteristic of almost any auction environment. The bidders 
might not know how much the items are worth. In the literature, two basic models regarding 
bidder's information have evolved and their approaches are very different (Klemperer 1999). 
The private-values model applies to the situation where each bidder knows exactly the worth of 
the item to her but may not know how much it is worth to others. In this situation, the valuations 
of individual bidders are considered different, and one's valuation does not depend upon others' 
valuations. The common-values model applies to the situation where the item auctioned is worth 
the same or very similar to every bidder but no one knows that value with certainty. In this 
situation, a bidder's value may depend to some extent on other bidders' signals (Klemperer 
1999). In reality, it is quite often the case that an auction has characteristics of both private 
values and a common value (as the case of the FHRSTS auctions). In a situation in which 
bidder's signals are affiliated (Milgrom and Weber 1982), that is, bidders' signals depend upon 
not only their private values but also their opposing bidders' common values, a general model 
encompassing both the private-values and common-values models needs to be used to analyse 
bidders' individual behaviours and their interactions. 
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is valid in both private-values (Vickrey 1961) and common-
values settings (Myerson 1981 ). This states that under the assumption of risk neutrality, 
independence of valuations and symmetry among bidders, all four of the common auctions yield 
the same allocation outcomes and thus the same expected revenues. However, relaxing any of 
these assumptions invalidates the general equivalence. 
Cramton (1998), Ausubel and Cramton (2002) and Ausubel (2004) emphasised the difference in 
allocative inefficiencies between discriminatory pricing and uniform pricing. For sealed-bid 
auctions, bidders' behaviours are different under different pricing rules. With the discriminatory 
price format, there is a close linkage between the bidders' actual payments and their bids. 
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Strategic bidders tend to bid under their true values to avoid a Winner's Curse, where a bidder 
pays far more than would have been necessary to win the auction due to incomplete information 
regarding the common value of the item. With the uniform price format, large bidders may have 
an incentive to bid under their true values in an attempt to bring down the clearing price, so 
demand reduction is prone to occur (Ausubel and Cramton 2002). Thus, neither discriminatory 
pricing nor uniform pricing is held to be fully efficient. 
In the literature, open ascending auctions are regarded superior to sealed-bid auctions in terms 
of achieving auction goals (Cramton 1998; Klemperer 1999; Ausubel 2002). Price discovery is 
the primary attribute and advantage of open ascending auctions over sealed-bid auctions, 
particular in the situation where bidder's signals are affiliated. In such a situation, an open 
ascending auction may induce bidders to bid more aggressively without fear of the Winner's 
Curse. This is because bidders can infer greater information about the common values and 
refine their valuation estimates through a competitive process where each bidder has the 
opportunity to change losing bids in the previous round to win bids in the next round. The price 
information generated as an open auction proceeds not only helps in discovering the true values, 
but also increases the probability for efficient outcomes and expected seller's revenues. For this 
reason, an open ascending format is often recommended for auctioning multi-unit objectives, in 
particular for auctions whose objectives include the discovery of price information. 
Collusion and entry deterrence are the main barriers to achieving the goals of auctions, and thus 
the major elements of concern of practical auction design (Klemperer 2002). Collusion refers to 
a phenomenon where bidders coordinate their strategies to shade their bid prices down through 
an implicit or explicit agreement (Klemperer 2002). Different auction formats vary in their 
vulnerability to collusion. Generally, open bidding procedures, where repeated signals of value 
and demand are available to all bidders, are regarded as being more vulnerable to tacit collusion 
than are sealed-bid. Bidders can use the early stages to signal who would win which objectives 
and then tacitly agree to stop pushing prices up (Robinson 1985; Klemperer 2002). A number of 
strategies have been provided in the literature to help curtail collusive biding, such as keeping 
the reserve price secret (Chan et al. 2003); including a final sealed-bid stage into an otherwise-
ascending auction to create an "Anglo-Dutch" auction (Klemperer 2002); and imposing a time 
limit on the bidding process if an open auction is used (Chan et al. 2003). As will be discussed 
in Section 5.4.2, some of these strategies have been applied to the FHRSTS credit auctions in 
order to reduce the potential for collusion. 
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An auction with too few bidders is unlikely to succeed in either revenue or efficiency terms due 
to the lack of competition. Potential entrants appear to believe that an open auction is more 
likely than a sealed-bid auction to be won by the strongest bidder. Open auctions are thus 
thought to be more vulnerable to lack of entry than sealed-bid auctions (Klemperer 2002). Other 
factors such as the high expense of entry and bidding and large asymmetries between bidders 
also discourage entry of potentially weaker bidders (Chan et al. 2003). 
The strengths and weaknesses of the key auction formats for multi-unit homogeneous items are 
summarised below in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 Comparison of attributes of various auction approaches 
Uniform Discriminatory Sealed-bid Open auction 
price pnce auction 
Efficiency achievement - - * * 
Revenue maximisation - - * * 
Information discovery - + - + 
Prevent collusions * * + -
Promote entry * * + -
Note:+= strength; - =weakness; *=contingent on the specific situation. 
Sources: Adapted from Cramton (1998); Klemperer (1999); Ausubel and Cramton (2002); 
Klemperer (2002); Chan et al. (2003); Ausubel (2004). 
There are many ways to structure an auction. The purposes of an auction determine the choice 
of auction format and influence the auction design. In practice, these auction formats are often 
jointly used to maximise a specific auction objective (Svendsen and Christensen 1999; Holt et 
al. 2007). The US S02 emission permits auction was the first auction ever to be applied in 
environmental regulation (Svendsen and Christensen 1999). Following this auction, a number of 
auctions for the sale of emission permits are being proposed, as listed in Table 5 .10. 
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Table 5.10 Environmental trading programs and their auction formats 
Program/proposal Items auctioned/to Features of auction Status 
be auctioned approaches 
US Climate Change Action Carbon permits Standard ascending- Proposed 
Plan. clock auction 
US Acid Rain Programme S02 emission two-sided pay-as- In place 
permits you-bid call auction 
Virginia NOx allowances In place 
UK Emission Trading GHG emissions A descending clock Proposed 
Scheme reduction auction 
Irish auction GHG emission Sealed-bid uniform 
reduction pricing auction 
US Regional Greenhouse Initial sale of C02 Single-round Proposed 
Gas (GHG) Initiative allowances sealed-bid uniform-
auction with a 
reserve price 
Hungarian auction GHG emission Uniform pricing 
reduction auction 
Sources: Adapted from Svendsen and Christensen (1999); Holt et al. (2007); Smith and 
Swierzbinski (2007) 
While there have been a number of emission trading programs involving auctions of emission 
permits, the FHRSTS salt credits auctions were the first one used for sale of discharge permits. 
However, their influence has not been as great as the Scheme itself: while the PHRSTS has been 
frequently cited in the literature (for example, OECD 1999; Kraemer et al. 2004; US EPA 2004; 
Henderson and Norris 2008), formal research on the FHRSTS auctions is still lacking. This 
study gives a preliminary examination of these auctions, starting with reviewing the key design 
elements of the FHRSTS credit auctions. 
5.4.2 Rules of the FHRSTS credit auctions 
For any auction, it is crucial to be clear what is to be auctioned and the purposes of the auction. 
Under the Regulation, every two years from 2004 to 2014, 20% of the credits (that is, 200 
credits) that were initially allocated to the PHRSTS participants by means of grandfathering are 
repossessed by the authority, and reallocated through public auctions. This means that from 
2004 to 2012, 200 credits are sold at auction every two years, but the total number of active 
credits still remains at 1000. The new, auctioned credits expire 10 years after the date of the 
auction (as shown in Figure 5.2). It is important to highlight the difference between the salt 
135 
Chapter 5 Mechanisms and Operations of the PHRSTS 
credits in the PHRSTS trading market and in FHRSTS auction market: while what was traded 
on the trading market represent the one-time right to discharge saline water into a certain water 
block of the Hunter River, what is traded in the auction market is an ongoing right to discharge 
saline water into the Hunter River over a ten-year period. 
Figure 5.2 Lifespan of credits 
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Source: NSW EPA (2001) 
The primary objectives of the FHRSTS credit auctions were to "distribute credits to those who 
value them the most" (NSW EPA 2004a:3) and "provide equal access for all bidders, including 
new entrants to the market" (NSW EPA 2004a:3). Another primary objective of the FHRSTS 
auction is to learn the market value of credits (NSW EPA 2003b ). Maximising revenue is not 
the prioritised purpose of the credit auctions. The revenue from the auctions was proposed to 
pay the auction costs and offset the costs of the FHRSTS. The latter will reduce the annual 
contributions payable by the FHRSTS participants (NSW EPA 2004a). 
The NSW EPA proposed an auction design in 2003. Following a trial auction on 24 March 
2004, the first formal FHRSTS credit auction was conducted on 7 April 2004 and the second on 
5 April 2006. Both auctions were multi-round, sealed-bid, discriminatory pricing format without 
reserve price. The detailed auction rules and operations of these two auctions have been well 
documented in the NSW EPA reports, such as NSW EPA (2004a), NSW EPA (2004b) and 
NSW DEC (2006). The rest of this subsection will outline the key elements of the FHRSTS 
auctions. 
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The FHRSTS auctions were one-sided auctions. There was the only seller, the NSW EPA, 
whereas there were multiple buyers, the coal mining and power generating firms. The FHRSTS 
auctions adopted the multi-round sealed-bid auction approach. In each round buyers tendered a 
sealed bid consisting of the bid price and the amount of credits they were bidding for. At the end 
of each round, bids were sorted from highest price to lowest price to produce a bid stack. The 
top bidders whose aggregated bids were 200 credits were the provisional successful bidders. 
Rounds continued until there were no new bids or the time limit (3 hours) was reached 
whichever came first (NSW EPA 2004b ). Incorporating the sealed-bid format into the multi-
round procedures would have strengthened the capability of the auctions in price discovery. 
The discriminatory pricing rule was applied to the payment of successful bidders. Successful 
bidders were required to pay what they bid for their final successful bids, rather than all bidders 
paying the same price for all credits, such as the lowest successful price (NSW EPA 2004b ). A 
reserve price is often set in an auction to ensure a desired level of revenue and to reduce the 
chance of collusion. As maximising revenue for the FHRSTS auctions was not sought, no 
reserve was set (NSW EPA 2004b). 
A number of rules were applied in the FHRSTS auctions to reduce the potential for collusion. 
One of the rules regards the release of bidding information during the auctions. For example, 
each registered bidder was allocated an identification number (ID). At the end of each round, 
only bidder IDs and the number of credits they had been provisionally allocated were 
announced (NSW EPA 2004b). Therefore, each bidder was able to see how many credits they 
had won provisionally, but they did not know who the other successful bidders were. The lowest 
fully allocated bid price and the lowest partially allocated bid price were also released, but 
excluded the prices offered by the individual bidders (NSW EPA 2004b ). This information 
allowed bidders to see what they needed to bid in subsequent rounds to secure credits. Only at 
the end of the auctions were the names of successful bidders, as well as their final allocation of 
credits and prices offered, announced (NSW EPA 2004b ). 
Another auction rule specified the off er of bids. All bidders were required to bid in the first 
round. For each credit there was a requirement that the prices of new bids must be higher than 
the lowest partially allocated bid price from the previous round after the first round. For each 
round, while bidders were allowed to lodge up to three bids, there was no limit on the amount of 
credits a single bidder could purchase (NSW EPA 2004b ). 
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A three-hour time limit was also imposed on both the 2004 and the 2006 credits auctions (NSW 
EPA 2004c; NSW DEC 2006). This limit was set not only to help in curtailing collusion, but 
also to ensure a practical way of ending the auction if bidding was progressing by very small 
increments for a long time (NSW EPA 2003b). In addition, the conditions imposed on the 
successful bidders' payment and those dealing with allocation of residual credits (the credits 
that were not sold after successful bids had been settled) (NSW EPA 2004b) provide further 
prevention of strategic bidding behaviours. 
The main operational information and outcomes of the 2004 and 2006 auctions are summarised 
in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11 Summary of operational information about 2004 and 2006 auctions 
2004 auction 2006 auction 
Participants 10 11 
Number of auction rounds 19 21 
Winners 8 11 
Maximum credit price ($/credit) 551 658 
Minimum credit price (market clearing price) 478 535 
($/credit) 
Average price ($/credit) 507 564 
Revenue($) 101,465 112, 770 
Sources: Compiled data from NSW EPA (2004b); NSW DEC (2006). 
The 2004 auction generated a revenue of $101K (that is, $507/credit) and the 2006 auction 
generated a revenue of $112K (that is, $564/credit) (NSW EPA 2004b; NSW DEC 2006). For a 
very rough estimate, the total capital cost of 1000 credits, each of which is with 10-year 
lifetime, would be worth in the order of $SOOK. This suggests that the industries do not value 
the salt credits much, which is in line with the observations of this study (see Section 5.2.2) that 
the industries appeared to take advantage of unlimited discharge in the Flood flow period (for 
example, see Table 5.5, 53% of total salt load was discharged in the Flood flow period) and 
only use the tradability of salt credits as a backup alternative to discharge excess saline water in 
the High flow period. 
From the recently available 2008 Auction Report (DECC 2008), the average price of a credit in 
the 2008 auction was $947, with a maximum price of $1019/credit and a minimum of 
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$869/credit. This auction generated total revenue of $189,442, representing an increase of 68% 
over that from the 2006 auction. DECC (2008:3) provided an apparently straightforward 
explanation of the rising auction price: ''the decreased number of bid rounds (10 in 2008 
compared with 21 in 2006) may have encouraged bidders to place few but higher value bids 
rather than waiting until the final round of a greater number of bid rounds to secure credits". 
There could also have been other reasons, such as increasing credit prices on the FHRSTS 
trading market; fewer Flood flow days for unlimited discharge of salt in the past two years, and 
in tum more credits in demand to discharge salt on High flow days; the effect of the increased 
Flood flow threshold meaning more high flow discharge opportunities; or more value put on the 
credits by the firms as the amount of the initial allocated credits decreases. 
The above plausible reasons are generally supported by anecdotal evidence in NOx and SOx 
markets in the US (Ellerman 2004), the fisheries market in New Zealand (Kerr 2004) and the 
water markets in Australia (Bjomlund and Rossini 2005; 2007). For example, it has been found 
from Australian water market that the prices paid for permanent water entitlement has a 
significant positive correlation to those for temporary water allocation (Bjomlund and Rossini 
2005; 2007). This finding could be valid for the credit trading market of the PHRSTS. 
Evidence in Australian water markets has also suggested that water prices predominantly are 
driven by water scarcity determined by the seasonal availability of water (Bjomlund and Rossini 
2005; 2007). Fewer flood flow days in the context of the PHRSTS represent scarcity. While the 
purchase of salt credits from the trading market during the period of scarcity is a short-term 
action of the firms to minimise non-compliance risk, it is expected the credit prices in both 
trading and auction markets are significantly driven by this scarcity. When the occurrence of 
flood flow days is frequent and duration is long, the firms can discharge their excess saline 
water using their existing allocation of credits. As scarcity and prices of salt credits in the 
trading market increases, it becomes increasingly difficult and uncertain to secure the necessary 
credits at a reasonable price from trading market. Firms thus tend to buy more permanent credits 
from auction market and by doing so they increased demand and prices in market. Further 
investigation of the FHRSTS trading market and its implications for the auction market are 
therefore suggested to be topics for further study of the FHRSTS. 
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5.4.3 Simple analysis of the auction outcomes 
In spite of the prolific literature on auctions, it is only recently that the literature on 
environmental permits has blossomed, driven by the increasing applications of tradable permits 
in controlling greenhouse gas emissions. Research in the field of auctioning environmental 
permits has been concentrated in two main areas: the evaluation of existing auctions (for 
example, Kline and Meneses 1999; Cason et al. 2003; Brookshire and Burness 2001), and the 
optimal auction design for a particular tradable permits program (for example, Klemperer 2002; 
Sunnevag 2003; Holt et al. 2007; National Emissions Trading Taskforce 2007). The following 
simple analysis of the 2004 and 2006 FHRSTS credit auctions, which was the earliest attempt in 
this regard, will contribute to the analysis of the former area. 
In spite of various differences in design elements between the FHRSTS credit auctions and US 
S02 emission permits auctions, they have key elements in common. That is, trading had existed 
before the auctions were conducted, and furthermore the trading and auction markets still work 
in parallel. Nevertheless, in contrast to the US S02 emission permit markets where both auctions 
and trading markets deal with the long term right to emit S02, in the case of the HRSTS the 
trading market deals with one-time discharge rights, while the auction market deals with 
ongoing discharge rights over a ten-year period. In this regard, the HRSTS credit trading 
market seems more similar to Australian water markets where both markets for temporary water 
allocations and permanent water entitlements are in place. The literature on empirical analysis 
of the US S02 emission permits auctions (such as, Kline and Meneses 1999; Brookshire and 
Burness 2001; Cason et al. 2003) and the Australian water markets (Bjornlund and Rossini 
2005; 2007) thus offers a helpful reference to examine the FHRSTS auctions. 
For a tradable permits program where both the trading market and the auction market are active 
and both markets for temporary and permanent permits exist, as the case of the HRSTS, their 
interaction can be examined from two perspectives: the connection between the trading market 
and auction market, and the connection between the market for temporary permits and that for 
permanent permits. Since the auction prices are derived in this study for examining the PHRSTS 
credit trading market and estimating the net cost saving of the PHRSTS, the analysis focused on 
the implications of the credits traded in the PHRSTS trading market (representing one-time 
discharge rights) for the those traded in the FHRSTS auctions (representing ongoing discharge 
rights). The auction information revealed who were the successful bidders, as well as the 
number and prices of the credits they won. Drawing on this information and in conjunction with 
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the credit trading information, this study examines the implications of the observations on the 
auction market for those on the credit trading market from three aspects: the nature of the 
successful bidders; the amount of the credits won in the auctions; and their prices. In analysing 
the auction information, this analysis focuses on the final round of each auction because it is the 
binding offer round that determines the winners and losers for that auction, so it is obviously the 
most important round in terms of the price signals. 
5.4.3.l Successful bidders in the auctions versus their roles in the trading market 
Coal mining and power generating firms were the only bidders in both the 2004 and the 2006 
auctions. There were no registrations from non-industrial bidders in either of these two auctions 
(NSW EPA 2004; NSW DEC 2006). In the 2004 auction ten bidders representing 11 licensed 
mining and power generation facilities participated: all of which were already PHRSTS 
participants and held discharge licences (NSW EPA 2004). In the 2006 auction, 11 bidders 
representing mining and power generation facilities competed for credits. All but one bidder 
represented the firms that had already participated in the PHRSTS and held discharge licences 
before the auction. The only one who had not participated in the Scheme was Centennial Coal, a 
new development that was being proposed (NSW DEC 2006). The constitution of the bidders 
suggests that the credits were general worth more to those HRSTS participants who held 
discharge licences than to the HRSTS participants who did not hold discharge licences and 
other water users. 
There were eight successful bidders in the 2004 auctions and 11 successful bidders in the 2006 
auctions (NSW EPA 2004b; NSW DEC 2006). Six of these were successful bidders in both 
auctions, as shown in Table 5.12. Intuitively, it appears that the successful bidders are perceived 
to be the buyers or net buyers in the credit trading market. This study looked into the successful 
bidders' trading records immediately before the auctions in which they participated. For 
example, for the successful bidders of the 2004 auction, the study reviewed their trading records 
between January 1995 and March 2004. For the successful bidders of the 2006 auction, the 
study reviewed their trading records between January 1995 and March 2006. 
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Table 5.12 Successful bidders in FHRSTS auctions and their roles in the trading 
markets 
Successful bidders Auction(s) participated in Roles in the tradine: markets 
Hunter Valley Operations 2004 net seller 
Warkworth Colliery Holding 2004 net seller 
IBulga Coal Mana12:ement 2004 and 2006 Not involved in tradin12: 
[Liddell Coal Operations 2004 and 2006 net buyer 
Macquarie Generation 2004 and 2006 net seller 
IRavensworth Operations 2004 and 2006 net buyer 
[Redbank Power Station 2004 and 2006 buyer 
Wambo Mining Corporation 2004 and 2006 seller 
Bengalla Mine 2006 net seller 
Centennial Hunter 2006 NA 
Rio Tinto Coal Australia 2006 NA 
United Collieries 2006 seller 
Mt Owen Coal Mine 2006 seller 
Source: Compiled data from NSW DLWC (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 200la; 
2002); NSW EPA (2004c); NSW DEC (2006). 
Individual successful bidders' roles in the trading market are presented in Table 5.12. 
Interestingly, the successful bidders in the auctions were a mix of sellers and buyers in the credit 
trading market. More interestingly, sellers and net sellers, rather than buyers and net buyers, 
dominated the successful bidders. The large proportion of sellers and net sellers among the 
successful bidders appears to contradict the perception that buyers and net buyers would be the 
ones value credits most and thus put higher prices on bids. 
There are two possible explanations for the high proportion of sellers and net sellers among the 
successful bidders. One is that the prices the bidders paid do not reflect the true private value of 
the credits to them. A further discussion on the implication of auction prices for market prices 
and MACs will be provided in Section 5.4.3.3. Another possible explanation could be that some 
successful bidders may actually represent their parent companies in competing for credits. As a 
company may own more than one firm, once a firm won the bids, it would transfer the credits 
through intra-company trades. While the firm names were registered in the trading records, the 
company names were registered for both the 2004 and the 2006 auctions. So for a specific firm, 
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there might not exist any connection between its behaviours on the trading market and in the 
auctions. 
One observation about the trading records during December 2002 and March 2006 is worthy of 
note. Whilst the number of triggered trades increased, a few in-advance trades occurred. For 
example, on 29 April 2003, Lemington Coal Mine Colliery Holding sold four separate bulks of 
credits to Hunter Valley Operation (see Table 5.13). Whilst the durations (that is, river blocks) 
for individual bulk of credits traded were different, three bulks of credits were for future use. 
The variety of the trading formats suggests that the firms had become more experienced with 
the credits trading with their increasing knowledge about the currency of credits and their 
discharge needs. It also reflects the firms' certainty about the lifetime of the credits under the 
FHRSTS. 
Table 5.13 Trading record of Hunter Valley Operation on 29 April 2003 
Date and time Seller Buyer First block Last block Number of 
of trade credits traded 
29 April Lemington Hunter 2010/182 2012/182 8 
2003, 15:50 Coal Mine Valley 
Holding Operation 
29 April 2008/183 2010/181 16 
2003, 15:50 
29 April 2006/182 20081182 24 
2003, 15:49 
29 April 2004/183 2006/181 32 
2003, 15:49 
29 April 2003/119 2004/182 40 
2003, 15:49 
Source: NSW DEC (2007) 
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5.4.3.2 Quantity of the credits won in the auctions versus trading volume in the trading 
market 
No literature was identified systematically analysing the number of permits being traded in the 
trading market for those being traded in the auction market for a tradable permit program. Based 
on anecdotal evidence on the water allocation and entitlement markets in Australia (Bjornlund 
and d Rossini 2007) and in the fisheries quota market in New Zealand (Kerr 2004) and 
theoretical expectations, it could be hypothesed that under the HRSTS for a firm who was an 
active buyer in the trading market, the number of credits it purchased in the auction market 
should reflect its trading level in the trading market, even if the credits on these two markets 
represent different lifetime of discharge rightes (that is, one-time discharge rights in the trading 
market versus ongoing discharge rights in the auctions). To examine the connection between 
the trading volume in the trading market and quantity of the credits won in the auctions, let X 
denote a firm's initial allocation of credits in 1995, Y denote the firm's history of traded-in 
credits (for example, mean, maximum or minimum number of the credits traded-in), and Z 
denote the quantity of credits bid in the auction. These three quantities would be perceived to be 
related by accounting: Z = Y + 20% X This means the amount of credits bid by the firm in an 
auction might equal the sum of the number of expired credits and the number of credits traded 
in on the market. Therefore, there is a reason to compare these figures. 
For each successful bidder, this study has compared their 20% of expired credits with the 
number of credits they obtained from the auctions and the historical trading records. The 
information is presented in Tables 5.14 and 5.16. 
144 
Chapter 5 Mechanisms and Operations of the PHRSTS 
Table 5.14 Credits obtained from 2004 auctions versus trading volume of 1995-2004 
Credits Credits Number of traded-in 
held expired 2004 auction credits 
Firms by 2003 (20%X) (X) 
Credits 
obtained net gain Minimum Maximum 
Bulga Coal 50 10 7 -3 
Hunter Valley 120 24 30 6 1 72 
Liddell Coal 
Operations 65 13 14 1 8 230 
Macquarie Generation 230 46 50 4 21 27 
Ravensworth 
Operations 100 20 20 0 10 119 
Redbank Power 35 7 47 40 11 230 
Wambo Coal 35 7 12 5 
Warkworth 40 8 20 12 
TOTAL 675 135 200 65 
Sources: Compiled data from NSW DLWC (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 200la; 
2002); NSW EPA (2004c); NSW DEC (2006). 
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Table 5.15 Credits obtained from 2006 auction versus trading volume of 1995-2006 
Credits 
held Credits Number of traded-in 
by 2003 expired 2006 auction credits 
(X) (20%X) 
Firm credits obtained net gain Minimum Maximum 
Bulga Coal 50 10 9 -1 
Liddell Coal Operations 65 13 22 9 8 230 
Macquarie Generation 230 46 50 4 21 27 
Ravensworth Operations 100 20 25 5 8 119 
Redbank Power 35 7 15 8 11 280 
United Collieries 10 2 2 0 
Wambo Coal 35 7 12 5 
Xstrata Mt Owen 15 3 3 0 
Centennial Hunter17 10 10 
Rio Tinto 40 40 
Bengalla 35 7 12 12 40 72 
TOTAL 575 115 200 
Sources: data from NSW DLWC (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001a; 2002); NSW 
DEC (2006). 
From the above Tables 5.14 and 5.15, the number of credits that the firms won in the auctions 
appears to have little relationship to their pre-auction trade history. Except for the new firms, 
most of the existing firms seemed to use the auction for recovering their expired credits, rather 
than for obtaining extra credits for discharging excessive wastewater. The following reasons 
offer explanations for this. 
First, according to Regulation 2002, firms need to pay a contribution fee based on the number of 
credits they hold to fully cover the operational cost of the Scheme, instead of sharing the cost 
with the NSW DLWC and EPA (see Section 5.2.3). Therefore, anyone purchasing credits at the 
auction will be required to pay a FHRSTS contribution fee for each credit they buy on top of the 
credit purchase price. Due to the uncertainty of the need for the discharge of saline water and 
discharge opportunities, as well as the changing currency of a unit of credit over time, firms 
17 Centennial Hunter is a new development. No trading records are available. Rio Tinto Coal Australia 
manages Coal & Allied's operations at Bengalla, Mt Thorley, Wakeworth and Hunter Valley. From the 
auction reports, it is impossible to identify which coal operation Rio Tinto stands for there. 
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may be prone to buying the credits they need in the trading market, unless the auction prices are 
lower than market prices. Second, regardless of the allocation of credits on the auctions, a firm 
could recover its loss of credits in the auctions with later purchases in the trading markets for 
credits. This may also give firms an incentive to place their bids below the true values of the 
credits. The next section will provide further discussion in this regard. 
5.4.3.3 Auction prices versus market prices versus firms' marginal abatement costs 
Information released on US S02 emissions permit auctions shows that in every year, the auction 
price has been nearly coincident with the spot trading market prices in the surrounding months, 
or has been in line with a trend in prices, suggesting that auction prices have close relationship 
to trading market prices (Kline and Meneses 1999; Cason et al. 2003; Brookshire and Burness 
2001). However, caution may be required to use this information in analysis of credit prices in 
the HRSTS trading and auction markets. In the US S02 market, both trading and auction 
markets dealt with the same product - the long term right to emit S02• In contrast, under the 
HRSTS, what was traded in the trading market represents an one-time right to discharge saline 
water into a certain water block of the Hunter River, while what was traded in the auctions 
represents an ongoing right to discharge saline water into the Hunter River over a ten-year 
period. Thus, the observations in US may not easily apply to the case of HRSTS. 
In this regard, the significant insights gained from Australian water markets are referred, where 
both markets for temporary water allocations and permanent water entitlements exist in parallel. 
An evaluation of the Australian water markets conducted by Bjomlund and Rossini (2005; 
2007) has revealed that water prices in the (temporary) allocation market fluctuate widely in 
response to short-term water scarcity, and water prices in the (permanent) entitlement market, as 
a capital investment, reflect long-term factors in the economy and long-term trends in supply 
factors. Even so, there is a strong relationship between these two kinds of prices. The prices for 
water entitlements follow the same general trend of water allocations. On average the price of 
water entitlements increases when the price of water allocation increases, holding other 
variables constant. In some cases, the market for allocations has been leading the market for 
entitlements. 
For an auction in which a trading market co-exists with the auction market, bidders take both 
common value and private value into consideration. In the case of the FHRSTS credit auctions, 
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the common value of a unit of credit relates to its market price. Although the market price was 
not publicly available, those firms that have been active players in the trading market might 
have gained this information from their trading activities. Those firms who had limited 
experience in credit trading might have very little information on the market price before they 
attended the auctions. However, they learned this information from others' price signals through 
the iterative auction procedures and reflected it in their bids. 
In addition to the common value of a credit, a firm may also have its independent private value. 
This private value relates to its marginal abatement cost (MAC). However, while the firm may 
know the cost of reducing a unit of saline water or salt load, it might find it hard to value a unit 
of credit because of the uncertainty in the need to discharge saline water and the discharge 
opportunities, as well as the changing currency of a unit of credits. In this case, firms' marginal 
prices of bidding for a unit of salt credit in the auction could be more closely related to the 
firms' information about the market price of a credit than to the firms' own MACs. Regardless 
of their initial allocation of credits, firms may raise the bidding prices up to the market price. 
The highest, average and lowest successful credit prices offered for each of the rounds in the 
2004 and 2006 auctions are shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4., respectively. Figure 5.3 shows that 
deviations between the highest price and lowest prices gradually reduced as the rounds went on, 
reflecting the firms' learning process of the common value. The price curves show a steeper 
gradient over the last three rounds compared to the general trend in the previous 16 rounds. This 
suggests that most bidders raised their price increments in these last rounds, possibly to the 
maximum they were willing to pay, because they knew the auction was drawing to a close. 
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Price signals of the 2004 FHRSTS auction 
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Figure 5.4 Price signals of the 2006 FHRSTS auction 
Figure 1: HRSTS Credit Auction Results - 5 April 2006 
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From the 2006 auction (see Figure 5.4), while the highest bids increased in a stepwise manner, 
the rate of increase in the average price curve remained relatively constant throughout the 
auction, in contrast to the 2004 auction (see Figure 5.3) when it increased more steeply in the 
final rounds. This suggests that the bidders had more symmetrical information on the market 
value of a credit in the 2006 auction than in the 2004 auction, either from the trading market or 
from the price information of the 2004 auction. 
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Comparing the auction prices between the 2004 and 2006, auctions listed in Table 5.16, the 
average auction price of the 2006 ($564/credit = 112770/200) is higher than that of the 2004 
auction ($507/credit = 101467/200). This suggests that the firms placed more value on the 
credits as the amount of the initial allocated credits was decreasing. Nevertheless, converting the 
average auction price ($507) into a 2006 price using the price indexes 12004 = 146.0 and 12006 = 
154. 7 released by Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2008), the magnitude of the difference 
between the 2006 auction price ($564 in 2006 prices) and the 2004 price ($537 in 2006 prices) 
is modest. 
Table 5.16 Comparison of the prices of the firms who won in both auctions 
Firms 2004 auction 2006 auction 
Number of Total cos1 Price Number of Total costs Price 
credit obtained ($) $/credit credits obtained ($) $/credit' 
Hunter Valley 30 15,780 526 
Warkworth 20 11,020 551 
Bulga Coal 7 3,657 522 9 5,922 658 
Liddell Coal Operations 14 6,874 491 22 11,774 535 
Macquarie Generation 50 24,300 486 50 27,600 552 
Ravensworth Operations 20 10,170 509 25 13,700 548 
Redbank Power 47 23,666 504 15 8,640 576 
Wambo Coal 12 6,000 500 12 6,690 558 
United Collieries 2 1,080 540 
Dcstrata Mt Owen 3 1,656 552 
Centennial Hunter 10 5,550 555 
!Rio Tinto 40 23,640 591 
Bengalla 12 6,518 543 
TOTAL/ Avera2e 200 101,467 507 200 112,770 564 
Sources: NSW EPA (2004c) and NSW DEC (2006) 
The narrow dispersion of the average auction prices of 2004 and 2006 can be explained by two 
possible factors. One is the assumption that under the competitive PHRSTS trading market with 
good information, a sufficient number and frequency of trades have established a readily 
recognisable market price of the salt credits, even if this price is not publicly available. Since 
there would be no point in bidding above and it would be futile to bid below the market price, 
the auction prices are expected to cluster around the market price. If this assumption is valid, the 
auction prices then provide a reliable indicator of the trading market value of salt credits. 
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The other factor is the assumption that the price information on the trading market was poor. 
The auction prices would then be expected to reflect the bidders' MAC. As storing excess saline 
water on site is the prevailing control option for the coal mines, the closing auction prices would 
have suggested small variation in the MACs among bidders due to the similar saline water 
control option. Whatever the reason, it suggests that significant cost saving from permit trading 
under the PHRSTS should not be expected, as will be revealed in Chapter 7. 
In the meantime, for both the 2004 and 2006 auctions, firms had a potential incentive to bias 
their offer below their true value (that is, market price or marginal cost of credit). Clearly this 
potentially biased bidding incentive stems from the discriminatory pricing rule applied in both 
auctions, where firms' payments are closely related to their bids. Firms have an incentive to 
make a sophisticated bid lower than a bid that reveals their true values with the hope of paying 
less. They would then face the risk that their bids will be turned down. However, as firms can 
recover their credits lost in the auction with later purchases in the trading market, losing the bids 
in the auction may not have a significant impact on their overall capability of environmental 
compliance. In this situation, firms are prone to bid lower prices. Firms would also have an 
incentive to attempt arbitrage, that is, to buy cheaply at the auction and sell at the market price 
afterwards. For each unit that the firm buys in the auction, it would then make an additional 
profit equal to the difference between the auction price and the market price. This may also 
explain why the successful bidders are dominated by sellers and net sellers on the trading 
market. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has looked into a number of operational aspects of the PHRSTS. It finds that the 
PHRSTS participants tended to take more advantage of unlimited discharges in Flood flows 
than of tradable discharges in High flows. Around 53% of total salt load was discharged in the 
Flood flow periods (2.3% of the total time), whilst 43% was discharged in the High flow period 
(9 .6% of the total time). This reflects the feature of industrial saline water generation - the 
volume of saline water generated on site has a generally positive relationship with rainfall and 
river flows - and also offers an explanation for the low average utilisation rate of salt credits 
and the low auction prices of salt credits, because the scope for credit trading is limited by the 
flow conditions. 
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This chapter also provides a preliminary analysis of the credit trading market and its 
implications for the first two FHRSTS credit auctions in 2004 and 2006. It finds that the credit 
trading market of the PHRSTS was active in terms of both volume of trades and number of 
participants, in spite of the high proportion of intra-company trades due to high cross-company 
ownership of the PHRSTS participants. There were 157 credit transactions involving 6811 
credits traded during the PHRSTS period, 50% of which were intra-company trades. All the 
PHRSTS participants were involved in credit trading activities. A significant proportion of firms 
(9 out of 22 firms) were both sellers and buyers, and the successful bidders of the 2004 and 
2006 credit auctions during the FHRSTS were a mix of sellers and buyers in the credit trading 
market. However, while the low prices at these auctions suggest that the firms did not value the 
salt credits much, the narrow range of auction prices, which indicate little diversity of salt 
control costs across the firms, suggests that the gains of the industries from the credit trading is 
not great. 
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Chapter 6 Examination of the Environmental 
Effectiveness of the PHRSTS 
6.1 Introduction 
On various occasions, the NSW EPA has claimed that the PHRSTS is environmentally 
effective. Two pieces of evidence have often been cited by the NSW EPA, drawn from Figure 
6.1 below (NSW EPA 2001: 11). The first is that "the mean monthly salinity at Singleton has 
shown a declining trend since the Scheme's inception in 1995" (NSW EPA 2001: 10). The 
second, already cited in Box 1.1, is "in the fifteen years before the Scheme, salinity at Singleton 
exceeded 900 EC around 3 5% of the time. Since the Scheme's commencement, this has been 
reduced to 4% of the time" (NSW EPA 2001: 11 ). The NSW also believed that "the lower 
salinity under the Scheme has occurred despite the occurrence of drier weather that would 
previously have been associated with increasing salinity levels" (NSW EPA 2001:11), meaning 
that the PHRSTS improved the river salinity even though river flows were lower. 
At first glance, the above evidence seems convincing that the decline of river salinity after 1995 
is the direct result of the PHRSTS. However, it is also possible that the decrease in river salinity 
was at least partly caused by changes in other factors, such as rainfall, river flow conditions, 
irrigation runoff and underground inflows, given that the river salinity levels are jointly 
determined by the industrial salt load inputs which are affected by the PHRSTS, and the above-
mentioned factors which are not. 
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Figure 6.1 Evidence for reduction of river salinity at Singleton cited by the NSW EPA 
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Source: NSW EPA (2001: 11) 
This chapter assesses the environmental effectiveness of the PHRSTS against the Trickle 
Discharge (TD) through examining the effects of two factors, river flow and industrial salt load 
inputs, on salinity in the Hunter River. The examination of other factors, such as irrigation 
runoff, groundwater flows, requires further and more intensive investigation and was not 
pursued in this study. Analysis of the environmental effectiveness of the PHRSTS is done from 
two perspectives: 
(1) Before-vs-after perspective: how has the salinity of the Hunter River changed since 1995? 
(2) With-vs-without perspective: how does the salinity of the Hunter River under the PHRSTS 
compare with what it would have been without the PHRSTS (that is, under the previous Trickle 
Discharge system), and what is the benefit of the difference in the river quality to society? 
Although it is more analytically demanding, this with-vs-without perspective should ideally be 
adopted because it appears to be the conceptually correct basis for evaluating the net 
environmental effect of the PHRSTS. 
To address these questions, this chapter is divided into two parts. Though related, they have 
different focuses. The first part examines the trends in river salinity and flow before and after 
the introduction of the PHRSTS. The purpose of this examination is to detect any difference in 
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the river salinity between the PHRSTS and TD and any change of river flow that has affected 
the river salinity. 
The second part focuses on the simulation of river salinity without the PHRSTS to quantify the 
difference in river salinity caused by the PHRSTS. The challenge in such an analysis is to 
develop a consistent, accurate characterisation of the without-PHRSTS conditions. That 
characterisation must link estimates of pollutant discharges (that is, loadings) without-PHRSTS 
to their impacts on the river quality, the services provided by the water of the Hunter River, and 
the social value of these services. Those metrics are then compared to those under with-
PHRSTS conditions. 
As presented in the remainder of this chapter, this chapter addresses the first main research 
question posed in Chapter 1 - did the PHRSTS significantly improve the river salinity of the 
Hunter River? The analysis leads to a conclusion that the PHRSTS had a minimal effect on the 
improvement of river salinity in the Hunter River. In addition, there are two main contributions 
of the findings of this chapter to knowledge. Firstly, this study for the first time takes into 
account the autocorrelation effect in water quality analysis for the Hunter River. This new 
methodology provides a general reference for hydrological and water quality analysis. 
Secondly, the relationship of river salinity, river flow and discharge of industrial salt load 
simulated in this chapter, which can be further tested and calibrated using data collected in more 
recent years, could contribute to ongoing improvement in the operation of FHRSTS, such as 
providing earlier and more accurate prediction of daily Total Allowable Discharge (TAD) for 
High flow days. 
To measure the environmental performance of the PHRSTS aims, the ambient salinity 
concentration at the Singleton gauging station is chosen as the indicator. This choice was made 
for several reasons: (1) Singleton is the control point for defining river blocks, river salinity 
objective and total discharge permits in the PHRSTS regulation and operation (see Section 5.1); 
(2) hydrological and water quality records at the Singleton station are of sufficient duration and 
quality for statistical analysis; and (3) both daily data for ambient salinity at Singleton and daily 
salt load discharges from the PHRSTS participants are available for the period 1995-2002 when 
the PHRSTS was implemented. 
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Data required for this study include river flow and salinity at the Singleton station, and 
industrial salt load discharges of the PHRSTS participants. The available data are summarised 
in Table 6.1; all data were obtained from the NSW DLWC. As noted previously in Section 3.2, 
the flow data have been gathered by the DL WC at numerous gauging locations throughout the 
Hunter catchment. As one of the oldest gauging stations, Singleton has accumulated an 
abundance of historical flow data, which can be traced back as early as late 1981. However, it 
was only from 1993 that the daily flow data with very few missing observations became 
available. 
Monitoring salinity at Singleton gauging station began comparatively recently, and the 
frequency and integrity of the salinity observations vary between different periods. During the 
period 1980-1993, only monthly mean salinity records with considerable discontinuities are 
available, based on sporadic daily observations. After February 1993, daily river salinity 
observations are available as a result of a trial of flow augmentation and afterward the Hunter 
Integrated Telemetry Scheme (HITS) in the Hunter catchment (see Section 3.3). However, there 
have been a few failures due to equipment malfunction and technical problems, such as 
electrical shorting, damage to cables and wiring, failure of the new radio telemetry and faults in 
data transformation. 
Daily records of the salt load discharge of the PHRSTS participants for the period 1995-2002 
have been documented and maintained by the NSW EPA Newcastle office. The NSW DL WC 
releases these data in the HRSTS Annual Reports. The daily data on salt load discharge in this 
study were obtained from the HRSTS Annual Reports for the years from 111995 to 1112002. 
Table 6.1 Summary of available data for Singleton gauging station 
Monthly mean Daily mean 
Flow (ML/day) 111980 -1112002 111980 -1112002 
River salinity (EC) 111980 -12/1987 and 2/1993-1112002 
2/1991-11/2002 except for 7 
short gaps 
Salt load discharge (tonnes/day) Not available 1/1995~ 1112002 
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6.2 Comparison of the monthly mean EC and flow before and after the 
PHRSTS 
This section examines the difference in river salinity and flow before and after the PHRSTS 
implementation. That is, comparing the river salinity and flow under the PHRSTS and the TD. 
In order for the examination to be effective, long-term historical records have been used. To 
match the data series of monthly mean river salinity (denoted EC), which is only available after 
1980, the figures for monthly mean river flow (denoted Flow) from 1/1980 to 11/2002 are used 
in the comparison. Basic information on the monthly data under the PHRSTS and Trickle 
Discharge (TD) is listed in Table 6.2. Figure 6.2 depicts the EC against the time period. It shows 
a big gap in the EC data from 12/1987 to 2/1991 (before the PHRSTS), and seven shorter gaps 
between 1/1980 and 11/2002 (mainly before the PHRSTS as well). 
Table 6.2 Information about monthly data on EC and Flow (111980-11/2002) 
Total time series Trickle Discharge Pilot Hunter River 
Variables (1/1980-11/2002) (TD) Salinity Trading 
(1/1980-12/1994) Scheme 
(PHRSTS) 
(1/1995-11/2002) 
Sample size 275 180 95 
Available data 229 138 91 
EC Missing data 46 42 4 
Available data 274 179 95 
Flow 
Missing data 1 1 0 
Source: Data obtained from the NSW DL WC in 2003 
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Monthly mean of river salinity at Singleton 1980~2002 
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6.2.1 Exploratory analysis: normality and autocorrelation of the data 
This analysis starts with an examination of the characteristics of monthly mean river salinity 
(EC) and monthly mean river flow (Flow) data. The (probability) density plot and quantile-
quantile (qq)-plot against a normal distribution for the EC data are displayed in Figure 6.3 (a) 
and (b ). The EC data appear to have an approximately normal distribution, although this is 
slightly skewed toward the right, indicating the presence of a number of higher EC values. The 
density plot and qq-plot for the In-transformation of EC, that is, ln(EC), are presented in Figure 
6.3 (c) and (d), respectively. They show that the distribution of ln(EC) is closer to a normal 
distribution than to the distribution of EC. 
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Figure 6.3 Data distributions for EC and ln(EC), monthly mean, 1/1980-11/2002 
From Figure 6.4 (a) and (b), it can be seen that the Flow observations are not normally 
distributed and are clearly skewed toward the left due to the presence of a large number of low 
flows. Figure 6.4(c) and (d) show that the normality of Zn-transformed Flow, denoted ln(Flow), 
is much more normally distributed. 
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Data distributions for Flow and ln(Flow), monthly mean, 1/1980-11/2002 
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Flow = monthly mean river flow 
For most environmental data, such as river flow and salinity in this case, measured sequentially 
over time, the observations are usually not independent of each other. Rather, the observations 
made at a particular time are related to those made at immediately preceding times. For 
example, low flow days tend to follow other low flow days, and high flow days tend to follow 
other high flow days. This phenomenon is called autocorrelation or the time series effect 
(Diggle 1990) in statistical terms. Autocorrelation can have important implications for 
predicting water quality impacts. It is thus necessary to investigate whether or not 
autocorrelation is present in the EC and Flow data, because if it is present, the method of 
analysis for autocorrelated data must be used. Using analyses appropriate for independent data 
will give the wrong answers. 
Autocorrelation function (ACF) and Partial autocorrelation function (PACF) plots are useful 
and straightforward graphical tools for detecting the presence of autocorrelation in a data set. 
ACF measures the correlation between observations of a time series separated by time units. 
Suppose there are n time based observations x 1, x2, X3 ... Xn. When lag= 1, ACF gives a value of 
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the correlation between (x0, x1, x2 ... Xn_1) and (x1, x2, x3 ... Xn). When lag= 2, ACF then gives a 
value of the correlation between (x0, XJ, x2 ... Xn_2) and (x2, X3, X4 ..• Xn), and so on. PACF finds a 
correlation between some components of a data series, eliminating the contribution of other 
components. It removes the effect of shorter lag autocorrelation from the correlation estimate at 
longer lags (Millard and Neerchal 2001). 
The ACF for ln(EC) and ln(Flow) are plotted in Figure 6.5. The height of the vertical lines in 
the ACF plots represents the autocorrelation estimate at each lag. It measures the strength of 
similarity at each time lag among the observations, and usually decreases as the lag increases. 
The horizontal band around zero, which is defined by the two dotted lines, represents the 
approximate 95% confidence limits for the acceptance of a hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. 
That is, if no "height'' falls outside the band, it can be safely assumed that there is no 
autocorrelation effect in the tested data. Otherwise, the autocorrelation should be taken into 
account in the data analysis (Ginevan and Splitstone 2004). The PACF varies between -1 and 
+ 1, with values near± 1 indicating stronger correlation (Millard and Neerchal 2001 ). 
Figure 6.5 below clearly indicates a strong autocorrelation in ln(EC), and the peak at lag 11 in 
month indicates a seasonal cycle. The autocorrelation in ln(Flow) is not as strong as that in the 
ln(EC), as it dies out sooner, at around lag 4 in month. 
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Figure 6.5 ACF plots for ln(EC) and ln(Flow), monthly mean, 1/1980-11/2002 
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In order to understand the difference in monthly mean river salinity and flow under the Pilot 
Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) and the Trickle Discharge (TD), ln(EC) and 
ln(Flow) are first compared graphically. This is because graphical displays can be especially 
helpful for presenting a large volume of data and help develop a "big picture" understanding of 
the data before proceeding to analysis. 
First, ln(EC) and ln(Flow) under the PHRSTS and the TD are compared using boxplots. 
Boxplots are widely regarded as a very effective and concise method for comparing important 
distributional characteristics of two data sets. A central box shows the location of the 25th 
percentile (1st Q) and 75th percentile (3rd Q) with a central locating median (SOth percentile) 
(Millard and Neerchal 2001). 
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Let EC0 and EC1 be the monthly mean river salinity under the TD and the PHRSTS 
respectively, and let Flow0 and Flow1 be the monthly mean river flow under the TD and 
PHRSTS respectively. The boxplots allowing comparison of ln(EC0) and ln(EC1} are displayed 
in Figure 6.6 below. By visual inspection, the medians, 1st Q and 3rd Q of ln(EC0} are all higher 
than those of ln(EC1 ). While there are a few of extreme high ln(EC0), there are a few of extreme 
low ln(EC1 ). This seems to support the NSW EPA's claim that the river salinity declined after 
the introduction of the PHRSTS, although it does not indicate how much of this decline is the 
effect of the PHRSTS, and how much is the effect of other determining factors. 
Figure 6.6 Box plots for ln(EC0) and ln(ECJ), monthly mean, 1/1980-11/2002 
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The boxplots for ln(Flow0) versus ln(Flow1) are shown in Figure 6.7 below. The variation in 
ln(Flowo) and ln(FlowJ are similar. The median, 1st Q and 3rd Q of ln(Flow1) are all higher 
than those of ln(Flow0). This indicates that the overall river flow under the PHRSTS is higher 
than that under the TD. 
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Figure 6.7 Box plots for ln(Flow0) and ln(Flow1), monthly mean, 1/1980-11/2002 
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6.2.3 Exceedances 
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Another common way to compare hydrology and water quality data at a specified location on a 
river is to compare their frequencies of exceedance, that is, the percentage of time for which any 
selected value may be equalled or exceeded. It is often performed by delineating so-called 
occurrence/exceedance curves (Brooks et al. 2003). For any point on the curve, the vertical 
coordinate indicates the values of a hydrological or water quality parameter, while the 
horizontal coordinate shows the percentage of time that the particular value has been equalled or 
exceeded. These curves can provide a good indication of a river's hydrological and water 
quality history. A curve with a very flat slope indicates little variation in hydrological or water 
quality values, while that with a steep slope indicates the opposite. 
The exceedance of ln(EC) and ln(Flow) under TD and PHRSTS are compared in Figure 6.8 and 
Figure 6.9 respectively. Note that the percentages of exceedances for ln(EC) are identical to 
those for EC, but the scale of ln(EC) can show the difference in the river salinity before and 
after the PHRSTS implementation more clearly than that of EC. Figure 6.8 plots the exceedance 
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curves for ln(EC0 ) and ln(EC1 ). The corresponding numerical comparison is provided in Table 
6.3. It shows that the general distribution of ln(EC1 ) is lower than that of ln(ECo ). The 
proportion of observations in which EC exceeds 900 EC is reduced from 28.3% for ln(EC0 ) to 
2.5% for ln(EC1 ). This finding also supports the NSW EPA's claim that the river salinity has 
decreased since the introduction of the PHRSTS, though does not mean this is a result of the 
PHRSTS. 
Figure 6.8 Comparison of the exceedances of river salinity 
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Table 6.3 Numerical comparison of the exceedances of river salinity 
EC 
1500 
1200 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
EC = monthly river salinity 
TD = Trickle Discharge 
ln(EC) 
7.31 
7.09 
6.80 
6.68 
6.55 
6.40 
6.21 
5.99 
5.70 
PHRSTS =Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
Exceedances (%) 
TD PHRSTS 
0.72 0.00 
4.35 0.00 
28.26 3.33 
47.83 10.00 
72.46 37.78 
89.86 67.78 
97.83 91.11 
99.28 97.78 
99.28 100.00 
Figure 6.9 compares the exceedances for ln(Flow0) and ln(Flow1). Again, numerical 
comparisons are provided in Table 6.4. Both clearly indicate that the overall distribution of 
ln(Flow1) is slightly higher than ln(Flow0). While the percentage exceedance of 50 ML/day 
(base flow) is almost the same, the percentage exceedance of a flow of more than 5000 ML/day 
for the PHRSTS period is almost double that of the TD period. Based on the general inverse 
relationship between river flow and salinity (see Section 3.3), a plausible inference is that the 
decline of river salinity under the PHRSTS may be the result of higher river flows. 
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Figure 6.9 Comparison of the exceedances of river flow 
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Table 6.4 Numerical comparison of exceedances of river flow 
Exceedances (%) 
Flow ln(Flow) TD PHRSTS 
25000 10.12 
20000 
15000 
10000 
5000 
3000 
2000 
1000 
500 
300 
200 
150 
100 
50 
TD = Trickle Discharge 
PHRSTS = Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
Flow = monthly mean river flow 
9.90 
9.62 
9.21 
8.52 
8.01 
7.60 
6.91 
6.21 
5.70 
5.30 
5.01 
4.61 
3.91 
6.3 Regression models with autocorrelated errors 
0.00 0.00 
1.12 1.06 
2.23 1.06 
5.03 3.19 
7.26 4.26 
11.17 13.83 
16.20 18.09 
25.14 30.85 
40.78 42.55 
53.07 68.09 
68.72 91.49 
84.92 98.94 
96.09 100.00 
98.88 100.00 
This study first used simple statistical methods, such as the Student's t-test, the Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test and the Quantile test, to examine whether there is a statistical difference in river 
salinity and river flow between the PHRSTS and TD. However, all these methods assume that 
the data are independent of each other (Ginevan and Splitstone 2004), which is not a valid 
assumption for the river salinity and flow data of this study. The results are presented in 
Appendix 7. These simple statistical tests conclude that the river salinity under the PHRSTS is 
significantly different from that under the TD, but lead to different conclusions as to whether 
there has been a change in the river flow since the PHRSTS implementation. These conclusions 
contrast strongly with conclusions drawn from appropriate testing methods, which are presented 
here. 
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To be rigorous, the comparison of a continuous run of data before and after an intervention must 
account for the effect of autocorrelation within the data. In the literature, such an analysis falls 
broadly into the category of interrupted time series (Box and Tiao 1975; Manly 1992). The aim 
of interrupted time series analysis is to detect whether there is any evidence of a change in the 
process part way through the observation period. Interrupted time series analysis is often 
applied in environmental impact studies, behaviour modification experiments, and studies of the 
effect of government legislation on economic indicators, where the intervention may be planned 
or unplanned (Box and Tiao 1975; Manly 1992). In this section the data are analysed in a more 
rigorous way that accounts for the autocorrelation in the data analysis. 
6.3.1 Methodology 
An underlying analytical framework that can handle a wide range of interrupted time series 
problems is given in Manly (1992). In a case where the effect of autocorrelation is trivial and a 
series appears to exhibit a linear trend, a linear model can be fitted 
Y 1 = a + flt+ s 1 [6.1] 
where Y; is the observed value at time t, a and fJ are constants, and c1 represents a random 
disturbance. For intervention analysis, a dummy (or indicator) variable, denoted I, is introduced 
with values 0 (zero) at all times before the intervention event, and 1 at all times after the event. 
An intervention effect that shifts the mean level of the series by the amount 6 can be allowed for 
by fitting the model 
Y1 = a + flt + SI + s 1 [6.2] 
An intervention effect that changes the trend by the amount T can be allowed for by fitting the 
model 
Y 1 = a + flt + SI + r (It) + s 1 [6.3] 
where (It) represents the product of I and t. By using these models, the effect of the intervention 
can be assessed based on the significance of the estimates of 8 and T. In regression analysis, 
when the c1 are assumed to be independent or when the autocorrelation in c1 is assumed to be 
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small enough to ignore, Cf has a mean of zero and does not change with t. However, when the Cf 
are serially correlated, this correlation has to be accounted for in the models. In this situation, 
[6.4] 
where Jf is a random error, and k indicates the order of autocorrelation, which can be chosen 
according to the needs of each individual study. 
This method was initially developed by Box and Tiao (1975) to assess the effect of two 
interventions on the oxidant pollution level in downtown Los Angeles, and the effect of 
government controls on the monthly inflation rate in the United States. Bhattacharyya and 
Layton (1979) also used this method to study the effectiveness of seat-belt legislation in 
Queensland, Australia. 
6.3.2 Fitted models for monthly mean river salinity (EC) 
To examine the effect of PHRSTS on river salinity, a dummy variable, PHRSTS, has been 
introduced to indicate the values in the period of the Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading 
Scheme (PHRSTS). PHRSTS=O is for the Trickle Discharge (TD) period, and PHRSTS=I is for 
the PHRSTS period. Using S-plus statistical software, the models were fitted for the river 
salinity data in accordance with Equations [6.1], [6.2] and [6.3]. The simple model without a 
linear temporal (monthly) trend but accounting for the effect of PHRSTS was also fitted. The 
model description, coefficients of the estimates and the indicators for model selection are 
summarised in Table 6.5 below. 
Table 6.5 Fitted models for In (EC) 
Models 
Independent 
ln(EC).i.m1 ln(EC)-Month 
ln(EC).i.m2 ln(EC)-PHRSTS 
ln(EC).i.m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS 
ln(EC).i.m4 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS+Month*PHRSTS 
AR(1) 
ln(EC).ar1 .m1 ln(EC)-Month 
ln(EC).ar1 .m2 ln(EC)-PHRSTS 
ln(EC).ar1 .m2 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS 
ln(EC).ar1 .m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS+Month*PHRSTS 
EC = monthly mean river salinity 
AR(l) =first autoregressive model 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
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AR(1) Intercept Month PHRSTS Month*PHRSTS 
6.7802 -0.0157 
6.6769 -0.2061 
6.7589 -0.0114 -0.0724 
6.7439 -0.0094 0.1830 -0.0148 
0.4497 6.7815 -0.0161 
0.4672 6.6752 -0.2105 
0.4458 6.7587 -0.0115 -0.0783 
0.4413 6.7391 -0.0087 0.2365 -0.0185 
AIC 
-32.02 
-24.88 
-31.85 
-31.72 
-78.94 
-76.19 
-77.81 
-76.95 
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In Table 6.5 above and throughout the whole Chapter 6, AR(I) means the first autoregressive 
model. ml, m2, m3 and m4 represent inclusion of various variables in the models. The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) measures how close the fitted values under a model are to the 
observed data. It is a popular criterion for choosing between competing statistical models. The 
model with the lowest (most negative) AIC is best, but there is no associated test of how much 
better (Millard and Neerchal 2001). Models were fitted up to AR(l l), but only the first few 
models are shown in the table. In terms of the AIC, AR(l) models are generally better than 
those with higher AR levels. Based on Table 6.5, the model with a linear temporal trend better 
accounts for changes in EC than the simple model of constant EC before and after the PHRSTS 
implementation. The AR(l) models provide better fit than those that assume no autocorrelation. 
Furthermore, among the AR(l) models, ln(EC).arl.ml, which is expressed as Model [6.5] 
below, is the best fitting model for the trend in river salinity observations because of its smallest 
AIC value. 
ln(EC) = 6.78-0.016Month [6.5] 
This model fits a simple line with a negative slope for time (month) but without the variable 
P HRSTS, indicating there is no evidence of any change in the monthly mean river salinity of the 
Hunter River attributable to the introduction of the PHRSTS. 
To check that Model [6.5] fits the data, several diagnostic procedures were applied to the 
residuals from this model, including an autocorrelation check, a cumulative periodogram check 
and residual plots. 
A common diagnostic technique to assess the fit of a model to the autocorrelated data is to 
examine the ACF and PACF for its residuals. If no autocorrelation in the residuals is found, it 
can be assumed that the model adequately fits the autocorrelation in the data. Otherwise, the 
model is inadequate (Millard and Neerchal 2001). For comparison purposes, the ACF and 
PACF plots for the residuals from both ln(EC).i.ml (not accounting for autocorrelation effect) 
and ln(EC).arl.ml (accounting for autocorrelation effect) are displayed in Figure 6.10. At small 
lags, it is obvious that, while several autocorrelation estimates for the residuals of ln(EC).i.ml 
fall outside the strip defined by the two dotted lines, almost all the autocorrelation estimates for 
the residuals of ln(EC).arl.ml sit well within the strip. This indicates ln(EC).arl.ml has 
eliminated the autocorrelation effect, and thus is adequate for the EC observation trend. 
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Figure 6.10 ACF and PACF of ln(EC).i.ml and ln(EC).arl.ml 
(a) ACF of ln(EC).i.m1 (b) PACF of ln(EC).i.m1 
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(c) ACF of ln(EC).ar1 .m1 (d) PACF of ln(EC).ar1 .m1 
0 
"' 
ci 
co 
ci 
CD u. :g 
ci ~o u. 
O"': (ij 
<(O ~~ 
N 
ci o._9 
~ 
N 9 9 
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20 
Lag Lag 
ACF = autocorrelation function 
P ACF = partial autocorrelation function 
ln(EC).i.ml =fitted model for monthly mean river salinity without accounting for autocorrelation effect 
ln(EC). ar I. ml = fitted model for monthly mean river salinity accounting for autocorrelation effect 
A cumulative periodogram provides an effective means for the detection of periodicities in the 
residuals. The diagonal lines in the cumulative periodogram plots define the 95% confidence 
bands for an uncorrelated relationship between two observations in a stationary time series 
(Millard and Neerchal 2001). Figure 6.11 presents the cumulative periodograms for the 
residuals from the ln(EC).i.ml and ln(EC).arl.ml fits. The residual cumulative periodogram 
curve for ln(EC).arl.ml lies within the 95% band, while that for ln(EC).i.ml lies outside the 
band at more than 5% of the frequencies. This provides extra evidence on the goodness of fit of 
ln(EC).arl.ml. 
172 
Chapter 6 Examination of the Environmental Effectiveness of the PHRSTS 
Figure 6.11 Cumulative periodograms of ln(EC).i.ml and ln(EC). arl.ml 
(a) ln(EC).i.m1 (b) ln(EC).ar1 .m1 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
frequency frequency 
ln(EC).i.ml =fitted model for monthly mean river salinity without accounting for autocorrelation effect 
ln(EC).arl.ml =fitted model for monthly mean river salinity accounting for autocorrelation effect 
Residual plotting is another common tool used to reveal any weaknesses in a linear model 
(Millard and Neerchal 2001). The residual plots for ln(EC).arl.ml are displayed in Figure 6.12. 
The normal quantile-quantile plot ofresiduals shown in Figure 6.12 (a) provides a visual test of 
the assumption that the model's errors are normally distributed. The ordered residuals of 
ln(EC).ar I.ml lying along the qq-line reveal a normal distribution of its errors. In addition, the 
residuals plotted against PHRSTS, month and the fitted values EC are presented in Figure 6.12 
(b ), ( c) and ( d). Compared to the total 229 observation values, the number of outliers is 
minimal. The residuals plotted against PHRSTS indicate more variability for the TD period than 
the PHRSTS period perhaps because of a number of large values of river salinity present under 
the TD. 
173 
Chapter 6 Examination of the Environmental Effectiveness of the PHRSTS 
Figure 6.12 Residual plots of ln(EC).arl.ml 
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ln(EC).arl.ml =fitted model for monthly river salinity accounting for autocorrelation effect 
The diagnostic checks show no lack of fit or violation of assumptions in Model [6.5], 
confirming that [ 6.5] is the best model of those tested. The fitted line for Model [ 6.5] has been 
plotted in Figure 6.13 to show the EC trends for both before and after PHRSTS periods. 
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Fitted lines of AR(l) models of ln(EC) 
Fitted line of ln(EC).ar1 .m1 
1985 1990 1995 2000 
Year 
ln(EC).arl.ml =fitted model for monthly mean river salinity accounting for autocorrelation effect 
TD = Trickle Discharge 
PHRSTS = Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
Although the level of river salinity for the PHRSTS period is lower than that for the TD period, 
any differences in trend of river salinity between the periods are not statistically significant. The 
decrease of the monthly mean river salinity of the Hunter River is caused by a general declining 
trend of the river salinity over time, rather than by any effect of the PHRSTS. This leads to the 
conclusion that the PHRSTS has had little effect on the monthly mean river salinity. Comparing 
this finding with those from the simple statistical methods presented in Appendix 7, when the 
autocorrelation effect in the data is taken into account, the analysis no longer shows differences 
in river salinity flow under the PHRSTS and the TD. This illustrates that erroneous conclusions 
can be made if an analysis uses an inappropriate statistical method. 
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6.3.3 Fitted model for monthly mean river flow (Flow) 
In the same way, the models for ln(Flow) up to lag 4 in month were fitted based on the insight 
obtained from examination of the data. As shown in Figure 6.5(c), autocorrelation effect in 
ln(Flow) appears up to lag 4 . Similar to ln(EC), the AR(l) models are generally better than 
others. Only AR(O) and AR(J) models are presented in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 Fitted models of ln(Flow) 
Models AR(1) Intercept Month PHRSTS· Month*PHRSTS 
Independent 
ln(Flow).i.m1 ln(Flow)-Month 
ln(Flow).i.m2 ln(Flow)-Flow 
ln(Flow).i.m3 ln(Flow)-Month+PHRSTS 
ln(Flow).i.m4 ln(Flow)-Month+PHRSTS+Month*PHRSTS 
AR(1) 
ln(Flow).ar1 .m1 ln(Flow)-Month 
ln(Flow).ar1 .m2 ln(Flow)-PHRSTS 
ln(Flow).ar1 .m3 ln(Flow)-Month+PHRSTS 
ln(Flow).ar1 .m4 ln(Flow)-Month+PHRSTS+Month*PHRSTS 
Flow = monthly mean river flow 
AR(l) =first autoregressive model 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
5.9188 0.0320 
6.1839 0.2896 
5.8400 0.0461 -0.2393 
5.8991 0.0382 -1.3192 0.0619 
0.4863 5.9207 0.0314 
0.4948 6.1771 0.2938 
0.4848 5.8658 0.0414 -0.1698 
0.4828 5.9086 0.0354 -0.8988 -0.0422 
It can be seen from Table 6.6 that the AIC value of ln(Flow).arl.ml is the smallest among those 
of other fitted models. ln(Flow).arl.ml, expressed in Model [6.6], is the best fitted model for 
ln(Flow). 
ln(Flow) = 5.92 + 0.03Month [6.6] 
To check the fit of the model ln(Flow).arl.ml, diagnostic checks were undertaken and are 
displayed in Figures 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16. The diagnostic checks for the independent model 
ln(Flow).i.ml are provided for comparison purposes. The fitted line for the final model 
ln(Flow).arl.ml is presented in Figure 6.17. 
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910.57 
914.99 
911.85 
912.80 
838.58 
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Figure 6.14 ACF and PACF for ln(Flow).i.ml and ln(Flow).arl.ml 
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ln(jlow).i.ml =fitted model for monthly mean river flow without accounting for autocorrelation effect 
ln(jlow).arl.ml =fitted model for monthly mean river flow without accounting for autocorrelation effect 
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Figure 6.15 Cumulative periodograms of ln(Flow).i.ml and ln(Flow).arl.ml 
(a) ln(Flow).i.m1 (b) ln(Flow).ar1 .m1 
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Figure 6.17 Fitted lines for AR(l) models of ln(Flow) 
Fitted line of ln(Flow).ar1 .m1 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Year 
ln(flow).ar I.ml= fitted model for monthly mean river flow without accounting for autocorrelation effect 
TD = Trickle Discharge 
PHRSTS = Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
The above analysis reveals that the higher river flow under the PHRSTS than under the TD was 
caused by a general increasing trend of the river flow over time. However, the monthly mean 
river flow under the PHRSTS does not significantly differ from that under the TD in a statistical 
sense. 
6.3.4 Sensitivity analyses 
Further analyses were conducted to examine whether there are foresight or transitional effects in 
monthly mean river salinity ln(EC) or monthly mean river flow ln(Flow). As noted in Chapter 5, 
initiation of the PHRSTS started in 1993 after intensive consultation with local industries. The 
anticipation of the inception of the PHRSTS may have caused these industries to alter their 
discharge behaviour some years before 1995 when the PHRSTS was brought into force. 
Therefore it would be of interest to examine the effect of anticipation on the results of analyses. 
To do so, a one-year foresight effect was examined by employing a dummy variable PHRSTS_1, 
while P HRSTS_1 = 0 is for 111980~ 12/1993 and P HRSTS_1 = 1 is for 1/1994~ 11/2002. That is, it 
is assumed the PHRSTS effectively came into force after 1994. A two-year foresight effect was 
also examined. A dummy variable P HRSTS_2 is used to represent a two-year anticipation period 
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(1993 and 1994). That is, PHRSTS.2 = 0 is for 111980~12/1992 and PHRSTS_2 = 1 is for 
111993~ 1112002. 
The opposition to the foresight effect is the transitional effect. The PHRSTS implementation 
may not have had an immediate influence on behaviour. Industries might take several years to 
reform their saline water management, become accustomed to the operational system of 
PHRSTS, and change their discharges. To assess such possible transitional effects on the results 
of the analysis, two dummy variables, PHRSTS+1 and PHRSTS+2' were introduced to represent a 
one-year and two-year transitional period, respectively. By using PHRSTS+1, it is assumed that 
the PHRSTS effectively started in 1996. That is, PHRSTS+1 = 0 for l/1980~1211995, while 
PHRSTS+1 = 1 is for l/1996~1112002. Likewise, for an effective start date of 1997, PHRSTS+2 = 
0 for 111980~ 12/1996, while P HRSTS+2 = 1 is for 1/1997~ 11/2002. 
Using the same procedures as elaborated in Section 6.3.2 above, the fitted models for ln(EC) 
with different indicating variables from PHRSTS_2 to PHRSTS+2 were estimated. The results are 
shown in Appendix 8. The results show that there is no evidence of foresight or transitional 
effects in the data. The best fitting models for ln(EC) are the same as Model [6.5]. Again, this 
confirms that the PHRSTS had little effect on the overall trend of the monthly mean river 
salinity of the Hunter River. 
Up to this point, the analysis has shown that although the overall salinity of the Hunter River 
was lower after the PHRSTS than before, the PHRSTS is not the contributing factor. This 
finding, though disappointing, is straightforward to explain. The PHRSTS was designed to 
achieve the river salinity objectives by redistributing the saline water discharges over time and 
among industries, not by reducing total discharge. Therefore, if the PHRSTS had been 
environmentally effective, this may not have been reflected in the overall trend of the river 
salinity. Bearing this in mind, the next step of the study is to analyse the effect of the inception 
of PHRSTS on high salinity, which usually occurs in the Low flow periods. 
6.3.5 Comparison of the monthly mean river salinity in Low flow periods 
To assess the effect of the PHRSTS on the monthly mean river salinity in the Low flow periods, 
only data corresponding to flows less than 2000 ML/day were used to fit the models. Following 
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the same procedures as elaborated in Section 6.3 .2 above, models for ln(EC) in the Low flow 
period (Flow< 2000 ML/day) were fitted; these are shown in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 Fitted models of ln(EC) of Low flow period 
Models AR(1) Intercept Month PHRSTS Month*PHRSTS 
Independent 
ln(EC)L.i.m1 ln(ECk- Month 6.8073 -0.0174 
ln(EC)L.i.m2 ln(EC) L - PHRSTS 6.6629 -0.2054 
ln(EC)L.i.m3 ln(EC) L - Month+PHRSTS 6.8039 -0.0167 -0.0143 
ln(EC)L.i.m4 ln(EC) L - Month+PHRSTS+Month*PHRSTS 6.7960 -0.0158 0.6961 -0.0353 
AR(1) 
AIC 
-69.56 
-39.46 
-67.65 
-69.49 
ln(EC)L.ar1 .m1 ln(EC) L - Month 0.4573 6.8029 -0.0174 -103.27 
ln(EC)L.ar1 .m2 ln(EC) L - PHRSTS 0.5455 6.6535 -0.2063 -92.50 
ln(EC)L.ar1 .m3 ln(EC) L - Month+PHRSTS 0.4571 6.7993 -0.0168 -0.0147 -101.30 
ln(EClL.ar1 .m4 ln(EC) L - Month+PHRSTS+Month*PHRSTS 0.4442 
ECr =monthly mean river salinity of low flow period 
AR(l) =first autoregressive model 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
6.7882 -0.0153 0.8189 -0.0418 
From Table 6.7, the best model for the river salinity of the Low flow periods is ln(EC)r.arl.ml. 
That is, 
ln(EC)r =6.80-0.0I7Month [6.7] 
-101.52 
where ln(EC)r represents the river salinity in the Low flow period, accounting for the 
autocorrelation effect in the errors at lag 1 in month. Model [6. 7] is very close to Model [6.5], 
the best fitted model for the overall monthly mean river salinity. Model [6.7] does not include 
the variable PHRSTS either, indicating that there is no difference in the river salinity during the 
Low flow period before and after the PHRSTS implementation. 
It would be of interest to fit models to ln(EC) in both the High and Flood flow periods. 
However, there are insufficient monthly EC records in either of these periods to conduct the 
study. For example, while 35 monthly records of the river flow fall into the category of High 
flow, only one monthly record of the river salinity is available. There are 13 monthly records of 
the river flow falling into the category of the Flood flow, but only six monthly records of river 
salinity are available, of which two records are for the TD period, and four are for the PHRSTS 
period. 
So far, analyses of the river flow and salinity have been separated, rather than combined. The 
analyses have revealed that the difference in the monthly river flow and salinity before and after 
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the inception of PHRSTS is not statistically significant. Moreover, the difference in monthly 
mean river salinity of the Low flow period before and after the inception of PHRSTS is modest. 
However, two limitations of this method may prevent drawing a concrete conclusion without 
further quantitative analysis. 
One limitation is that the above analyses are all based on the monthly mean of both river salinity 
and river flow observations. However, the observation records for river salinity are incomplete 
before 1993. While there were no observation records for the 42 months before 1993, only a few 
daily observations are available for many months. This may affect the reliability of the 
comparison results. Even if the monthly mean data are complete without any missing records, 
they can only provide the general features of river flow and salinity in an indicative way. Loss 
of extreme daily values in the averaging might also have an additional effect on the reliability of 
the comparison results. 
The other limitation is that as a general problem with comparative time series, the time series of 
river salinity and flow under the PHRSTS and TD may not in fact be very comparable, and may 
be affected in different ways by various interrupted events during the time, although 
superficially they seem similar. As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, it is assumed 
that all the conditions, such as irrigation runoff, land use and groundwater inflows in the Hunter 
River, are unchanged under the PHRSTS compared to the TD. Under this assumption, the 
inception of PHRSTS and river flow are regarded as the only interventions. However, other 
possible interventions may have some negative effects on the river salinity; these can offset any 
positive effects of the PHRSTS. Without extra information, it is hard to make a judgment and 
reach a concrete conclusion. 
In response to these limitations, a convincing way of examining the net effect of the PHRSTS 
on the river salinity of the Hunter River is to compare the river salinity with and without the 
PHRSTS. Ideally, if the relationship between the river flow, river salinity and industrial salt 
load inputs could be modelled from readily obtained data, the salinities under a variety of 
hydrological conditions and management strategies could be easily predicted, and then the net 
environmental effect of the PHRSTS on the river salinity could be quantified. However, again, 
the complexity of the salinity process of the Hunter River suggests a need for examining other 
intensive information on land use, irrigation practices and groundwater movement. This 
information is less easy to obtain and beyond the scope of the present research. So the next 
section models the relationship between river salinity, river flow and industrial salt inputs, based 
182 
Chapter 6 Examination of the Environmental Effectiveness of the PHRSTS 
on the available daily observations during 1995-2002, with the aim of quantifying the response 
of river salinity to the change of flow conditions and the salt discharge from the PHRSTS 
participants. 
6.4 Comparison of the environmental performance with versus 
without-PHRSTS using daily observed data 
Statistical analysis to identify variables affecting river salinity must include river flow and 
industrial salt discharge. Other variables, such as salt load from irrigation and groundwater 
inflows, could be added but the data are not available. In this section, the relationship between 
river salinity, river flow and industrial discharge are explored. This relationship will be used to 
simulate the river salinity under the scenario without-PHRSTS and then assess the 
environmental effectiveness of the PHRSTS through comparing the river salinity with versus 
without the PHRSTS. 
To do this, the daily observations of river salinity (denoted ec), river flow (denoted.flow) 18 and 
aggregated industrial salt discharge (denoted d) at Singleton for the period of 111995-11/2002 
are used here. These observations are not available for the period before the PHRSTS 
implementation. The basic information about ec,jlow and dis provided in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 Basic information about the daily data of ec,flow and d (1/1995-11/2002) 
Sample size 
Available data 
Missing data 
ec = daily river salinity 
flow = daily river flow 
ec 
2891 
2633 
258 
d = daily aggregated industrial salt discharge 
flow d 
2891 2891 
2891 2981 
0 0 
18 The lower case distinguishes the daily from the monthly data, which have been denoted as EC and Flow, 
respectively. 
183 
Chapter 6 Examination of the Environmental Effectiveness of the PHRSTS 
6.4.1 Exploratory analysis 
The density plots and qq-plots for ec,jlow and d, and for their corresponding In-transformations, 
denoted as ln(ec), ln(flow) and ln(d+ I) respectively, are presented in Figures 6.18, 6.19 and 
6.20 .. Adding 1 to d values is to avoid the undefined ln(O) when there is no discharge from the 
PHRSTS participants. Also, the ACF and APCF plots for ec and ln(ec) are presented in Figure 
6.1. 
Figure 6.18 Distribution of ec and ln(ec), daily river salinity, 111995-11/2002 
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Figure 6.19 Distribution ofjlow and ln(Flow), daily river flow, 1/1995-11/2002 
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Figure 6.20 Distribution of d and ln(d+l), daily industrial salt discharge, 1/1995-
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Figure 6.21 ACF and PACF of ec and ln(ec), daily river salinity, 1/1995-11/2002 
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• The distribution of ec is approximately normal, and follows a normal distribution more 
closely than ln(ec) does. 
• Strong autocorrelation is seen in both ec and ln(ec). 
• The distribution of flow is far from normal. This is a problem, since to use flow as an 
explanatory variable in models for ec, its distribution should be relatively even. The 
evenness of the distribution of flow is greatly improved by transforming it into ln(flow). 
• The distribution of d is also non-normal. A considerable number of nil discharges in the 
Low flow period and occasionally large values of salt discharge in the Flood flow period 
are a direct effect of the PHRSTS. Recall that the PHRSTS prohibits discharge during Low 
flow periods, and allows virtually unlimited discharge during Flood flow periods. As dis to 
be used as an explanatory variable in models for ec, its distribution should be relatively 
even. Thus, transforming d to ln(d+ I) improves the evenness of the distribution of salt. 
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Accordingly, ec, ln(flow) instead of flow, and ln(d+ I) instead of dare used in the models. The 
autocorrelation effect between successive observations is also taken into account. 
6.4.2 Relationship between ec, ln(fiow) and ln(d+l) 
The relationships between daily river salinity ec, daily river flow ln(flow) and daily aggregated 
industrial salt discharge ln(d +I) are explored graphically, two at a time, below. 
6.4.2.1 Relationship between ln(d+l) and ln(flow) 
Figure 6.22 plots daily aggregated industrial salt discharge ln(d+ I) against daily river flow 
ln(Flow) at various river flow periods. As noted in 5.1.3, the PHRSTS regulations regulated the 
industrial discharge of saline water on the basis of river flow periods. Discharge is only allowed 
when the river flow is predicted to be High (over 2000 ML/day). This is reflected in Figure 
6.22. In Figure 6.22(a), the amount of industrial salt discharge shows generally increasing 
relationship with increasing river flow when the river flow exceeds the threshold of ln(2000) 
=7.6. Another interesting finding from Figure 6.22(b) is that some discharge events in the Low 
flow periods should not have occurred. This is due to flow prediction errors. As described in 
Section 5.2.1, the PHRSTS relies on an Integrated Quantity and Quality Model (IQQM) to 
predict the flow at Singleton and issues the discharge permits in advance. Although IQQM is 
reliable, it still generated a relatively low error rate (that is, 1.82%) during 1995-2002 when 
High or Flood flows were predicted, but actual events were Low flows. This kind of error 
resulted in the discharge events as shown in Figure 6.22(b ). Figure 6.22 ( c) and ( d) show a 
number of nil discharges during the High and Flood flow periods. This may be caused by errors 
in model predictions, or it is possible that there was no need for industry to discharge. 
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Figure 6.22 Relationship between ln(d+l) and ln(/low), daily data, 1/1995-11/2002 
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Figure 6.23 plots daily river salinity ec against daily aggregated industrial salt discharge ln(d+ I) 
for the period 1995~2002. No clear relationship between ec and ln(d +I) can be detected from 
the scatter plot. However, when a smoothing spline19 is fitted, it can be seen that when ln(d+ I) 
is greater than 2, ec gradually decreases as the discharge increases. Since a large amount of 
industrial discharge occurs in High and Flood flow periods as the PHRSTS specifies, this 
suggests industrial discharge has little effect on the river salinity. It appears that river flow is the 
dominating factor affecting the river salinity levels in the Hunter River. 
19 Smoothing spline is an exploratory operation, a means of gaining insight into data without precisely formulated 
models or hypotheses (Diggle 1990). 
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Figure 6.23 Relationship between ec and ln(d+l), daily data, 1/1995-11/2002 
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An exploratory method suitable for detecting temporal trends in daily river flow (flow) and daily 
river salinity (ec) is to plot them through time, as shown in Figure 6.24. This shows large day-
to-day and year-to-year fluctuations in both flow and ec. A generally inverse relationship is 
observed between ec andflow. In a model that has diffused high salinity groundwater mixing 
with fresher surface water, such an inverse relationship is expected and well known (see Section 
3.3). Nonetheless, the inverse relationship between ec and flow appears to be different in 
different periods. 
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Figure 6.24 flow and ec at Singleton, daily data, 1/1995-11/2002 
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The daily time series ofriver salinity (ec) shown in Figure 6.24 exhibits two distinct processes. 
First, an underlying sinusoidal pattern generally peaks during summer Low-flow periods. This 
pattern represents the receiving water's response to the steady background salt load and high 
evaporation rate (see Section 3.3), which together produce maximum concentrations during 
Low flow. Second, sudden peak concentrations sometimes occur. These peaks represent the 
occurrences of shock loads from the runoff in the first-flush washoff at the start of a rainfall 
runoff (see Section 3 .3) or starts of intensive salt discharges from the industries. 
Figure 6.25 shows a scatter plot of ec against ln(flow) and a fitted smoothing spline. From the 
graph, dilution of salinity is evident at flows higher than 600 ML/day where ln(flow) = 6.4. 
However, the relationship between ec and ln(flow) at flows lower than 600 ML/day is complex 
with a wide range of variation. This could be due to complex salt discharge processes (for 
example, diffuse groundwater inflows, and salt from agricultural irrigation), and/or the 
distribution of rainfall across the catchment, or instrumental and data processing errors. 
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Figure 6.25 Relationship between ec and ln(/low), daily data, 111995-11/2002 
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Figure 6.25 highlights two simple hydrological trends of the Hunter River. First, the average 
river salinity is, at least qualitatively, inversely proportional to the river flow. In general, higher 
river flows are characterised by lower average salinity. Second, at lower river flows, the 
variability in average salinity is much higher than that at higher flows. 
6.4.2.4 Model to predict ec from flow and d 
As observed in Section 6.4.1, the river salinity of any one day not only directly depends upon 
the salt inputs from various sources and the river flow conditions of that day, but is also 
indirectly affected by the in-river salinity on the preceding days. The autocorrelation inherent in 
the river salinity is also present in the river flow, which varies over time. Using S-plus, the 
following model was fitted, allowing autocorrelation of various orders up to AR(8) in &1, where 
b and c measures the effect of jfow and don ec separately, d measures the joint effect of jfow 
and don ec. 
ec =a+ b In(flow) + c ln(d + 1) + d In(flow) x ln(d + 1) +ct [6.8) 
191 
Chapter 6 Examination of the Environmental Effectiveness of the PHRSTS 
In such modelling, the main effects are usually first fitted, followed by the AR terms. Running 
the models showed that a possible convergence problem arises from ec.ar5. This implies there 
is no further improvement in the result of the models that allow autocorrelation of orders higher 
than AR(4). Therefore, only the coefficients of the estimates and the indicators for model 
selection for the models up to ec.ar4 are summarised in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 Fitted model of ec,flow and d 
AR(l) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4) a b c d AIC 
ec.i 677.29 -2.04 60.60 -9.52 33646.20 
ec.arl 0.96 986.55 -53.14 22.00 -2.84 27627.62 
ec.ar2 0.98 -0.03 1016.61 -58.02 18.22 -2.35 27618.57 
ec.ar3 0.98 -0.12 0.11 1065.32 -65.95 10.74 -1.40 27588.72 
ec.ar4 0.97 -0.11 0.04 0.07 1061.19 -65.28 12.17 -1.57 27579.52 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
ec. i = fitted model without accounting for autocorrelation effect 
ec.arl, ec.ar2, ec.ar3, ec.ar4 =fitted model accounting for autocorrelation effect at lagl, lag2, lag3 and 
lag4 respectively 
Comparing the AI Cs in the above Table, it can be seen that the last four models which consider 
the autocorrelation effect are superior to the one without considering the autocorrelation effect 
as their considerable lower AIC values. Among them, ec.ar4, the model that includes the effect 
of river salinity of the previous four days, has the smallest value of AIC and is thus the best 
model to fit the data. The residual cumulative periodogram curves in Figure 6.26 provide 
evidence of the goodness of fit of ec.ar4. Figure 6.26 shows that ec.arl, ec.ar2, ec.ar3 and 
ec.ar4 are much more adequate than that which ignores autocorrelation (that is, ec.i). 
Furthermore, the fitness of ec.ar4 is the best among all. 
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Figure 6.26 Cumulative periodograms of fitted models for ec 
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Therefore, the best fitting model to describe the relationship between ec,jlow and dis expressed 
as follows: 
ec = 1061.19- 65.28ln(flow) + 12.17ln(d+1)-l.57ln(flow) x ln(d + 1) + & 1 
[6.9] 
In [6.9], the significance of the coefficients of ln(flow) and ln(d+ 1) is less visible. When d = 0, 
the coefficient of the ln(flow) parameter is -65.28, showing that as flow increases, ec decreases. 
At higher d values, because ln(d+ 1) is positive, the negative coefficient (that is, -1.57) on the 
interaction term ln(flow) x ln(d+ 1) makes ec decrease faster than at d = 0. At lower flow, when 
d increases, ec increases. In contrast, at higher flow, when d increases, ec decrease. This means 
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that while industrial salt discharge has an effect on river salinity, such an effect is more evident 
in Low flow than in High flow. 
6.4.2.5 Comparison of river salinity with and without the PHRSTS 
As stated earlier, one way to evaluate the net environmental effectiveness of the Pilot Hunter 
River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) is to compare the river salinity with and without the 
PHRSTS. Since the Trickle Discharge (TD) system dominated the NSW EPA's regulations on 
industrial saline water discharge before the introduction of the PHRSTS in 1993, this study 
stimulates the daily river salinities at Singleton under the TD using Model [6.9] and further 
assumptions below, and compares the simulated salinities with the actual salinities under the 
PHRSTS. 
Under the TD system, industries were allowed to discharge saline water to the Hunter River at a 
low rate on a more-or-less continuous basis all year round, subject to various licensing 
conditions (see Section 4.2). Because information about discharge frequency, discharge 
concentration and volume on a daily basis from each mine and power station is not available, 
and given that the underlying philosophy of this simulation is to re-distribute the industrial 
discharge within the entire period of the PHRSTS so as to capture the net environmental 
benefits of the PHRSTS, the following restrictive assumptions were made in this study: 
• In the period of 1/1995-11/2002, the aggregated amounts of industrial salt discharged under 
the PHRSTS and TD system are the same; 
• Under the TD system, the industrial salt is discharged at a continuous, stable and even rate. 
This assumption enables the daily salt discharge under the TD system to be estimated by 
averaging the aggregated amount of salt discharge under the PHRSTS. 
Let d1 (tonnes/day) be the aggregated salt load discharged by the PHRSTS participants on any 
day during the PHRSTS period. The daily salt load discharged by the participants under the TD, 
denoted d , is 
T Ida 
d=l=l_ 
T 
[6.10] 
Tis the number of days during 1/1995-11/2002, which is 2981 in total. Putting d; into [6.9], the 
daily river salinity under the TD system, denoted ec, is predicted as follows: 
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ec = 1061.19- 65.28ln(flow)+12.17ln(d+1)-1.57 ln(jlow) x ln(d + 1) + &t [6.11] 
By the definition in [6.4] and the result in Table 6.9, in the analysis here 
[6.12] 
where 61 is a random error on day t. By including the term E:1 , the effect of the river salinity in 
the previous four days is included in the prediction. 
The observed river salinity under the PHRSTS (that is, ec) and the stimulated river salinity 
under the TD system (that is, ec) are compared using smoothing splines in Figure 6.27. These 
two lines intersect at approximately ln(flow) = 6.55 where flow = 700 ML/day. This is the 
direct effect of prediction errors generated by the IQQM. If the IQQM had predicted river flow 
at Singleton as precisely as it should have occurred, and there was no actual discharge from the 
industries in the Low flow period as the PHRSTS specified, the two lines are expected to 
intersect at ln(flow) = 7.6 where flow= 2000 ML/day. This procedure clearly shows that without 
the PHRSTS the river salinity at lower flow period (jlow < 700 ML/day) would be much higher 
than that with the PHRSTS, and the river salinity at higher flow periods (jlow > 700 ML/day) 
would be lower than those with the PHRSTS. This is the anticipated result - the low values of 
river salinity (which occurred in higher flow period) under the TD are lower than those under 
the PHRSTS, and high values of river salinity (which occurred in lower flow period) under the 
TD are higher than those under the PHRSTS - since under the PHRSTS no industrial salt was 
discharged at Low flows and more salt was discharged at High and Flood flows. However, the 
Figure shows a modest difference between ec and ec. 
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Figure 6.27 Observed ec of the PHRSTS versus stimulated ec of the TD 
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The exceedance curves for the river salinity under the PHRSTS and TD are plotted in Figure 
6.28. The Figure shows that the curves under these two situations are too close to be seen 
separately. Table 6.10 provides a comparison of the exceedance at some key thresholds of river 
salinity for both. It shows that the PHRSTS would have reduced the number of days that river 
salinity exceeded 900 EC by 0.57%, compared to without the PHRSTS. 
196 
Chapter 6 Examination of the Environmental Effectiveness of the PHRSTS 
Figure 6.28 Exceedance curves for ec under the PHRSTS and under the TD 
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Table 6.10 Comparison of the exceedance of the river salinity under the PHRSTS and 
under the TD 
Exceedances (%) 
Daily river salinity Pilot Hunter River Salinity 
ec Trading Scheme Trickle Discharge 
PHRSTS TD TD-PHRSTS 
200 99.85 99.96 0.11 
500 84.31 87.81 3.49 
600 64.34 66.54 2.20 
900 4.60 5.17 0.57 
1000 0.87 1.06 0.19 
1100 0.04 0.08 0.04 
1200 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Using a regression with autocorrelated errors, this study has predicted river salinity subject to 
the same river flow conditions as under the PHRSTS, but assuming that industrial discharge 
takes place under the TD system. The analysis shows that the difference in the river salinity 
under the PHRSTS and TD is minor. So the data show little if any effect of PHRSTS on the 
improvement of water quality in the Hunter River. 
However, several factors may cause some profound effects on these predictions. Firstly, 
regression with autocorrelated errors assumes the explanatory variables in a model are 
independent of each other. However, in this case, the industrial discharge is not a completely 
independent variable from the river flow. Despite the fact that the amount of actual salt 
discharge is not closely related to the river flow, the occurrence of the discharge (that is. the 
time that industrial saline water is discharged into the Hunter River) is determined by the river 
flow periods. Therefore, there is a connection between.flow and din the model. 
Secondly, the nil salt discharge from the PHRSTS participants in the Low flow period could 
mask the effect of the discharge on the river salinity under a Low flow period to some extent. 
Strong dilution in the High flow period could also weaken the effect of the industrial discharge. 
These two aspects would jointly produce a biased model. 
Thirdly, in this prediction, the industrial salt discharge under the TD is estimated by averaging 
the aggregated amount of discharge under the PHRSTS during the whole period of 111995-
11/2002. This may not reflect the real situation of TD. For example, in the real situation, 
especially in its later stage, the TD not only specified the ambient level of the River, but also 
imposed a limit of incremental river salinity on some industrial dischargers. It is plausible that 
the total industrial salt under the TD system would be less than that under the PHRSTS. The 
rough estimate of industrial discharge under the TD may have some effect on the result of river 
salinity prediction. 
6.5 Estimation of environmental benefit 
The above analysis has revealed that the river salinity of the Hunter River under the PHRSTS is 
not significantly different from that under the TD. As such, no considerable saving in social 
damage cost generated by the PHRSTS is expected. Even so, the cost saving is still estimated 
here for completeness and comparison. The methodology of this section could provide a 
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reference for other studies that evaluate the environmental effectiveness of water quality 
management programs. 
As noted in Section 3 .6, there is still a considerable gap in the knowledge of the costs associated 
with elevated salinity in the Hunter River. Given that investigation of the social costs of the 
Hunter salinity is beyond the scope of this study, and the AGC Woodward-Clyde's study (1992) 
represents the best estimation in this respect, this study borrows the figures from the latter study 
to estimate the social benefits derived from the PHRSTS in improving the water quality in the 
Hunter River. 
AGC Woodward-Clyde (1992) estimated that the annual cost (in 1992 prices) of an increase of 
lEC, starting from a conservative threshold of 600 EC, was $10,000 for the Hunter River in 
1992 prices, of which $7000 would be borne by urban users, $1200 by non-urban users and 
$1800 by irrigators. The daily social cost when the river salinity exceeds 600 EC by one unit 
can then be estimated in 2002 prices using the following formula: 
DC = 10000 x 12002 
2002 365 I 
1992 
[6.13] 
where DC2002 ($/EC.day) is the daily social cost of one incremental EC in 2002 prices. l1992and 
12002 are price indexes of 1992 and 2002 respectively. Based on Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS, 2008), 11992 = 107.5and12002 = 138.1. Accordingly, an increase in one unit of EC starting 
from 600 EC would cause a social cost of DC2002 = $35/EC.day in 2002 prices. 
Thus, the total social cost during the entire period of the PHRSTS can be approximately 
calculated by the below Equation [ 6 .14]: 
2002 n 
TC2002 = DC2002 L (~)c1 - 600 )(1 + r )1002-N) 
N=l995 r=l 
(er> 600) [6.14) 
where TC2002 ($) is total social cost during the PHRSTS period in 2002 prices. Cr (EC) 
represents the daily river salinity that exceeds 600 EC. N represents any year during 1995-2002. 
n is the total number of days that daily river salinity exceeded 600 EC within year N. r is the 
discount rate used to convert a series of costs into a present value in 2002 prices. 
In the literature, there has been a long debate on what discount rate is appropriate for a 
regulatory program or public investment project that provides benefits and costs to the general 
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public. While social time preference and opportunity cost of capital are the two most common 
bases for the setting of the discount rate, there has been no universally accepted correct discount 
rate for the cost-benefit analysis of regulatory policies and public projects (Morrison 1998). 
This study has adopted a central real discount rate of 7% per year, as recommended by the NSW 
Treasury (2007). 
Putting the observed and simulated river salinity from Section 6.4.2.5 into [6.14] separately, the 
total social costs under the PHRSTS and TD system have been calculated and are presented in 
Table 6.11. They show that the PHRSTS would save approximately $0.33 million (in 2002 
prices) in total social cost that would have been incurred under the TD system during 1995-
2002, which is equivalent to $41K per annum. 
Table 6.11 Comparison of damage costs under the PHRSTS and the TD system 
Social costs 
Total (1995-2002) cost Average annual cost 
($million) ($ thousand) 
Trickle Discharge (TD) 11.51 1,439 
Pilot Hunter River Salinity 11.18 1,398 
Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) 
Cost saving Savings 0.33 41 
As discussed in Section 3.6, AGC Woodward-Clyde assumed a linear MSD function for the 
elevated river salinity of the Hunter River. This linear function is regarded as under-estimating 
the social costs of the impact of those river salinities that are over 1500 EC. Nevertheless, as 
none of the observed and stimulated river salinities exceed 1500 EC (see Table 6.10), the under-
estimation of the MSD has no effect on the estimates of the saving in the social cost generated 
by the PHRSTS. 
The saving in the social cost as a result of the river salinity improvement under the PHRSTS is 
minimal, as expected from the statistically insignificant impact of the PHRSTS (compared with 
the TD) on salinity found in the previous section. 
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6.6 Summary 
This chapter has examined the environmental effectiveness of the Pilot Hunter River Salinity 
Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) from two perspectives. Firstly, the long-series monthly mean 
observations of the river flow and salinity have been examined using advanced regression 
models that account for the time-series (autocorrelation) effect in the data. It has been revealed 
that the differences in the overall river salinity and flow between the PHRSTS and the Trickle 
Discharge (TD) are not statistically significant. Furthermore, even for the Low flow period, the 
difference in the river salinity between the PHRSTS and the TD is modest. Secondly, the 
relationship of river salinity, flow and industrial salt load discharge has been established by a 
regression model with autocorrelated errors using available daily observations of 1995-2002. 
Based on this relationship, the river salinity of without-PHRSTS scenario has been predicted. 
Comparison of the river salinity with and without-PHRSTS indicates that PHRSTS had a 
minimal effect on the improvement of river salinity in the Hunter River. It is estimated that the 
PHRSTS saved only about $0.33 million (in 2002 prices) of total social cost of river salinity 
during its whole lifetime. 
This chapter concludes that the PHRSTS, although attaining the overall river salinity objectives, 
did not significantly improve the river salinity of the Hunter River. As such, the PHRSTS only 
generated a trivial saving in the social cost of the river salinity, contradicting the NSW EPA's 
claim reported in Box 1.1 of Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 7 Examination of the Economic Effectiveness 
of the PHRSTS 
This chapter evaluates the economic performance of the Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading 
Scheme (PHRSTS). It addresses the second main research question of this study set out in 
Chapter 1 - did the PHRSTS generate substantial saving to its participants in control costs? 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7 .1 presents an innovative, purpose-built, theoretical 
model for estimating the total control cost of the PHRSTS to coal mines and power stations 
under various discharge permits schemes, following the theoretical framework constructed in 
Section 2.4. The lack of the required data is the largest barrier to the application of this 
theoretical model, and indeed it cannot be used empirically in this thesis. Even so, the 
methodology of this theoretical model will offer a useful reference for other research on water 
quality management, in particular for cost estimation for storable river pollutants, an area which 
is sparse in the literature. Quite separately, in Section 7.2 an operational, empirical model is 
developed to estimate the saving in the control cost of the PHRSTS over the TD for its 20 initial 
participants and the two new developments. The overall saving is apportioned between the two 
main elements of the PHRSTS, namely the dynamicism and the tradability of its discharge 
permits. The significance of the total cost saving to the PHRSTS participants is also measured. 
To this end, this section provides the first set of quantitative measurements of the economic 
effectiveness of the PHRSTS. 
7.1 Theoretical model for estimating saline water control costs of four 
regulatory schemes 
7.1.1 Hypothetical regulatory schemes 
Estimating the cost effectiveness of the PHRSTS requires, in part, characterising the costs of 
saline water control required in the absence of the PHRSTS. These without-PHRSTS cost 
estimates, combined with an estimate of the with-PHRSTS conditions, provide the basis for 
estimating the cost savings of the PHRSTS over other schemes. 
In this study, four regulatory schemes for managing industrial saline water discharge have been 
developed following the analytical framework constructed in Section 2.4. The definitions of 
these regulatory schemes are consistent with the general definitions of SN, ST, DN and DT in 
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Table 2.2, but reflect features of historical water quality management strategies for the Hunter 
River as presented in Chapter 4. So the four acronyms SN, ST, DN and DT have slightly 
different meanings here from those in Table 2.2. The four schemes are defined below. 
(1) Static non-tradable permits (SN) - approximately corresponding to the Trickle Discharge 
(TD) scheme 
The total permitted daily discharge of salt (measured as tonnes/day) for the whole river 
is defined based on the lowest daily river flow and its corresponding river salinity 
background concentrations from the historical observations. Once this discharge is 
defined, it remains unchanged over time. 
Daily permitted discharge of salt for an individual discharger (that is, coal mine or 
power station) is defined in proportion to the PHRSTS initial credit allocation. 
Therefore, for each discharger, the amount of salt discharged is fixed. 
Discharge permits cannot be traded. The salt load of each discharger is not allowed to 
exceed its corresponding discharge permits. 
(2) Static tradable permits (ST) - hypothetical 
The daily discharge permits of salt load are defined in the same way as the above SN. 
Dischargers are allowed to trade permits as long as their aggregated daily discharge of 
salt load does not exceed the fixed daily permit. 
(3) Dynamic non-tradable permits (DN) - hypothetical 
The total permitted daily discharge of salt load is determined by conditions in the river. 
In principle, it should be defined based on instantaneous daily river flow and its 
corresponding salinity background concentrations. It therefore varies from day to day. 
To be consistent with the dynamic component of the PHRSTS, total permitted daily salt 
load is defined as zero when the river flow is Low, infinite when the river is in Flood 
flow, and could be any intermediate values when the river is in High flow (as described 
in Chapter 4 ). 
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The permitted daily salt load for an individual discharger is defined in accordance with 
the PHRSTS initial credit allocation, that is, a fixed share allocated initially (in 
percentage) multiplied by a variable daily total allowable salt load permits results in a 
variable daily salt load for an individual discharger. 
Discharge permits cannot be traded. The salt load of each discharger is not allowed to 
exceed that stipulated in its corresponding discharge permits. 
(4) Dynamic tradable permits (DT) - corresponding to the PHRSTS 
The discharge permits of salt load are defined in the same ways as the above DN. 
Dischargers are allowed to trade permits as long as their aggregated daily salt load 
discharged does not exceed the fixed daily total allowable salt load. 
For a firm producing outputs and discharging regulatory pollutants, there are two basic ways to 
control its discharges: investing in pollution control facilities, and scaling down its production 
activities (and therefore reducing outputs). In either case, discharge reduction entails costs. The 
theoretical framework that applies to the firm's trade-off between these two processes is total 
cost function, which combines both production cost and pollution abatement cost. As elaborated 
by Carlson et al. (2000), any economically sensitive firm tends to choose general inputs of 
capital k, materials m, and labour l to minimise the total cost (TC) of producing output q and 
achieving a discharge rate d in time period t, subject to production and discharge constraints. 
This process is expressed by the following equation: 
[7.1) 
Subject to 
q(k,m,l)?. q' [7.2) 
d(k,m,l)~ d* [7.3) 
where Pk. Pm and p1 are the price of k, m and l, q * represents the target of minimum outputs, d* 
represents the discharge permits expressed in the load of a pollutant. In Equation [7 .1 ], unit and 
time indexes are suppressed for convenience. 
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In a situation where the generation of discharge is not very relevant to the level of productivity 
(for example, the coal mines in this study), or where firms do not tend to control their discharge 
through reducing the level of their outputs (for example, the power stations in this study), 
production costs may be excluded from the cost analysis of discharge control activities. The 
total cost function can then be simplified to an abatement cost function that relates inputs of 
capital, materials and labour to discharge reduction. As the firms' abatement behaviours in 
response to regulatory policies are the concern of this study, the abatement cost is expressed by 
the following function that explicitly incorporates actual discharge d as an independent variable 
[7.4] 
In the abatement cost function [7.2], d is an endogenous variable. It is subject to discharge 
permits d* that may be different under different regulatory schemes. In other words, different d* 
may require and result in different effects on firms' abatement activities and performance, and 
in turn on their associated costs. 
In the case study presented here, coal mines and power stations adopt different options for saline 
water control. As presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, while storing excess water on-site without 
any treatment is a viable option for the coal mines, desalination is a common technique used by 
power stations to extract the salt. Accordingly, theoretical models for estimating the costs of 
saline water control for coal mines and power stations are developed separately here. 
7.1.2 Storage costs for coal mines 
Storage of pollutants, that is, treatment and storage of pollutants for a period of time and 
releasing them into the environment later when adverse effects are minimal, represents an 
important aspect of the pollution management strategy. Storage, by temporally separating 
pollutant generation and discharge, has a theoretical attraction when the relative benefits of 
generating pollutants and costs of discharging pollutants vary through time (Lee 1977). 
However, so far there is little theoretical research on this area, nor are there empirical studies on 
estimating the costs of storage of pollutants. 
Loosely following Lee (1977), Lewis (1981) and O'Neill (1983a), this study has developed a 
theoretical model for estimating the costs of storing mine water on-site under various regulatory 
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schemes as follows. Assuming there were no on-site dams constructed before the PHRSTS 
implementation, if the data on excess mine water for individual coal mines were available, the 
storage requirement of a mine under the four regulatory schemes (SN, ST, DN and DT) can be 
simulated. Furthermore, once information on the marginal construction and operational costs of 
storage for an individual mine is available, the optimal capacity of on-site storage dams with a 
minimised total cost for the whole PHRSTS coal mines can be estimated. 
The notation used in the model, and its meaning, is as follows: 
i Any firm of mining industry. 
m The number of all firms of mining industry, i = 1, ... n. 
T Number of days during 1/1/1995 to 30/11/2002 under the PHRSTS. In total, T= 2891. 
vu Volume of the saline water generated by finn ion day t (ML). 
Its cumulative generation of the saline water up to t days is 
[7.5] 
X=I 
ci Salinity concentration of the saline water generated by firm i (µSiem). For simplicity, it 
is assumed constant over time for finn i, but may vary from mine to mine. 
f Conversion factor between EC and mg/L. In general, lEC ;:::; 0.6~0.68 mg/L. For the 
Hunter River,/= 0.6 applies (NSW EPA 1995). 
gu Firm i's generation of salt load on day t (tonnes). 
[7.6] 
Its cumulative generation of salt load up to t days is 
t 
Git = L gix (tonnes) [7.7] 
x=I 
wu Volume of actual discharge from firm ion day t (ML). 
Its total volume of actual discharge up tot days is 
[7.8] 
X=I 
du Firm i's actual discharge of salt load on the day t (tonnes). 
[7.9] 
The total discharge from the mining industry, denoted m, on day t is 
m m 
Dmt = Ldu =JL:wuci [7.1 O] 
i=l i=l 
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A; Firm i's storage capacity for saline water (ML). 
K;(AJ Firm i's annualised capital cost of storage construction ($/year). 
The cost of storing saline water on-site is made up of the capital cost incurred to construct dams, 
and the cost associated with operating and maintaining the dams. Therefore, separate equations 
are needed to specify the cost components. 
The annualised capital cost of storage construction K;(AJ is the function of storage capacity A; 
It is reasonable to believe that K; is an increasing, though not necessarily linear, function of A;. 
That is, the larger the capacity is, the more the capital cost would be (K;'(A;) > 0). Then the 
capital cost of storage construction for the mining industry, denoted KCm, is 
m 
KCm = IKJA;) [7.11] 
i=I 
Operational activities of storage dams include, but may be not limited to, water pumping, 
monitoring the water quality in the storage dams under a range of flows, identifying periods 
when they may be discharged, and monitoring the discharge rates to ensure the downstream 
waterways are in fact being protected. Storage dams also need regular maintenance: inlet and 
outlet structures need to be kept clear of debris; litter needs to be collected and removed 
regularly; and water levels need to be altered at particular periods to prevent algal blooms from 
forming (Cullen et al. 1988; Lawrence and Breen 1998). Therefore, it is reasonable to divide the 
operation and maintenance (O&M) cost of any mine into two separate parts: fixed O&M cost 
(denoted FC;) and variable O&M cost (denoted OC;). 
FC; refers to those O&M costs that neither change with the size of storage dam A;, nor change 
with duration and volume of the saline water stored. The above listed monitoring cost is one of 
the examples. However, FC; may vary from mine to mine. So, the annual fixed O&M cost for 
the whole industry, denoted FCm, is 
n 
FCm = IFC; [7.12] 
i=I 
In contrast to FC;, OCit, at least in principle is the function of the number of days that the saline 
water is stored and the volume of the saline water stored. The most representative cost falling 
into this category is the cost (for example, electricity consumption) associating with water 
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pumping. Let aw be the accumulation inherited at the start of day 1. It reflects the history of 
stored water before the day being studied. Then 
The accumulation at the end of day 1 is au = a;o + vu - wu 
The accumulation at the end of day 2 is ai2 = au + vi2 - wi2 = a;o + vu - wu + vi2 - wi2 
The accumulation at the end of day t is ait = ai(t-JJ + vit - wit 
= aw + vu - Wu + vi2 - wi2 + ... + Vu - wit 
t 
= a;o + ~)vix -wix) 
X=I 
So, the variable O&M cost on day t for mine i is OCi1 = O;ait = O; (aw+ V;1 - W;J 
The variable O&M costs over all T days for all m mines (that is, the annual industry cost) 
denoted OCm, is 
[7.13] 
i=I t=I i=I t=I 
Since O; is not dependent on time t, it can be taken outside the second summation, giving 
m T m T 
ocm =I Ioiait =ID;I(a;o + v;t -W;t) [7.14] 
i=I t=l i=l t=l 
Combining Equations [7.11 ], [7 .12] and [7.14 ], the total annual cost of storing mine water on-
site for the mining industry TCm, is 
m m m T 
TCm =KCm +FCm +OCm = LK;(A;)+ LFCi + LO;L(aiO +v;1 -W;1 ) 
i=I i=I i=l t=I 
[7.15] 
It could be envisaged that the marginal cost OCit in response to the time and amount of saline 
water stored would virtually not be of significance, and could be omitted from [7 .15]. Then 
[7 .15] can be simplified as 
m m 
TCm = LK;(Ai)+ LFC; [7.16] 
i=l i=l 
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7.1.3 Treatment costs of power stations 
As described in Section 3.5.1.3, the power stations directly or indirectly withdraw water from 
the Hunter River for boiler feed water and make-up water and for cooling condensers and 
reactors. The water is pre-treated to eliminate salt and other contaminants, then recycled many 
times for plant use and eventually discharged to the Hunter River. In this case, this study can 
treat each power station as an individual wastewater treatment plant that involves a desalination 
process. 
Given this simplification, the method of analysing costs for wastewater treatment plants is 
applicable to the power stations on saline water treatment. The engineering model is a 
prevailing method used to analyse the cost associated with water treatment. Borrowing the idea 
from Fraas and Munley's study (1984), the costs of any water treatment system depend upon the 
volume of the flow, concentration of influent stream, and concentration of effluent stream. The 
following general form of the cost function applies 
C = f(F,I,E,P) [7.17] 
where C is the cost of wastewater treatment. F is flow size of the waste stream. I is the 
concentration of pollutant in the influent stream. E is the concentration of pollutant in the 
effluent stream, and P is the vector of prices for factor inputs. 
Following [7 .17], the capital cost and operational cost for desalination processes of each power 
station need to be estimated separately. This is because the magnitude of capital cost is expected 
to relate to design flow and performance, while operating cost would be related to actual flow 
and performance. 
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For the desalination treatment facility of any power station j, let 
FdJ Designed influent capacity (ML/day) 
FaJt Actual flow of influent on day t (ML/day) 
IdJ Designed salinity concentration of influent (EC) 
IaJt Actual salinity concentration of influent on day t (EC) 
EdJ Design salinity concentration of effluent (EC) 
E011 Actual salinity concentration of effluent on day t (EC) 
P dJ Vector of annualised prices for capital inputs ($/year) 
P aJt Vector of prices for the inputs of actual performance ($/day) 
The annual capital cost for power station} is: 
[7.18] 
The annual capital cost for the power generating industry with n power stations is: 
[7 .19] 
The operating cost on day t for power station} is: 
QC jt = Vajt - E ajt )Fajt P ajt [7.20] 
The operating cost over all T days (T=2891) for all n power stations is: 
[7.21] 
Thus, the total treatment cost for the power generating industry is 
[7.22] 
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From [7 .18] and [7.20], the treatment cost for any power station is positively related to the 
influent flows (FdJ and F 011) and the pollutant concentration of influent (IdJ and IGJ1), and 
negatively related to the pollutant concentration of effluent (Edi and E0J1). That is, increases in 
flow size and influent concentration raise treatment costs, but increases in the level of effluent 
concentration (lower effluent quality) reduce treatment costs. Within a power station's 
microeconomic framework, an obvious trade-off is between obtaining cleaner influent and 
minimising treatment cost. This is especially true for the Liddell Power Station, which uses 
Lake Liddell as a buffer for storing intake water and withholding discharge. The salinity of its 
effluent may directly affect that of its influent, and in tum their treatment costs. 
Let ~1, be power stationj's actual salt load discharge on day t, then 
[7.23] 
The total salt load discharge from the power generating industry, which includes n power 
stations, on day t is 
n n 
Dgt = Ld.il = LEajtFajt [7.24] 
j=l j=l 
For simplicity, it is assumed for each power station 
• The salinity concentration of influent ! 011 is exogenous; meaning the salinity of influent is 
out of the power stations' control and may change over time. 
• The influent flow Fa.ft has some implications for the amount of electricity generated and the 
times of recycling. However, power stations do not reduce their electricity product or 
increase the recycling times in order to reduce the volume of water treated. 
• The effluent flow is approximately the same as the influent flow in volume on day t. That 
is, the loss of water in the power generating and cooling processes is omitted. 
Under these restrictive assumptions, power stations may change their operating costs by 
choosing different levels of treatment, that is, by altering Ea.ft, subject to variations in the salt 
load discharge permits under different regulatory schemes. When F011 is fixed, the more 
discharge permits a power station obtains, the higher the salinity effluent it will discharge, and 
the less cost it would incur in the desalination processes. However, the capital cost of treatment 
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does not change in response to different regulatory schemes, since the treatment facilities have 
to be constructed to account for the higher effluent quality to meet the rigid salt load discharge 
permits in the worst situations (for example, no discharge is allowed in the Low flow periods 
under the HRSTS) and to accommodate large swings in effluent quality responding to salt load 
discharge permits. 
7.1.4 Minimisation of total control costs 
From Equations [7.10] and [7.24], the total salt load discharged from the whole industry 
(including mines and power stations) on any day tis 
[7.25] 
From Equations [7 .15] and [7.22], the total control costs of the whole industry over T days is 
[7.26] 
TC is minimised by actions of both firms in response to regulations, and by the regulator's 
choice of regulatory scheme and the parameters within that scheme. Assuming that each mine 
treats its vit (volume of saline water generated) as exogenous, that is, beyond its control, and 
assuming that power stations are able to operate flexibly their levels of removal of desalination 
facilities in response to different regulations, and further assuming that : 
(1) Using the notations of the schemes set out in 7.1.l, firms collectively minimise either TCsN 
(for static non-tradable permits), TCDN (for dynamic non-tradable permits), TCsr (for static 
tradable permits), or TCDT (for dynamic tradable permits), depending on which scheme is 
chosen by the regulator, and 
(a) for the mines, by choosing their dam sizes Ai and daily discharge volumes wit, subject to the 
following constraints: 
- Neither generation nor discharge of mine water can be negative 
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vit 2:'.: 0 , W;1 2:'.: 0, for all i and t [7.27) 
- The amount of mine water that mine i stores in its dam on day t can never be negative, or 
greater than its dam capacity A; : 
0:::: au::::A;, for all i and t [7.28) 
(b) for power stations, by choosing the salinity concentration EaJt and flow FaJt of their effluent, 
subject to the following constraints: 
- Flow of effluent can never be negative 
FaJt 2:'.: 0 for all j and t [7.29) 
- Actual flow of effluent can never exceed its designed capacity 
[7.30) 
- The quality of effluent, measured by salinity concentration, can never be better than its 
designed quality 
[7.31) 
- The quality of effluent, measured by salinity concentration, can never be worse than that of the 
influent 
Eajt ~ Jajt [7.32) 
(c) The discharge permits are set to control the salt load discharge (du and Dmt for mines; c/;1 and 
Dg1 for power stations), rather than the volume of discharge (wit for mines; FaJt for power 
stations), into the River. 
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Let 
si, s1 Mine i or power station j's daily permit for salt load discharge under the system of static 
discharge permits. It is fixed throughout the time (tonnes). 
m n 
The industry discharge permit for any day is S = L si + Ls 1 [7.33] 
i=l J=l 
sit, s11 Mine i or power station j's discharge permit on day t (tonnes) under the system of dynamic 
discharge permits. Under the PHRSTS, no discharge is permitted in a Low flow period. In 
a High flow period, the permits vary from day to day, depending on the assimilative 
capacity of the river, which is determined by river flow and in-river salinity concentration. 
No limit is set on salt discharge during a Flood flow period (we assume the limits on 
volumetric discharge noted in Section 5 .1.3 are never binding). Those are, 
sit= 0 and s11 = 0 Low flow 
0 < sit < oo and 0 < s11 < oo High flow 
Su= oo and sJt = oo Flood flow 
m n 
The industry discharge permit on day t is S1 = L sit + Ls 11 [7.34] 
i=l J=l 
Constraints under the four different discharge permit schemes defined in Section 7 .1.1 are 
shown in Table 7.1. Thus, a mine's actual daily discharge of salt load du (tonnes) and the actual 
aggregated daily discharge of salt load from the whole mining industry Dmi (tonnes) are 
translated into the volume of daily discharge of saline water wit (ML) so as to make it clearer 
that the salinity discharge limits translate into constraints on the mines' choice variables {wit}. 
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Table 7.1 Constraints under the four different schemes 
Static Dynamic 
(SN) (DN) 
dit (= fwitci) :SS; Vi,t dit ( = fwitci) :S S;1 Vi,t 
Non-tradable 
dit ( = EqjtFajt):::; s J Vj,t d;1 ( = E aJt F ajt ) :::; s 11 Vj,t 
[7.35] [7.36] 
(ST) (DT) 
m n m n 
Tradable 
D1(=fLw;1C;+ LEaitFait):::::;S Dt(=fLWA + LEaitFait):::::;St 
i=l }=1 i=l J=I 
Vt Vt 
[7.37] [7.38] 
Constraint [7.35] is set to ensure that the salt load discharge of each firm (dit or 01) does not 
exceed its corresponding static permit (s; or s1), which is defined based on the worst river 
conditions (that is, lowest level of river flow) and remains constant throughout the years. The 
purpose of Constraint [7.36] is basically the same as that of Constraint [7.35], except that the 
permits for a specific firm (sit or s11) may vary with the daily river flow and salinity conditions. 
Constraints [7.37] and [7.38] are set to make sure that the aggregated discharge from the firms 
(Di) does not exceed the total discharge permits (Sor S1) on any day, although the permits under 
the static and dynamic permit systems are different. The relaxation of the constraint that occurs 
moving from [7.35] and [7.36] to [7.37] and [7.38], respectively, reflects the tradability of 
permits. 
(2) Assuming that the regulator knows how firms collectively minimise their costs as in (1) 
above, for each scheme it will minimise TC by choosing 
- which scheme (SN, DN, ST, DT) to use 
- within each scheme, a full schedule of discharge permits, respectively {s;}, {sit}, {sJ}, {sjt} {S} 
or {S1} 
- subject to the constraint that salinity in the river never exceeds 900 EC at any time or place. 
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(3) Assuming cost-minimising actions both by all firms and by the regulator as in (1) and (2) 
above, the cost-saving potential of the PHRSTS is then either TCm - TCsN, TCm - TCDN or 
TCDT - TCsT, depending on which control scheme is considered to be the alternative. 
This purpose-built theoretical model is conceptually comprehensive and appealing. However, 
there are obvious difficulties in using it empirically. The full range of required data about each 
PHRSTS participants is not available, and where some data exist, those data are generally 
limited in scope. The parameters required for exercising the theoretical model and the data 
available for this study are compared in Figure 7.1 below and described fully in Appendix 9. 
Because of problem of the lack of data, this study has developed an alternative operational 
model to estimate the cost effectiveness of the PHRSTS over the TD using the empirical data 
from the PHRSTS operation. 
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Figure 7.1 Data availability of the theoretical model for the coal mines 
Grey box means the data is available 
White box means the data is not available 
The dotted rectangle shows the data needed to determine the discharge requirement for an individual mine. 
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7.2 An operational model for estimating the cost saving of the PHRSTS 
over the TD 
This section develops an alternative, practical model that uses data available from the actual 
operation of the PHRSTS from 1995 to 2002 to evaluate empirically its economic performance. 
This so-called operational model is comparatively simple and straightforward. Its underlying 
philosophy is calculation of ( 1) the total amount of saline water storage capacity avoided for the 
coal mines, and (2) the total amount of saline water treatment avoided for the power stations, 
under the Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) in relation to the Trickle 
Discharge (TD). This will allow us to estimate the cost saving of the PHRSTS over the TD 
without the need of knowing the data on industrial salt discharges under the TD, which are 
unavailable. Using the operational model, the cost savings of the PHRSTS over the TD derived 
from the dynamicism and from the tradability of discharge permits can be estimated separately. 
The cost savings to the initial PHRSTS participants and the two new developments (those are, 
Bengalla Coal Mine and Redbank Power Station) can also be estimated separately. 
7.2.1 Cost savings of the PHRSTS for the coal mines 
7.2.1.1 Discharge behaviour of coal mines 
The NSW EPA regulates mine water discharges based on the mines' discharge of salt load. 
What the mines are really concerned about, however, is the volume of discharge, rather than or 
in addition to salt load. Therefore, mines have to account for both water quality and water 
quantity in their on-site mine water management. Figure 3.7 in Section 3.4.3 presents a 
comprehensive picture of the mine water generated and excess water, showing the implications 
of different control systems for on-site storage capacity of the coal mines. 
In response to different regulatory schemes, mines' decisions on capital investment are 
particularly important, since the costs associated with capital works usually constitute a 
relatively high proportion of the costs of excess water management. If a mine chooses to store 
excess water on-site without any treatment, as is the case for most coal mines in the Hunter 
Valley, determination of storage capacity is a crucial and challenging issue confronting any 
decision-makers who are sensitive to economic efficiency and averse to the risks of non-
compliance with the regulations. 
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Under a static non-tradable permits (SN) control system daily permits are specified in advance 
and do not change with the river conditions. There is a relatively high degree of certainty that 
firms will have to undertake cost-efficient investment in management of excess water. In 
designing their storage capacity, firms only need to quantify the volumes of excess water that 
must be withheld on-site. This can be carried out through a site-specific mine water balance 
model. 
To operate this model, a long-term local catchment rainfall-runoff model is often used to 
calculate daily runoff originating at the mine site from historical daily rainfall data. The mine 
water generated on-site on any day is the difference between the sum of runoff originating from 
rainfall and groundwater inflow, and the sum of evaporation and net mine water use on the site 
on that day (see Appendix 9). Daily runoff originating at the mine site and the daily volume of 
net mine water use are the main components of the mine water balance model. The daily 
volume of net mine water use may be relatively easy to quantify based on the operational 
experience. 
However, the volume of mine water generated is hard to predict with a high level of confidence. 
This is because daily on-site runoff largely depends on local rainfall conditions. Even with a 
sophisticated rainfall-runoff model in hand, the inherent natures of rainfall (such as, 
discontinuous, with random occurrence, duration and intensity) still make the precise prediction 
of the volume of runoff difficult. 
In this situation, mines often design their dam capacity based on the criterion that it should be 
sufficient to accommodate the duration and intensity of a rainfall event with a certain recurrence 
interval, accounting for the fixed daily allowable discharge permits. Given that the operational 
lifetime for most coal mines in the Hunter Valley is designed to be 21 years, the 20-year 
Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) is the prevailing reasonable criterion used in the designation 
of dam capacity. Firms may choose a lower ARI (for example, 10-year) to lessen the capital 
costs of dam construction (Aseervatham 1997). However, as mines bear all the risks associated 
with non-compliance with river quality regulations, they have to trade off the costs of additional 
storage capacity against the consequence of non-compliance. 
Under a dynamic permits scheme (either dynamic non-tradable or dynamic tradable permits), 
daily discharge permits vary with river conditions: more discharge is allowed when the river 
flow is higher, and less discharge or even no discharge is allowed when the flow is lower. In 
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this situation, both the NSW EPA and the mines face some uncertainties and would bear some 
risks, though different in nature. For the NSW EPA, it is their responsibility to detect the 
window of discharge opportunities. Moreover, they have to determine the total salt load 
discharge permits issued to the firms so that the river salinity standards at reference gauging 
stations are not exceeded. In other words, the NSW EPA has to translate the ambient river 
salinity standards into the discharge limits defined in tonnes of salt with some degree of 
accuracy. 
However, given the nature of highly variable flow and salinity background concentration in the 
Hunter River, this may not be an easy task. As already shown in Figure 6.25, although the 
average daily river salinity is inversely related to the daily flow in the Hunter River, at lower 
river flows the average salinity is more variable than that experienced at higher flows. It 
therefore seems impossible to identify the allowable discharge of salt load with a high level of 
confidence in the Low flow period. This may partly explain why the dynamic permits of the 
PHRSTS were designed using a trigger value approach mentioned in Section 2.2.4. By defining 
flow-variable permits based on both ranges of flows (that is, Low, High and Flood flow periods) 
and individual instantaneous flows with a certain range of flows (that is, daily discharge permits 
in High flow period), the trigger value approach provides a middle ground between conditional 
permits and periodic permits. 
Under a typical dynamic non-tradable permits (DN) control system, mines have to answer a set 
of crucial questions in designing their storage capacity, which include, but may not be limited to 
• How often do the windows of discharge opportunities (that is, High flows and Flood flows 
defined by the EPA) occur? In other words, what would be the intervals of discharge 
opportunities? 
• What variability in the allowable total salt load can be expected at a given location (for 
example, Singleton gauging station)? 
• What variability would exist in the length (days) of these opportunities? 
• If so, what dam capacity would be required to take sufficient advantage of High flow 
conditions when discharges are allowed? 
• What would be the variability of salinity concentration in the mine water? 
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• Would local extreme rainfall events (such as, 10-year ARI or 20-year ARI) be likely to 
occur during a period of Low flow in the Hunter River defined by the EPA, and thus fail to 
comply with the regulations? (A detailed discussion about such a situation will be provided 
below). 
These questions require considerable information and analysis, though working out the answers 
is not completely impossible. To address these questions, in addition to using an on-site mine 
water balance model, mines have to model the river flow in response to rainfall. Linking a mine 
water balance model to the rainfall-flow model superimposes the activities of mines onto the 
hydrological cycles (Aseervatham 1997). A comparison of the mine water generated in mines 
and flows in the Hunter River at the relevant gauging stations can be carried out to identify the 
incidence of potential discharges during Low, High and Flood flow periods respectively and in 
tum the storage requirement of the mines. 
A long-term local rainfall-runoff analysis, combined with a mine's individual water balance 
model and compared to the corresponding Hunter River flows is thus essential for managing 
risk as it enables the average risk exposure of the mine to be quantified. In addition to managing 
the average risk, mines also have to be able to manage the risk caused by spatial variability in 
the local rainfall and flow periods within the river. When some storms occur in the immediate 
locality of a mine site, the opportunity to release may not exist, because the larger Hunter River 
catchment has not been exposed to a similar storm and the river flow is still at a low level (J. 
Pola [Water manager, Coal & Allied Operation] 2003, pers. comm., 8 July). Mines are therefore 
required to maintain some short-term absorption capability on-site for such a contingency. A 
filtered analysis of site-specific rainfall against, respectively, Low, High and Flood flow events 
in the river is needed to determine the size of the threshold rainfall event above which the 
likelihood of a non-correlated flow event in the Hunter River decreases (J. Pola [Water manager, 
Coal & Allied Operation] 2003, pers. comm., 8 July). The identification of these threshold 
rainfall values could result in the calculation of desired minimum buffer volumes to be 
maintained in the storage dams of a mine. 
If the answers to the above questions cannot be expressed in quantitative terms with a high level 
of certainty, mines may be exposed to the risk of either non-compliance with regulations or 
adverse impacts on mine operations (as they may have to store excess water in the existing 
mining pits). The risks associated with these uncertainties are alleviated to some extent by the 
tradability of PHRSTS salt credits, as this tradability allows a mine to offset its short-term risks 
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through buying extra discharge permits from those mines in low-risk positions with surplus 
permits during a given period. 
Under the PHRSTS, however, tradable salt credits only work during the High flow scenario 
when discharges are allowed. There is no latitude for offsetting short-term risks of discharge 
during Low flow periods as no discharge is allowed for any firms at those times. Conversely, 
there is no requirement to offset any risks when a Flood flow presents because there are no 
discharge constraints. Thus, it should be recognised that while tradability of salt credits can 
reduce some mines' storage requirements for the periods of High river flow, it will not remove 
the requirement for a certain minimum level of storage for withholding excess water on-site for 
the periods of Low river flow. As such, the use of PHRSTS could alleviate the risks to the 
mines, but is in no way a substitute for a risk-based water management strategy. 
7.2.1.2 A numerical example 
A numerical example is given in Table 7.2 to explain the method of estimating the storage 
capacity that a coal mine avoided under the PHRSTS, compared to the Trickle Discharge (TD). 
Table 7.2 Illustration of avoided withholdings for Mine i under the PHRSTS 
(days of A WEs for Mine i, defined below, are marked in bold italic.) 
Day Flow TD PHRSTS PHRSTS Avoided A voided discharge 
(t) periods Permit Permit Discharge discharge with without permit 
(s1) (su) (d11) permit trading trading 
(Ll d11) (Ll d'it) 
... Low 10 0 0 
x Low 10 0 0 
x+J= High JO J5 5 0 (5<JO) 0 
Muil 
x+2 Flood JO ao 45 35 (=45-JO) 35 (=45-JO) 
x+3 Flood JO ao 60 50 (=60-JO) 50 (=60-JO) 
x+4 Hi2h JO 40 50 40 (=50-JO) 30 (=40-JO) 
x+5= High JO 20 35 25 (=35-10) 10 (=20-JO) 
Nun 
... Low 10 0 
y+J= High 10 5 25 J5 (=25-JO) 0 (5<JO) 
M1m 
y+2= High JO 45 30 20 (30-JO) 20 (=30-JO) 
N1m 
... Low 10 0 0 
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The notations and definitions of the variables in the Table follow those in earlier sections. Those 
are 
si Mine i's daily permitted discharge of salt load under the TD, which remains 
unchanged throughout days (tonnes/day). 
su Mine i's permitted discharge of salt load on day t under the PHRSTS. The 
definition of Flood, High and Low flow days and the corresponding discharge rules 
are as introduced in Section 5 .1.1. That is, 
sit = 0 Low flow 
0 <sit< oo High flow 
sit= oo Flood flow 
dit Mine i's actual discharge of salt load on day t under the PHRSTS (tonnes/day). 
Ll dit Mine i's avoided withholding of salt load on day t under the PHRSTS with permits 
trading (tonnes/day). 
Ll d'it Mine i's avoided withholding of salt load on day t under the PHRSTS without 
permits trading (tonnes/day). 
To calculate the avoided storage capacity, we need first to define: 
(a) an Avoided Withholding Event (AWE) for mine i is any set of consecutive days t, t+ 1, ... on 
which its discharge is allowed; and 
(b) let mine i experience z(i) A WEs during the entire PHRSTS period from t=l, ... ,T (T=2891); 
let these A WEs be indexed by k = 1, ... ,z(i); and let the first and last days of the kth A WE be 
respectively Mk(iJ and Nk(iJ (the values of all the z(i), Mk(iJ and Nk(iJ are found by processing the 
empirical data sets). 
The dynamicism and tradability of discharge permits, which lie at the heart of the PHRSTS and 
form the major difference between the PHRSTS and the TD, allow the mine to make an excess 
discharge during High and Flood flow days. Our admittedly rough estimate of the cost 
advantage of the PHRSTS over the TD is based on: 
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(a) the observation that during the period of 2891 days from 1/1/1995-30/11/2002 inclusive for 
which the PHRSTS was implemented, which is indexed by t = l, ... ,T where T = 2891, no 
enlargement of mine water storage dams took place to accommodate excess discharge, in 
particular during the Low flow days on which no discharge was made; and: 
(b) the assumption that during this same period, any seller of permits - which must be 
discharging less than its permits, and therefore withholding (not discharging) more saline water 
than it needs to - is just using up spare dam capacity, and does not incur any cost of dam 
enlargement as a result; and lastly 
( c) the assumption that any buyer of permits would otherwise have had to store any excess of 
discharge over permits, dit-sit + di(t+irsi(t+JJ + ... which is accumulated over successive days t, 
t+ 1, ... , and so gains a benefit from the PHRSTS of avoiding the cost of dam enlargement. 
Assumption (b) is based directly on observation (a), but assumption (c) is more speculative and 
can only be approximate at best. One reason for this is that in general, and contrary to our 
assumption, the regulator would not choose the same optimal set of firms' permit levels under 
the PHRSTS as under the TD, because the firms' responses to permits differ between the 
schemes. Another reason is that assumption (b) excludes what we call precautionary excess 
discharge. This happens whenever a mine chooses to make an excess discharge even when it 
still has spare dam capacity, because it suspects that reducing storage volume now will avoid 
the need to buy permits on future days when they will be more expensive. However, a mine 
with a well developed water management strategy and a sound understanding of their water 
balance, hydrological processes and risk will realise the economical benefits of storing water for 
use on-site and reducing water withdrawal (at a price) from the Hunter River, as noted in 
Section 3.4.3. This leads to a well-defined balance between retention and discharge, backed by 
the appropriate level of analysis and rigour. Our assumptions allow the cost saving of the 
PHRSTS (compared to TD) from the Hunter mining industry to be approximated by the sum of 
avoided storage costs of all mines during the PHRSTS period, as follows. 
In Table 7.2, suppose the mine has two A WEs over the entire PHRSTS period. A WE1 runs from 
t = x+ I = M1(iJ tot = x+ 5 = Ni(iJ' comprising 1 High flow days, followed by 2 Flood flow days, 
and lastly another 2 High flow days (typically followed by a set of long consecutive Low flow 
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days). A WE2 runs from t = y+ I = M1(i) to t = y+ 2 = N2(iJ' comprising only 2 High flow days. 
The next calculations are comprised of three parts. 
(1) Avoided storage capacity with permit trading 
For both Avoided Withholding Events (A WEs), any actual daily discharge (dit) that is more than 
its TD permit (si) on a particular High or Flood flow day is the discharge that would otherwise 
have to be stored on site. In other words, on any day of an A WE, as long as dit > si , the mine 
avoids withholding of an extra volume of mine water equivalent to the salt load of (dit - si) on 
that day as a result of dynamicism and tradability of the permits of the PHRSTS. 
For A WEi, on day x+ 1 the mine does not avoid any withholding of discharge because (dit = 5) 
< (si=JO). From day x+2 to x+5, the avoided withholding amounts are (45-10=35), (60-10=50), 
(50-10=40) and (35-10=25) in order. Thus, the accumulated withholding of salt that the mine 
avoids during its A WE1 is (45-10) + (60-10) + (50-10) + (35-10) = 150 tonnes. For A WE2, the 
accumulated avoided withholding of salt is (25-10) + (30-10) = 35 tonnes. The overall 
withholding of salt that the mine avoids as a result of dynamic ism and tradability of the permits 
during the entire PHRSTS period is the sum of avoided withholding over these two A WEs, that 
is, 150+35 = 185 tonnes. 
Assuming that the salinity concentrations of mine water for both A WEs are approximately the 
same, the storage capacity that the mine avoids building during the entire PHRSTS period is the 
volume equivalent to maximum, cumulative, avoided saline water over these two A WEs; that is, 
the volume equivalent to the salt of 150 tonnes. 
(2) Avoided storage capacity without permit trading 
In the above analysis, the tradability of discharge permits allows the mine to make discharge 
over its PHRSTS permits on some particular High flow days (that is, dit > sit on days x+4, x+ 5 
and y+ I for the mine) through buying salt credits from other firms. Of course, some other firms 
must discharge less than their permits (dit < sit for other firms) so that the industry-wide 
Constraint [7.3 8] in Section 7 .1.4 is obeyed. If the permits are not tradable, Mine i would have 
to only discharge up to its PHRSTS permit sit. In other words, the mine would have ~o withhold 
more saline water on site (that is, less avoided withholding). The mine's avoided storage 
capacity in the scenario without permit trading is thus calculated as follows. 
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Referring again to Table 7.2, during A WEi, from day x+ 1 to x+3, the mine's daily avoided 
withholdings are still 0, (45-10 = 35) and (60-10 = 50)- this is exactly the same as Calculation 
(a) where the permits are tradable. However, on day x+4, the avoided withholding of salt load is 
now (40-10 = 30) instead of (50-10 = 40), because the mine is not allowed to make a discharge 
more than its PHRSTS permit (that is, sit= 40). For the same reason, on day x+5, the avoided 
withholding of salt load is (20-10 = 10) instead of (35-10 = 25). Thus, the accumulated 
withholding of salt that the mine avoids during its AWE1 is ( 45-10) + (60-10) + ( 40-10) + (20-
10) = 125 tonnes. 
During A WE2, on day y+ 1, the avoided withholding is O; this is because given the permits are 
not tradable, the mine is not allowed to make a discharge more than its PHRSTS permit (that is, 
sit=5). As the PHRSTS permit is less than the TD permit (that is, (sit=5) < (s; =10)), the mine 
does not avoid any withholding on this day. On day y+2, the avoided withholding is (30-10 = 20) 
- although the actual discharge does not exceed its PHRSTS permit (that is, (dit = 30) < (sit= 
45)), but the actual discharge is more than its TD permit (that is, (dit =30) > (s;=lO)). So, the 
avoided withholding is dit minus s;, that is, (30-10 =20). So, the accumulated withholding of salt 
that the mine avoids during its A WE2 is 0 + (30-10) =20 tonnes. 
Therefore, without permit trading, the total salt load that mine i avoids withholding during the 
entire PHRSTS period would have been 125+20=145 tonnes. But what matters for saving costs 
is the storage capacity that the mine avoids building during the entire PHRSTS period. That is 
the volume equivalent to the maximum, cumulative, avoided saline water over both A WEs for 
these two, that is, the volume equivalent of 125 tonnes of salt. 
(3) Avoided storage capacity due to permit trading 
From the above calculations (a) and (b), the withholding of salt during the entire PHRSTS 
period that the mine avoids due to permit trading is 20 (=185-165) tonnes. The storage capacity 
that the mine avoids building during the same period is a volume of saline water equivalent to 
the salt of25 (=150-125) tonnes. 
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7.2.1.3 Method for calculation of avoided storage capacity 
The above analysis of the numerical example can be generalised to the following methodology 
applicable to all PHRSTS coal mines for calculating their avoided storage capacities under the 
Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) over the Trickle Discharge (TD). 
(1) Avoided storage capacity with permit trading 
The salt load that firm i avoids withholding on any day t of its A WE (denoted L'.l dir) due to both 
the dynamicism and the tradability of permits under the PHRSTS is 
L'.ldit=O (whendit.5 si )orL'.ldit=dit-s;(whendit>s;) [7.39] 
The accumulated withholding of salt that firm i avoids during its A voided Withholding Event 
(A WE) k (denoted L'.l Dit) is then 
NkUJ 
W;r= L!!:..d;r 
t=MkU) 
[7.40] 
The corresponding accumulated withholding of mine water with an average salinity 
concentration C; (denotedL'.l Vit) is 
[7.41] 
So the storage capacity which i avoids building due to the tradability of permits during the 
entire PHRSTS period is the volume equivalent to maximum, cumulative, avoided saline water 
over its z(i) A WEs: 
Nk<n 
M; := Maxk=l, .. ,z(i)!!:.. v;t = (1 / fci) Maxk=l,. ,z(i) L !!:..du [7.42] 
t=MkU) 
The total storage capacity that the mining industry (consisting of n mines) avoid under the 
PHRSTS compared to the TD is thus: 
n Nk(O 
M := L(ll Jc;) Maxk=I, ,z(i) L!!:..dit [7.43] 
i=l t=MkU) 
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(2) Avoided storage capacity without permit trading 
The salt that mine i avoids withholding on any day t of its A WE ( denotedLl d'it) due to the 
dynamicism but no tradability of permits under the PHRSTS is 
When dits s;, L1 d'u = 0 
Whendit>s; 
If on Flood flow days, then L1 d'it = dit - S; 
If on Flood flow days, then 
L1 d'it = dit - S; (when S; < du < sit) 
L1 d'it 1= S;1- s; (when S; < sit< dit) 
L1 d'it =0 (when Su< S; <du) [7.44] 
The accumulated withholding of salt load that firm i avoids during its A WE k ( denotedLl D 'u) is 
then 
NkU) 
M';1 = LL1d'u 
t=MkUJ 
[7.45] 
The corresponding accumulated withholding of mine water with an average salinity 
concentration c; ( denotedLl Vii) is 
[7.46] 
So the storage capacity which i avoids building due to the dynamicism but no tradability of 
permits during the entire PHRSTS period is the volume equivalent to maximum, cumulative, 
avoided saline water over its z(i) A WEs: 
NkU> 
L1l; := Maxk=I, .. ,z(i)L1V,;1 = (1/ /c;) Maxk=I, ,z(i) LL1d'u [7.47] 
t=MkU> 
The total storage capacity that the mines avoid under the PHRSTS compared to the TD is thus: 
n Nk(i) 
M.' := L (II fc;) Maxk=I, .. ,z(i) L L1d'u [7.48] 
i=l 
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(3) Avoided storage capacity due to permit trading 
So the storage capacity which i avoids building due to permit trading during the entire PHRSTS 
period, denoted L'.l A "i , is the difference between L'.l Ai and L'.l A 'i , that is, L'.l A" =L'.l (Ai - A 'J 
Accordingly, the total storage capacity that the mining industry avoids due to permit trading 
under the PHRSTS compared to the TD, denotedL'.l A", is the difference between L'.l A andL'.l A' 
' 
that is, 
[7.49] 
7.2.1.4 Data and results 
The data for daily total allowable discharge (TAD) of salt load (denoted TAD1) during the 
PHRSTS period was obtained from the HRSTS Annual Report 1995-2002 (NSW DLWC 1995; 
1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 200la; 2002). In conjunction with the number of salt credits 
that the mines were initially allocated (denoted ai ), the daily permitted discharge of salt load 
for individual mines on any day (sit) can be calculated by 
8; xTAD1 s -----
it - 1000 [7.50] 
The daily salt load that an individual mine actually discharged (du) was also obtained from the 
HRSTS Annual Report 1995-2002. The discharge salinity concentration for an individual mine 
(c;) is the average of the available discharge concentrations recorded in its Annual Returns. 
The data for maximum daily release rates for individual mines that were permitted under the TD 
(denoted v;) were obtained from the NSW EPA report (1995). If we assume that the salinity 
concentration of discharge for each individual mine (c;) remains the same under both the 
PHRSTS and the TD systems, the daily permitted discharge of salt load under the TD (that is, s;) 
was calculated by si = Jc V; . 
Recall that Bengalla Coal Mine is one of the two new developments that occurred under the 
PHRSTS. In the discussion in Section 4.2, it was stated that because of the increasing river 
salinity under TD system, the NSW EPA had to move in 1992 to a position of allowing no 
further salt discharge to the Hunter River. If the TD had remained in place and the Nil 
Discharge policy had applied, no discharge from Bengalla Coal Mine would have occurred. In 
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the calculation, s; is treated as zero for Bengalla Coal Mine (and Redbank Power Station, see 
Section 7.2.3) to reflect this Nil Discharge situation. 
The avoided withholdings of salt load and mine water, as well as the avoided storage capacity of 
the coal mines under the PHRSTS with and without permit trading, have been calculated based 
on the above-stated method and data. The break-down of results by the mines are set out in 
Table 7.3 below. The existing storage capacity of each mine before the inception of the 
PHRSTS, which is extracted from the NSW EPA report ( l 995), is also listed in the Table for 
comparison purposes. 
Table 7.3 Mines' avoided withholdings and storage capacities under the PHRSTS 
With Without Due to 
permits trading permits trading permits trading 
Aw 
Mines L1Du L1Vu LlA; LlD'u LlV'u LlA'; LlD"u LlV"it LlA"; (ML) 
(tonnes) (ML) (ML) (tonnes) (ML) (ML) (tonnes) (ML) (ML) 
Bengalla 588 724 276 350 431 276 238 293 0 280 
Dartbrook 191 37 9 191 37 9 0 0 0 450 
Howick 2702 1560 254 1831 1057 225 871 503 28 1417 
Hunter Valley 356 122 32 291 100 32 66 23 0 506 
Operation 
Lemington 191 107 76 191 107 76 0 0 0 1002 
Liddell 5282 1863 1505 5247 1851 1505 35 12 0 2502 
Muswellbrook 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86 
Mt Owen 386 178 88 307 141 72 79 36 15 500 
Ravensworth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1400 
Saxonvale/Bulga 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1360 
Wambo 3102 768 383 3102 768 383 0 0 0 428 
Warkworth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1280 
Sum 12798 5359 2621 11510 4492 2577 1289 867 44 11211 
Percentage (%) 19 10 16 2 
L1Dit, LlD'u, LlD"u = the accumulated withholding of salt that Mine i avoids with permit trading, without 
permit trading and due to permit trading respectively. 
L1 Vu, L1 V';v L1 V"u = the accumulated withholding of mine water that Mine i avoids with permit trading, 
without permit trading and due to permit trading respectively. 
L1Ait, LlA 'u, LlA "u = the storage capacity that Mine i avoids with permit trading, without permit trading and 
due to permit trading respectively. 
Aw= the existing storage capacity of the mines before the inception of the PHRSTS. 
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From Table 7.3, the avoided storage capacities of the mines vary across a wide range. 
According to the model estimates, the coal mines avoided withholding a total 12798 tonnes salt 
equivalent to a volume of 5359 ML mine water during the entire PHRSTS period that they 
would otherwise have had to store on site under the previous TD control system, due to both the 
dynamicism and the tradability of the permits under the PHRSTS. This leads the mines to save 
an overall 2621 ML storage capacity, accounting for 19% (= 2621 I (2621+11211)) of the total 
storage capacity that would otherwise be required by the mines under the previous TD. 
If the permits had not been traded under the PHRSTS, the coal mines would have avoided a 
withholding of 11510 tonnes salt equivalent to 4492 ML mine water during the same period. 
The mines would have saved a sightly lower capacity of 2577 ML. Accordingly, permit trading 
under the PHRSTS made the mines avoid withholding 1289 tonnes of salt, equivalent to 867 
ML of mine water and saving 44 ML of storage capacity. Permit trading contributed 10% (= 
1289/12798) to the total withholding of salt load and 16% (= 867/5359) of the total withholding 
of mine water that the mines avoided during the entire PHRSTS period (see Table 7.3). 
However, permit trading only contributed 2% (= 44/2621) of the total avoided storage capacity. 
This is because for most of the mines, the maximum cumulative avoided saline water over its 
A WE actually occurred on Flood flow days, rather than on High flow days. As each of these 
mines' avoided storage capacity is ultimately determined by its discharges on these Flood flow 
days, their excess discharges (through permit trading) on the High flow days have little, if any, 
effect on the size of their avoided storage capacities .LI Ai. Given that the mines' cost savings 
from the PHRSTS virtually come from the avoided costs associated with construction of extra 
storage capacity, the low contribution of permit trading to the total avoided storage indicates 
that the cost saving from permit trading under the PHRSTS is minimal, as will be discussed 
further in the next section. 
7.2.1.5 Indicative cost saving of the mining industry 
The information of the marginal cost of storing saline water for individual mines is crucial to an 
estimation of the total cost saving of the PHRSTS from the Hunter mining industry. Appendix 
1 O provides a review of various approaches to estimation of MAC curves. It also contains a 
detailed description of a survey that I conducted to collect the information about saline water 
control costs from the PHRSTS participants. There were few responses to the survey, which 
prohibits this study estimating the cost of storing saline water for the coal mines in a precise 
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way. So I have estimated the total cost saving based on empirical information in the following 
indicative way. 
Indicative costs of constructing storage dams in the Hunter Region were provided by the NSW 
EPA (2001) when assessing the effect of altering Flood flow threshold on the storage capacity 
required by the PHRSTS mines. The costs associated with various levels of water storage 
requirements are listed in Table 7.4 below. 
Table 7.4 Water storage requirements and their costs 
Water storage Estimated cost Incremental cost above Marginal cost 
requirement ($Million) base($ Million) $/ML 
230ML 1.5 0 -
~480ML 2.8 1.3 5200 
~600ML 3.3 1.8 4865 
970ML 4.5 3.0 4687 
Source: NSW EPA (2001:30) 
As for new development, in 2000 Bengalla Coal Mine constructed its staged discharge dam with 
a capacity of 280 ML for storing excess mine water. This volume was designed sufficient to 
store water for all but the most extreme wet weather conditions accounting for the tradability of 
discharge permits (Bengalla Mining Company 2003). Bengalla Coal Mine estimated that the 
capital cost for its construction was approximately $2 million based on tenders received, which 
is equivalent to $7143/ML in 2000 prices (Bengalla Mining Company 2003). This average 
construction cost is converted into $7696/ML in 2002 prices using the price indexes 12000 = 
129.2 and 12002 =139.2 released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (see Table 7.5). 
Comparing Table 7 .5 with Table 7.4, it appears that Bengalla' s cost estimation is not 
unreasonable. 
Table 7.5 Bengalla's water storage and its construction cost (used in the estimation) 
Water storage Total Average marginal cost Average marginal cost 
construction cost (in 2000 prices) (in 2002 prices) 
280ML $2 Million $7143/ML $7696/ML 
However, an empirical formula for estimating the operating costs of storage dams in the Hunter 
region does not exist. As noted in Section 3.4.3, in addition to having a staged dam for storing 
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saline water, most Hunter coalmines have some other types of dams, such as a raw water dam, a 
washery dam and a ramp dam, for the mining operations. Bengalla is no exception. Bengalla 
budgeted for their water management system, including dams, pipelines, pumps, valves and 
power, as a whole, but not for individual dams. As a very broad figure, Bengalla estimated that 
the cost for the ongoing management of its 280 ML staged dam is approximately $10,000-
$15,000 per annum (Bengalla Mining Company 2003). 
It may not be proper to directly apply the above capital and operating costs of Bengalla Coal 
Mine to any specific PHRSTS mines. However, in the absence of other more precise 
information, these costs indicate the likely order of magnitude of costs avoided by the mines 
under the PHRSTS. 
My study assumes that ( 1) the space required for storage extension for any individual PHRSTS 
mine is readily available; (2) cost of storage extension for existing mines is proportional to the 
increase in cost of storage requirements for new mines; and (3) the incremental operating cost 
due to the storage extension for an individual mine is trivial and therefore can be ignored. Based 
on the avoided storage capacity presented in Table 7.3, the total avoided cost by the mines for 
storage extension during the entire PHRSTS period (see Table 7.6) is approximately $20.2 
million in 2002 prices. 
As in the earlier calculation, the avoided storage capacity of the mines due to permit trading 
accounts for 2% of the overall avoided storage capacity during the entire PHRSTS period. 
Accordingly, the cost saving of permits trading for the mining industry during the same period 
is $0.4 million(= 20.2 x 2%) in 2002 prices. 
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Table 7.6 Avoided storage cost of the coal mines under the PHRSTS (in 2002 prices) 
(assuming $7696/ML capital cost) 
AAi Cost saving 
Mines (ML) ($Million) 
Bengalla 276 2.1 
Dartbrook 9 0.1 
Howick 254 2.0 
Hunter Valley Operation 32 0.2 
Lemington 76 0.6 
Liddell 1505 11.6 
Muswellbrook 0 0.0 
Mt Owen 88 0.7 
Ravensworth 0 0.0 
Saxonvale/Bulga 0 0.0 
Wambo 383 2.9 
Warkworth 0 0.0 
Total 2621 20.2 
L1A; =Mine i's avoided storage capacity during entire PHRSTS period 
The above approach to the cost estimation is oversimplified by assuming that the total capital 
cost of incremental storage for an individual mine is just proportional to the size of storage 
extension (See TC; in Figure 7.2). In reality, however, the total capital cost function might well 
be a stepped line like TC in the Table, Thus, the cost tends to be under-estimated (for example, 
point A) or over-estimated (for example, point B) by an unknown amount. 
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Figure 7.2 Assumed and actual total capital cost functions of storage construction 
-' 
A 
B I 
I 
____ J 
storage capacity (ML) 
TC; = assumed total capital cost function of storage construction 
TC = actual total capital cost function of storage construction 
re, 
------- re 
7.2.2 Cost savings of the PHRSTS for the power stations 
The description in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 shows that whilst the volume of mine water is the main 
concern of the coal mines, the mass of salt is a greater worry for the power stations. Thus, for 
the power stations it is meaningful to calculate their avoided treatment costs of salt under the 
Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) over the Trickle Discharge (TD). 
Under the TD, the permitted daily discharge of salt load did not vary in response to the river 
flow conditions. Under the PHRSTS, however, on Low flow days, the power stations have to 
treat all salt load produced on these days because no discharge is allowed, which in tum might 
induce an incremental treatment cost. On High and Flood days, the power stations are allowed 
to discharge more salt (depending on actual flows), resulting in a reduced treatment cost. 
Therefore, the net cost saving of the power stations under the PHRSTS over the TD depends 
upon the reduced cost during High and Flood flows in relation to the incremental cost during 
Low flows. 
My estimation of the salt that the power stations avoided treating under the PHRSTS is based on 
the following two assumptions. (1) The power stations can withhold the incremental salt load 
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treatment on Low flow days, incurring no or minimal additional cost. This assumption is valid 
because, as described in Section 3.5.1.3, in practice Macquarie's two power stations use Lake 
Liddell as a buffer to withhold their freshwater and wastewater. The large storage capacity (152 
GL) of the Lake Liddell makes their withholding of saline water flexible. (2) All power stations 
treat their daily discharges of saline water in excess of the corresponding permits (by extracting 
the salt using the existing desalinisation technology) on any one day. These assumptions allow 
this study to treat any additional salt load from a power station beyond its daily permit as 
avoided treatment, and allows the total saving in treatment under the PHRSTS (compared to the 
TD) from the power generation industry to be approximated by the sum of avoided treatment of 
individual power stations, as follows. 
7.2.2.1 Calculation of avoided saline water treatment 
Following the notations set out in Section 7.2.1.3, the salt load that power station j avoids 
treating on any one day under the PHRSTS against the TD, denoted L'.l 01 can be calculated 
based on either Equation [7.39) or Equation [7.44), depending upon the scenario with or without 
permit trading. 
The volume of saline water that the power station avoids treating on that day is then 
[7.51) 
So the total salt (11S"R;) and volume of saline water (11 V~) which j avoids treating during the 
entire PHRSTS period (T = 2891 days) are the sum of daily salt load and sum of saline water 
avoided treating over that period as expressed by [7 .52) and [7 .53) respectively: 
T 
f..SR1 := ·~.:>~d11 [7.52) 
I=] 
T 
!'1VR1 := (1/ fc1 ) Ll'1d11 [7.53) 
t=I 
The overall salt load (11SR) and volume of saline water (11 VR) that the power stations avoids 
under the PHRSTS compared to under TD are thus [7.54) and [7.55) respectively: 
n T 
MR := I I !'!djt [7.54) 
i=] I=] 
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n T 
LiVR := Icu Jc) I!id11 [7.55] 
i=l t=l 
Using the same data set as in Section 7 .2.1.3, the total salt load and volume of saline water that 
the power stations avoided treating during the entire PHRSTS period with and without permits 
trading are calculated and presented in Table 7.7. Since Redbank Power Station is another new 
development under the PHRSTS, we treat it in the same way as Bengalla Coal Mine. So in our 
calculation, Redbank Power Station's daily permitted discharge under the TD s1 is treated as 
zero to reflect the Nil Discharge regulation it would have been subject to under the TD. 
Table 7.7 Avoided salt load and volume of saline water treatment during PHRSTS 
period 
With Without Due to 
permits trading permits trading permits trading 
11SR1 11VR1 !1SR1 11VR1 11SR1 11VR1 
Power Stations (tonnes) (ML) (tonnes) (ML) (tonnes) (ML) 
Macquarie Power 27034 11756 25747 11196 1287 560 
Redbank Power 582 55 306 29 276 26 
Total 27616 11811 26053 11225 1563 586 
!'>.SR1= Power Station j's total salt load avoided treating over the entire PHRSTS period 
!'>. VR1 = Power Station j's total saline water avoided treating over the entire PHRSTS period 
As Table 7.7 shows, the power stations avoided 11811 ML of saline water, which contains 
2 7 616 tonnes of salt, being treated during the entire PHRSTS period, thanks to the dynamicism 
and tradability of permits. But only 5% (= 586/11811) of the total avoided saline water, 
equivalent to 6% (= 1563/27616) of the total avoided salt, is attributable to permit trading. This 
suggests that most of the cost saving of the power stations from the PHRSTS also derives from 
the dynamicism of permits. 
7 .2.2.2 Indicative treatment cost avoided by the power generation industry 
For the power stations, the cost saving comes from reduced treatment cost due to lower quantity 
or quality of saline water treated under the PHRSTS than would have been needed under the 
TD. My study assumes that (a) power stations used the same Reverse Osmosis (RO) 
desalination technique to treat their saline water under the PHRSTS as under the TD; and (b) the 
capacity of the existing desalination technique for each individual power station is sufficient to 
accommodate excess saline water for treatment, and therefore no extra investment (that is, 
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incremental capital costs) would incur. Borrowing the following empirical information on 
operating costs of brackish RO desalination plants in the literature, this study has estimated the 
treatment cost avoided by the power generation industry under the PHRSTS as follows. 
Commissioned by the Murray-Darling Basin Commission and the National Land and Water 
Resources Audit, URS Australia (2002) undertook a study, assessing the technical and financial 
aspects of desalination as a source of fresh water and a salinity management tool in the National 
Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality regions of Australia, including the NSW region. 
This study examined various desalination techniques and provided a generic estimation of 
depreciated capital and operational costs for these techniques. Among others, the information 
on brackish RO operating costs of various feedwater salinity and product flow rate is relevant to 
this study and is thus presented in Table 7.8. The Table shows that the per ML operating costs 
of desalination processes is positively related to the feedwater salinity level (that is, influent 
concentration) and negatively related to product flow rate (that is, volume of effluent). The 
higher influent salinity level is, the more operating costs would be. Conversely, the lower 
effluent volume, the more operating costs would be. 
Table 7.8 
Feed salinity 
in TDS 
RO operating costs by feedwater salinity and product flow rate (in 1999 
price) 
Product water flow rate 5 KL/day 15 KL/day 50 KL/day 
($/ML) ($/ML) ($/ML) 
2000 mg/L (3333 EC) 1000 900 650 
10000 mg/L (16667 EC) 1500 1300 930 
35000 mg/L (55000 EC) 2200 2000 1890 
Source: URS Australia (2002) 
Neither the average feedwater salinity nor the treatment flow capacity of Macquarie 
Generation's two stations is known. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2.3, the NSW EPA (2001: 6) 
estimated that the discharge of saline water could save Macquarie Generation treatment costs in 
the order of $100/ML to $400/ML, without specifying the level of feed water salinity and 
effluent volume. Obviously, the NSW EPA's estimate is much lower than the figures in Table 
7.8. For an optimistic estimation, the upper boundary of the operating cost at the feed salinity of 
55000 EC in Table 7.8, that is, $2200/ML (in 1999 prices), has been used in the calculation of 
the treatment cost avoided by Macquarie Generation under the PHRSTS. 
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The average feedwater salinity of Redbank Power Station is approximately 33000 EC (NSW 
EPA 2001 ). Again, without information on its treatment flow capacity, the upper boundary of 
the operating cost at the feedwater salinity of 55000 EC, that is, $2200/ML (in 1999 prices), has 
also been used in the calculation of the treatment cost avoided by Redbank Power Station under 
the PHRSTS. 
In the calculation, the average treatment cost of $2200/ML in 1999 prices is converted into 
$2478/ML in 2002 prices based on the price indexes 11999 = 123.6 and 12002 = 139.2 released by 
the ABS (2008). In conjunction with the estimated avoided volume of saline water (~VR) as 
presented in Table 7. 7, the total avoided treatment cost by the PHRSTS power stations is $ 29 
million (in 2002 prices), as shown in Table 7.9. As the avoided treatment of saline water due to 
permit trading only accounts for 5% of the total avoided volume of treatment, the cost saving of 
the power stations from permit trading is approximately $1.46 (= 29.2 x 5%) million over the 
whole the lifetime of the PHRSTS. 
Table 7.9 Avoided treatment cost by the power generation industry (in 2002 prices) 
~VRJ Cost saving 
Power stations (ML) ($million) 
Macquarie power stations 11756 29.1 
Redbank Power 55 0.1 
Total 11811 29.2 
~ VR1 = Power Station j's total sahne water avoided treatmg over the entire PHRSTS penod 
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7.2.3 Cost saving of the PHRSTS from the new development 
As in Box 7 .1, the NSW EPA claimed that a significant cost saving from the PHRSTS was from 
allowing new development. 
Box 7.1 NSW EPA's claim on the PHRSTS contribution to the new development 
"The pilot Scheme has enabled the development of new mining and power generation projects 
that might not otherwise have been possible under the previous [Trickle Discharge] system 
because that system restricted new salt discharge into the catchment (as discharges were already 
adversely affecting river salinity and threaten agriculture) ... " 
"One of these new developments is Bengalla Coal Mine, which was developed at a cost of 
around $300 million. This mine employs 300 people and has a projected coal output of nearly 6 
Mt per year. The value of this output is around $300 million per year at current price. 
Another new development that may not have been possible without the Scheme is Redbank 
Power Station, which was also established at a cost of $300 million. The power station will 
employ 50 full-time employees and will have a power output of 130 MW ... " 
"The benefits of avoiding the cost of foregone development are also significant, with each mine 
likely to employ over 300 people and to generation output worth over $300 million per year." 
Source: NSW EPA (2001: 12; 13; 51) 
However, the high rate of saving from development not forgone cannot be attributed to the 
PHRSTS. In principle, the new mine and power station are technically able to achieve zero 
discharge through desalinisation technology or building large storage capacity or other 
alternatives. The PHRSTS just provides an option for the new development to achieve the 
stricter effluent standard (such as, Nil Discharge) at a lower cost than other control measures. 
Bearing this in mind, the cost effectiveness of the PHRSTS to the new developments is the 
avoided control cost that would have otherwise been incurred under other control systems such 
as the TD. 
This study estimated the cost saving of the PHRSTS to the new development via calculation of 
the avoided storage capacity for Bengalla Coal Mines and the avoided saline water treatment for 
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Redbank Power Station, as have been presented in the earlier sections of this chapter. In the 
calculations, the daily permitted discharge (si or s1 ) for both Bengalla and Redbank under the 
TD is treated as zero to reflect the Nil Discharge requirement as if the PHRSTS had not been in 
place. Thus, any discharges from Bengalla and Redbank under the PHRSTS are counted as their 
savings in storage capacity enlargement or saline water treatment under the PHRSTS over the 
TD. The cost savings of Bengalla Coal Mine and Redbank Power Station were included in 
Table 7.6 and Table 7.9, respectively, and are summarised in Table 7.10 below. As the Table 
shows, the total cost saving of the new development under the PHRSTS is $2.2 million (in 2002 
prices). The small portion of Redbank Power Station's cost saving is partly due to the fact that it 
did not join the PHRSTS until 21December2000. 
Table 7.10 Avoided control cost for new developments (in 2002 prices) 
A voided control cost saving 
Power stations (ML) ($million) 
Bengalla Coal Mine 276 (avoided storage capacity) 2.1 
Redbank Power 55 (avoided saline water treatment) 0.1 
Total 2.2 
7.2.4 Total saving in control cost and its significance 
7.2.4.1 Total cost saving of the PHRSTS 
The total cost saving of the Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) over the 
Trickle Discharge (TD) is the sum of avoided cost of storage enlargement by the mining 
industry ($ 20.2 million) and avoided treatment cost by the power generating industry ($29.2 
million), equalling $49.4 million in 2002 prices (see Table 7.11). Table 5.6 shows the 
contribution fees of the PHRSTS across the years from 1995 to 2002. Accordingly, the total 
contribution fee during the entire PHRSTS period is calculated based on the price index 
released by the ABS (2008) and the real discount rate of 7%/yr recommended by the NSW 
Treasury (2007). The total transaction cost borne by the PHRSTS participant is $2.2 million, 
accounting for approximately 4.5% (= 2.2/49.4) of the total saving in control cost generated by 
the PHRSTS. Taking into account this transaction cost, the total net saving in control cost to the 
PHRSTS participants is $4 7 .2 million. 
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Table 7.11 Total cost saving of the PHRSTS 
Cost saving/cost 
($ million in 2002 price) 
Mining industry 20.2 
Cost saving Power generating industry 29.2 
Sum 49.4 
Transaction cost (-2.2) 
Net cost saving 47.2 
Among the total net cost saving, $2.2 million or 4.5% of the saving comes from the new 
development. Thus, most of the cost saving of the PHRSTS comes from the existing mines and 
power stations. Furthermore, only $1.85 million - $0.4 million from the mines and $1.45 
million from the power stations - comes from permit trading. The cost saving from permit 
trading only accounts for 3.7% (=l.85/49.4) of the total cost saving (see Table 7.12). So the vast 
majority of the cost saving of the PHRSTS actually derives from the dynamicism of the permits. 
This finding provides an important explanation of the low values of the FHRSTS salt credits 
indicated by their auction prices (see Section 5.4.3). 
Table 7.12 Total cost saving of the PHRSTS from permit trading 
Total cost saving Contribution of Cost saving due to 
($Million) permit trading permit trading 
(%) ($Million) 
Coal mines 20.2 2.0 0.40 
Power stations 29.1 5.0 1.45 
Total/avera2e 49.3 3.8 1.85 
At first glance, the modest cost saving of the PHRSTS from permit trading seems conflict with 
the observation of the high volume of trading and large number of participants on the PHRSTS 
credit trading market (see Section 5.3). Contemplation offers a plausible explanation; the actual 
daily discharge record ( dit) used in the calculations above gives 100% accurate hindsight of 
discharge events. Reliance on that discharge record carries an implicit assumption that all events 
in the record are accurately forecast ahead of time and that sufficient advance notice was given 
for dischargers to make use of those opportunities. In reality, however, the firms conducted a 
large number of what I called precautionary trading to meet their precautionary excess 
discharge. As noted in Section 5.3, precautionary excess discharge occurred whenever a mine, 
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facing a high degree of uncertainty in the time and duration of the next discharge event, chose to 
make an excess discharge one day even when it still had spare dam capacity. This precautionary 
trading behaviour can be regarded as one of their strategies to address the inherent risk that the 
firms have to bear under any dynamic permits system, as discussed in Section 2.2.4. This 
explanation is well supported by the observation of the low utilisation rate of salt credits (that is, 
17%) during the entire PHRST period, as in Section 5.2.2. 
7 .2.4.2 Significance of the total cost saving 
Ideally, the significance of the total cost saving of the PHRSTS should be measured by its 
magnitude in relation to the total control cost of the coal mining and power generating industries 
under the TD. However, lack of data on the latter prevented this study proceeding in this way. 
The conclusion drawn from the earlier analysis in Section 7 .2.1 is that the PHRSTS saved the 
coal mines up to 19% of the construction cost of storage capacity that would otherwise have 
been needed under the TD. 
As an alternative, this study measures the significance of the PHRSTS total cost saving by 
calculating its magnitude in relation to the coal mines and power stations' revenues. This study 
estimated the revenue for the PHRSTS mines during 1995-2002 based on their saleable 
production and average export price of the individual year sourced from the NSW Coal Industry 
Profile. Each year's revenue is converted into 2002 prices using the price indexes released by 
the ABS (2008). The real discount rate of 7% (NSW Treasury 20007) is then used to convert a 
flow of revenues into a present value in 2002 prices. The total revenue of the coal mines during 
the PHRSTS period is then $32981 million in 2002 prices, as shown in Table 7.13. 
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Saleable production, unit value and revenue of coal mines during 1995-
2002 
Revenue Present 
value Price Saleable production Average value Revenue index ($Million) ($ 
Year (Mt) ($/tonne) ($Million) (in 2002 price) Million) 
94/95 45.81 47.05 2155 113.0 2617 4202 
95196 45.91 53.09 2437 118.7 2818 4229 
96197 50.03 50.36 2520 120.4 2872 4028 
97/98 61.26 52.62 3224 120.5 3670 4810 
98/99 63.40 49.15 3116 122.5 3490 4276 
99100 64.97 42.69 2774 125.4 3034 3474 
00/01 67.04 50.55 3389 133.2 3490 3734 
01/02 69.55 60.79 4228 137.2 4228 4228 
Total 467.97 23842 32981 
Source: Data from NSW DMR (1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002); ABS (2008). 
In fact, approximately 75% of coal produced in the Hunter Region is exported overseas, with 
only 25% actually consumed by domestic users, primarily by the power stations in the Region 
(HVRF 2003). For instance, in 2001/2002, 20 Mt out of the 70 Mt total saleable productions 
was consumed by the two large power stations located in the Liddell area (HVRF 2003). It is 
reasonable to assume that the export prices should be higher than domestic prices because of the 
additional costs of transport and tariff for coal exporting. However, the absence of data on coal 
production supplied to domestic markets and their associated sale prices prohibit this study from 
separating the revenue of production exported from that sold in the domestic markets. The 
revenue may thus have been overestimated. 
This study has calculated the revenue of Macquarie Generation during the PHRSTS period 
based on its annual electricity outputs and NSW average pool prices. Redbank Power Station 
joined the PHRSTS in December 2000. Information on its annual electricity outputs during 
2001 and 2002 is unavailable. So the revenue of Redbank is not included in this calculation. The 
total revenue of the power generating industry during the entire PHRSTS is $5416 million, as 
presented in Table 7 .14. 
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Table 7.14 Revenue of the Hunter power generating industry during the PHRSTS 
period 
Electricity Revenue in 
output Pool price Revenue Price 2002 prices Present value 
Year (GWh20) ($/MWh) ($Million) index ($Million) ($Million) 
96197 24,501 21.9 536 120.4 629 943 
97/98 23,894 14.3 341 120.5 400 400 
98199 24,096 24.2 583 122.5 672 672 
99100 25,059 28.3 708 125.4 797 797 
00/01 25,984 37.7 979 133.2 1,037 1,037 
01/02 26,084 34.8 907 137.2 932 932 
02/03 24,333 32.9 801 141.l 801 801 
Total 173,951 4,856 5,583 
Source: Compiled from data provided by the Macquarie Generation in 2003 
Table 7 .15 compares the cost saving of the PHRSTS from the mining industry and Macquarie 
Generation in relation to their respective revenue during 1995-2002. The total net cost saving of 
the PHRSTS accounts for 0.12% (= 47.2/38564) of the overall PHRSTS participants' 
production revenue. The cost savings of the PHRSTS from the coal mine and power stations 
account for 0.06% (= 0.2/32981) and 0.52% (= 29.2/5583) of their revenue, respectively. This 
means that the cost saving is marginally more significant to the power stations than to the coal 
mines. This is because the main sources of cost saving for the coal mines are different from 
those of the power stations. As discussed earlier, while the savings mainly derive from capital 
costs of storage dams for the coal mines, the savings are mainly from the operational costs of 
the desalinisation processes for the power stations. The PHRSTS might not be able to reduce the 
coal mines' capital cost, as most of the storage dams had been constructed prior to the inception 
of PHRSTS. It can reduce the operation cost for the power stations by allowing variation of low 
treatment rates in response to changes of river conditions. 
20 1 GWh (gigawatt hour)= 1000 MWh (megawatt hour) 
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Table 7.15 Cost savings of the PHRSTS versus industrial revenue 
Cost saving Production revenue Saving I revenue 
($million) ($million) (%) 
Mining industry 20.2 32981 0.06 
Power generating industry 29.2 5583 0.52 
Transaction cost (-2.0) 
47.2 38564 0.12 
Total 
(net cost saving) 
7.3 Summary 
Using an operational model and available empirical data, this chapter has estimated the avoided 
storage enlargement by the mining industry and the avoided saline water treatment by the power 
generating industry under the Pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) over the 
Trickle Discharge (TD), respectively. This enabled estimates of the cost savings of these 
industries to be made from the dynamicism and tradability of the PHRSTS separately, and of 
the significance of the cost savings. It revealed that the PHRSTS enables the mining industry to 
avoid a storage capacity enlargement of 2624 ML and the power generating industry to avoid a 
salt treatment of 27616 tonnes, which would otherwise be needed under the TD. This generates 
a cost saving of $20.2 million to the mining industry and $29.2 million to the power generating 
industry, of which the new development saves $2.2 million. Together, the total net cost saving 
during the entire PHRSTS period (1995-2002) is $47.2 million after a $2.2 million transaction 
cost is taken into account. 
The total cost saving may be worthwhile in relation to the control cost of the industries (for 
example, a 19% saving is worthwhile to the coal mines in relation to their storage costs), but it 
is very modest by other measures, being only 0.12% of their overall production revenue. 
Furthermore, of the total net cost saving, only 3.7% ($1.85 million) actually derives from permit 
trading. 
In conclusion, the PHRSTS did not generate a substantial saving in the total cost of saline water 
management to either its initial participants or the two new developments over its entire period. 
Tradability of the discharge permits produced only a very modest cost saving, and the 
247 
Chapter 7 Examination of the Economic Effectiveness of the PHRSTS 
dynamicism of the permits was the main source of the cost saving of the PHRSTS. This 
conclusion is, again, contrary to the NSW EPA' s claim reported in Box 1.1 of Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
8.1 Main findings and contributions of this thesis 
This thesis has examined the application of dynamic tradable discharge permits (DT) in 
managing the discharge of conservative pollutants from industrial point sources into a river 
system. Its main contributions lie at two levels. Conceptually, it has constructed an analytical 
framework that allows comparisons of various discharge permits schemes from both 
environmental and economic perspectives (Section 2.4). This framework enriches the theoretical 
foundation of DT as the most cost-effective pollution control scheme. Empirically, it has 
evaluated many aspects of the pilot Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (PHRSTS) which ran 
from 1995 to 2002, and some aspects of the formalised Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme 
(FHRSTS) which succeeded it in 2002. It has investigated the origins, evolution and 
institutional arrangement of the PHRSTS; examined the performance of the credits trading 
market of the PHRSTS, and the 2004 and 2006 auctioning markets of the FHRSTS; and as its 
major contribution to knowledge, measured the environmental and economic effectiveness of 
the PHRSTS. Altogether, it provides the first comprehensive quantitative assessment for many 
aspects of the HRS TS. To this end, the study not only offers the interim feedback necessary to 
shape the evolution of the Scheme over time, but also enriches the empirical evidence on 
operation of tradable permit programs, adding knowledge about how well a tradable permit 
system can work and the design features that contribute to desirable outcomes. 
To provide this assessment, it proved necessary to undertake a comprehensive review of the 
environmental and engineering science of industrial saline discharges to the Hunter River in 
New South Wales (Chapter 3). It was also necessary to carry out an extensive investigation of 
the long and varied institutional history of how these discharges have been managed, and of the 
initiation, development and evolution of the PHRSTS (Chapter 4). While not providing any new 
data analyses or policy recommendations, these reviews and investigations make an 
interdisciplinary contribution to knowledge by bringing together for the first time a wide range 
of information on the HRSTS, much of which was obtained from oral sources and thus 
previously unavailable in the written record. 
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This study found that the PHRSTS participants tended to take the advantage of the effectively 
unlimited discharge during the Scheme's Flood flows to the Hunter River instead of the tradable 
discharge in the High flows. Around 53% of total salt load was discharged in the Flood flow 
period (2.3% of the total time), whilst 43% was discharged in the High flow period (9.6% of the 
total time) (Section 5 .2). This reflects the feature of industrial saline water generation that the 
volume of the saline water generated on mine sites has a generally positive relationship with 
river flows. It also helps explain the low average utilisation rate of salt credits (Section 5.2), and 
the low prices of salt credits in the 2004 and 2006 auctions of the FHRSTS (Section 5 .4 ). 
Another finding was that the credit trading market of the PHRSTS was active in terms of both 
volume of trades and number of participants, in spite of the high proportion of intra-company 
trades due to the high cross-company ownership of the PHRSTS participants. There were 157 
credit transactions involving 6811 credits traded during the PHRSTS period; 50% of these were 
intra-company trades. All the PHRSTS participants were involved in credit trading activities, 
and a significant proportion of firms (9 out of 22 firms) were both sellers and buyers (Section 
5.3). The successful bidders in the 2004 and 2006 credit auctions of the FHRSTS were a mix of 
sellers and buyers on the credit trading market of the PHRSTS. The low prices of the salt credits 
in the 2004 and 2006 auctions suggest that the firms did not value the salt credits very highly. 
The narrow range of these auction prices also indicates little diversity in the salt control costs 
across the firms, and suggests that the gains of the PHRSTS participants from credit trading are 
not great (Section 5 .4) 
Environmental effectiveness and economic effectiveness are the two important criteria used for 
evaluating the PHRSTS in this thesis and formed the bases of the two research questions posed 
in Chapter 1. Examination of the environmental effectiveness of the PHRSTS, measured against 
the Trickle Discharge (TD) control system that it replaced in 1995, has provided one of the main 
contributions to knowledge, and has been conducted in various ways (Chapter 6). Regression 
models that account for the autocorrelation (time-series) effect in the data were used to examine 
the long-series monthly mean observations of river salinity and flow. They showed that neither 
the overall river salinities and flows nor the river salinity of Low flow period between the 
PHRSTS and the TD are significantly different in a statistical sense. This finding was confirmed 
by analysis using a simulation model, which showed that the difference in the river salinity 
between the (actual) with-PHRSTS and (hypothetically modelled) without-PHRSTS situations 
is minor. Thus, the PHRSTS saved only an insignificant amount of the social cost of the river 
salinity (approximately $0.3 million at 2002 prices) during its nearly 8-year lifetime. These 
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findings lead to the conclusion that the PHRSTS has had little, if any, effect on the 
improvement of river salinity, contrary to the NSW EPA's claim regarding the environmental 
effectiveness of the PHRSTS, as reported in Box 1.1. 
Evaluation of the economic (cost) effectiveness of the PHRSTS compared to the TD is another 
major contribution of this study to knowledge here. The new theoretical model developed in this 
thesis would have demonstrated the cost saving potential of the PHRSTS over other regulatory 
schemes if the required data had been available (Chapter 7.1). Since they were not, the cost 
effectiveness of the PHRSTS was evaluated with a simple operational model, by estimating the 
avoided storage capacity for the mining industry and the avoided treatment of saline water for 
the power generating industry under the PHRSTS that would otherwise have been needed under 
the TD (Chapter 7.2). The model estimates that during its lifetime, the PHRSTS generated a 
cost saving of $20 million to the mining industry and $29 million to the power generating 
industry, of which $2.2 million derived from a new coal mine and a power station, while 
maintaining the river salinity objectives. The total net cost saving of the PHRSTS was 
approximately $47 million when the transaction cost of $2 million is taken into account. 
Furthermore, of the total cost saving, only 3.7% ($1.85 million) came from the credit trading. 
This finding of modest cost saving of the PHRSTS resulting from allowing the permits to be 
traded is consistent with the above observations of low average utilisation rate under the 
PHRSTS and low auction prices of salt credits under the FHRSTS. It also shows that the great 
majority of the cost saving of the PHRSTS in fact came from its dynamicism, that is, its 
allowing the total permitted discharge to vary over time in response to changing (Low, High or 
Flood) flows in the Hunter River. These findings, again, are contrary to the NSW EPA's claim 
regarding the economic effectiveness of the PHRSTS, as reported in Box I. I. 
Overall, the finding of this study is that the PHRSTS attained the river salinity objectives of the 
Hunter River whilst allowing new development. However, it did not significantly improve the 
river salinity. Nor did it generate a substantial cost saving to its participants. These conclusions 
do not support the NSW EPA's claim that the PHRSTS achieved significant environmental and 
cost (economic) effectiveness. The insights derived from this study on the merits of tradable 
permit system in terms of environmental and cost effectiveness in a broader sense highlight the 
potential benefits of integrating various regulatory instruments for managing natural resources 
and environmental quality at a time where the prevailing wisdom seems to be that the market is 
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a panacea to all problems. This could have strong implication for other fields of resource and 
environmental management beyond water quality management for river systems. 
The experimental design features and operational experiences of permit trading being built into 
a dynamic permits control system are perhaps the most important benefits of the PHRSTS. 
These experiences include, but are not limited to, that: 
• An environmentally and economically effective water quality management program 
requires the combination of multiple policy tools and the cooperation of multiple parties 
involving government, market, communities and polluters. 
• Legislative and regulatory backing is essential for any market-based environmental 
management program. 
• Fundamental scientific understanding of the nature of the pollutant and the characteristics 
of the river being regulated is essential for designing an effective river quality management 
program. 
• Clearly defined and well agreed environmental objectives, and the stakeholder's 
participation and support, are cornerstones for the effective implementation of any river 
quality management program. 
• Appropriate institutional mechanisms for monitoring, reporting and enforcement are 
necessary for effective enforcement. 
• Adequate information flow and low transaction costs are important to a smooth effluent 
trading market. 
These experiences have formed a basis for the Scheme's evolution, development and 
formalisation. They will prove a useful reference for developing innovative and effective water 
quality management programs in Australia and elsewhere, even for other tradable permit 
programs in the areas beyond water quality trading. 
Further, less important contributions to knowledge from this thesis are: 
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• The theoretical framework for comparing various discharge permits schemes from both 
environmental and economic perspectives (Section 2.4) will help empirical studies in 
devising strategies for river quality management. 
• The new approach to accounting for the time series effect in analysis of the river flow and 
salinity of the Hunter River (Section 6.3) can provide a reference for hydro logic and water 
quality analysis for other rivers. 
• The flow-discharge-salinity model developed for the Hunter River (Section 6.4) can 
contribute to the improvement of the ongoing FHRSTS operation by providing a more 
advanced model to predict the discharge events and calculate the salt discharge permits. 
• The operational model for estimation of the cost saving for the coal mines (Section 7.2) can 
be extended to cost estimation for storable river pollutants, which is sparse in the literature. 
8.2 Recommendations for the FHRSTS 
The HRSTS has evolved since it was formalised and made permanent on 1 December 2002. 
There were a number of changes accompanying the formalisation of the HRSTS that built on 
the PHRSTS' s operational experience, such as re-distributing the salt credits via progressive 
public auctions, and re-defining the thresholds of the river flow periods to address the increasing 
growth of industrial growth in the upper Hunter region (see Section 5.4). While these changes 
are expected to improve the environmental and economic effectiveness of the FHRSTS, this 
study still has two recommendations for improving the performance of the FHRSTS, as follows. 
The information on the trading prices of salt credits is important for understanding the HRS TS 
credit trading and auctioning markets. Trading prices, along with the auction prices, could 
provide the best evidence of true value of the salt credits and more general insights into this 
aspect. This information is also important for empirical research on the HRSTS. However, 
reporting the trading prices is not required under either the PHRSTS or the current FHRSTS. So 
it is in the public interest to publish this information. 
Looking ahead, a significant challenge exists to the FHRSTS in the context of improvement of 
the overall river salinity in the Hunter River. There has been clear evidence that nonpoint 
sources (NPS), such as irrigation runoff, are also major contributors to the salinity in the Hunter 
River. It is conceivable that in some cases reducing or even eliminating industrial salt discharge 
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would still be inadequate to achieve the river salinity objectives, given that the industrial salt 
inputs only account for a small proportion (some 5%) of the total salt received by the Hunter 
River. This suggests that improvement of the overall river salinity of the Hunter River also 
relies on management of the NPS in the region. In some instances, it is likely that the costs of 
reducing salt inputs from NPS can be much lower than reduction from well managed point 
sources. While the current Scheme is still confined to point-to-point trading, the greater benefits 
of effiuent trading under the HRS TS would be realised when trades are made between point and 
nonpoint sources. In recognition of more difficulties in water quality trading involving NPS 
(such as, set up appropriate trading ratios, monitoring and enforcement), exploring the potential 
for inclusion of NPS in the Scheme would be more challenging but more rewarding. 
8.3 Prospects for future study 
Several follow-up topics in need of further research have been identified during the course of 
this study. These are: 
o Improving understanding of the social costs associated with various levels of river salinity 
in the Hunter River (see Section 3.7); and 
o Using recent-year data to test and calibrate the simulation model of discharge-flow-river 
salinity that has been developed in this study based on short-series historical observations 
(see Section 6.4.2). 
It has been six years since the FHRSTS was made permanent in December 2002. While this 
study has partially investigated the 2004 and 2006 auctions of the FHRSTS, so far the 
performance of the FHRSTS has not been fully investigated. Thus, genuine opportunities exist 
for evaluating various aspects of the FHRSTS. Further studies of the areas given below are of 
particular interest and would be welcomed. 
o Examining the relationship between the salt credit trading market and the auction market 
under the FHRSTS with the information generated from subsequent credit auctions when 
the trading price information becomes public available; 
o Investigating the effect of the FHRSTS on changes of firms' strategies for management of 
saline water; 
254 
Chapter 8 Conclusions 
• Investigating the effect of the FHRSTS on firms' incentives for further reduction of saline 
water discharge; 
• Measuring empirically the degree of environmental effectiveness achieved by the 
FHRSTS; 
• Estimating the cost saving generated by the FHRSTS, in particular, for the new 
development during the period, and measuring its significance; and 
• Undertaking a feasibility study of extending the FHRSTS to include NPS. 
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Appendix 1 List of the HRSTS stakeholders consulted for this study 
Stakeholders Contact Position Consultation Site 
methods 
Department of David Hoey Environmental Emails; NSW Department 
Land and Water Officer interviews; of Natural 
Conservation group meetings Resources (DNR) 
(DLWC) Newcastle Office; 
Canberra 
DLWC Eddie Manager Resource Interviews; NSWDNR 
Harris Assessment & group meetings Newcastle Office 
Planning Hunter 
Region 
DLWC Sandra HRS TS Emails; NSWDNR 
Mitchell Administrator interviews; Newcastle Office 
group meetings 
DLWC Mark Resource analyst Emails; NSWDNR 
Simons interview Newcastle Office 
NSWEPA Mitchell Head of Regional Emails; NSWEPA 
(Newcastle Bennett Operations interview; Newcastle Office 
Office) group meeting 
Hunter Dean Catchment Manger Interview Newcastle 
Catchment Trust Chapman - Land & Water 
Hunter River W.E.J. Chairman Emails 
Research Paradice 
Foundation 
Coal & Allied John Pola Environmental Interview Coal & Allied Coal 
Coal Mine Specialist- Water Mine 
Manager 
Liddell Coal Edward Environmental Co- Interview; Credit auctions at 
Operation Wegner coordinator emails Newcastle 
NSW Minerals Peter Smith Assistant Director, Emails; Sydney; Singleton; 
Council Environment interviews; Newcastle 
Group meetings 
HRS TS Representatives of Group meeting Credit auctions at 
participants coal mines and Singleton 
power stations 
NSW Michele Group meeting Newcastle 
Department of Weight 
Environment and 
Conservation 
Macquarie Jim Devine Public Affairs Emails Newcastle; 
Generation Manager Singleton 
Coal & Allied Scott Environmental emails; Newcastle; 
Oakley Officer interview; Singleton 
Group meetings 
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Appendix 2 Available data and their sources for this study 
Prior to PHRSTS FHRSTS Sources 
PHRSTS (111/1995 ~ (after 
(Before 30/11/2002) 30/11/2002) 
1/1/1995) 
Hydrological River flow 1980-1995 1995-2002 NA Provided by the 
data (Monthly) NSWDLWC 
River flow 1993-1995 1995-2002 NA 
(Daily) 
River salinity 1993-1995 1995-2002 NA 
(monthly) 
River salinity 1993-1995 1995-2002 NA 
(Daily) 
HRS TS Ownerships of NA 1990-2002 NA 
participants mines 
(coal mines) Saleable coal NA 1990-2002 NA NSWDMR 
production 
(Yearly) 
Prices saleable NA 1990-2002 NA 
coal 
HRS TS Electricity NA 1997-2002 NA Macquarie 
participants outputs Generation 
(power (Yearly) 
stations) 
Initial allocation NA 1995 NA 
of credits 
TAD NA 1995-2002 NA HRSTS Annual 
PHRSTS (Daily) Report 1995-2002 
operation Salt load NA 1995-2002 NA 
discharge 
(Daily) 
Credit traded NA 1995-2002 2002-2006 HRSTS Annual 
(Daily) Report 1995-2002 
Trading parties NA 1995-2002 2002-2006 andHRSTS 
website 
Trading prices NA NA NA 
Contribution fee NA DLWC 
(yearly) 
HRS TS Number of Bids 2004 and NSWEPA 
credit 2006 Auction reports 
Auctions Prices of bids 2004 andHRSTS 
and2006 website 
Note: NA= Not available. 
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Appendix 3 System of coal-fired power stations 
To help better understand water consumption by and wastewater discharge from the power 
stations in the Hunter Valley, a brief description of the thermoelectric generation process is 
provided here. In general, almost all coal-fired power stations work in such a way that coal and 
fuels are burned inside a boiler to heat water and generate steam. The steam is then used to turn 
turbines that drive the power generators to make electricity. 
The prevailing work process of coal-fired power stations is shown as Figure A3.1. Coal 
transported from the nearby open-cut and underground mines is crushed before being 
transported to the power station coal handling area. The coal is fed by conveyor into the 
stations' mills, and pulverized into a fine consistency. The pulverized coal is blown into the 
boiler in a stream of pre-hearted air. The coal is then burned in the boiler furnace chamber and 
produces great heat to convert water, circulating in the boiler tubes, into high-pressure steam. 
An extensive fabric filter system between the boiler and emission stack extracts virtually all fine 
ash particles, a by-product of burnt coal, from boiler exhaust gasses (Macquarie Generation 
2005). 
Steam, injected at very high pressure into the turbine, turns the fan-like turbine blades mounted 
along the main drive shaft of the turbine. For maximum efficiency, the stream is reheated in the 
boiler after its energy is partially spent driving the first stage of the turbine (higher pressure 
cylinder where the blades are smallest in diameter). It is then passed to the second stage of the 
turbine (intermediate pressure cylinder-large blades) and, as heat and pressure dissipate, on to 
the two low pressure cylinders, where the blades are largest. The spent steam is then cooled 
back to water for re-use as it passes over a series of condenser tubes through which cold water 
from the water cooling system is circulated. Electricity produced by the generators then passes 
into the adjacent power station switchyard through a transformer (Macquarie Generation 2005). 
Thus, the generation of electricity in coal-fired power stations requires large amounts of water. 
There are two separate water systems involved: one is for the steam production cycle, and the 
other is for cooling purposes in the cycle. Most of the water in both systems is used over and 
over again. For the steam cycle, the quality of the feedwater used to produce the steam is 
critical. This is because impurities in the feedwater can cause problems such as scaling that will 
reduce the amount of electricity produced. They can also cause erosion of equipment and reduce 
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the efficiency of operations. Therefore, power stations usually treat the feedwater before it is 
used in any processes. By removing any contaminated content from the feedwater, the number 
of cycles before the deleterious effects of scaling are felt is maximised (Macquarie Generation 
2005). 
Figure A3.1 Flow diagram of coal-fired power station system 
Source: Macquarie Generation (2005) 
The salinity level in the Hunter River is naturally high. Before the water extracted from the 
River is used as feedback for steam generation and cooling, both power stations apply reverse 
osmosis (RO) to remove the salt from the water. RO is one of the most common desalination 
technologies used primarily with brackish waters (as opposed to seawater). While the RO 
treatment capacity of the Liddell Power Station is unknown, Bayswater Power Station owns a 
35 ML/day RO plant, the largest desalination plant in Australia (Macquarie Generation 2005). 
In RO (see Figure A3.2), saline feedwater is pumped at high pressure through permeable 
membranes, separating salts from the water. To this end, the saline water is separated into two 
streams: the product steam with a low salinity concentration (freshwater stream) and the effluent 
stream with a concentrated brine solution. When the non-salt-free freshwater stream is used by 
the power stations for steam generation and cooling, the soluble salt is concentrated, and the 
water becomes even more saline. The prevailing methods for desalination plants dealing with 
the brine stream include discharging it to the ocean, producing salt products or filling in land 
after it has dried out. However, Macquarie Generation stores the saline water in its dam, Lake 
Liddell, for management or disposal (Macquarie Generation 2005). 
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Figure A3.2 Flow diagram of a reverse osmosis system 
Saline 
_F_e_e_d_w_at_e_r ..- Pre-
Treatment 
Source: Macquarie Generation (2005) 
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Appendix4 Examination of incremental discharge 
This appendix examines the ambient and incremental controls in a rigorous way. The purpose of 
this examination is to find out whether the control is a static permits scheme or dynamic permits 
scheme. 
Let Q be river flow or industrial saline water discharge. C is the discharge or river salinity. The 
suffixes r and d refer to river and discharges, respectively, and the suffix rd represents the river 
status after the inputs of industrial discharge (see Figure A4.1) 
Figure A4.1 River salinity before and after discharge input 
Discharge 
Qd. Cd 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
River 
Q,, c, 
'-------'• ~iv er 
Q*'1.Crd 
where 
Q,: river flow background at discharge point (ML/day). 
C,: river salinity background concentration at discharge point (µSiem) 
Qd: volume of industrial discharge (ML/day) 
Cd: salinity concentration of industrial discharge (µSiem) 
Q,d: river flow after the inputs of industrial discharge (ML/day), 
C,d: river salinity concentration after the inputs of industrial discharge (µSiem). 
261 
Appendices 
Since salt is a conservative pollutant, assuming that industrial saline water immediately and 
uniformly mixes with river flow once it is discharged into the river, it follows a mass balance, 
whose basic formula is: 
[A4.1] 
[A4.2] 
[A4.1] and [A4.2] together give 
Cd= QrCr +QdCd 
r Q, + Qd 
[A4.3) 
This, the downstream salinity, faces two constrains: 
(1) crd :=:;; 700' which after simple algebra, 
[A4.4] 
provided Cd > 700 (if not the constraint cannot be binding) 
(2) C,d :=:;; Cr + 40, which after simple algebra, 
Q < 40Q, => d - C -C -40 d r 
[A4.5] 
provided Cd > C, + 40 (if not the constraint cannot be binding) 
So, assuming both Cd> 700 and Cd> Cr+ 40, 
Q . { (700-Cr)Q, 40Q, } d :=:;; mm , ------'--Cd - 700 C -C - 40 d r 
[A4.6] 
[ A4.6] indicates, the maximum volume of saline water allowed to be discharged (Qd) has a 
progressive linear relationship with the river flow (Q,), other things being equal. Assuming the 
salinity concentration of discharge (Cd) of a firm's discharge is fixed, this means that the higher 
the river flow, the greater the volume of saline water (and in turn the more salt load) allowed to 
be discharged. From this standpoint only, the ambient and increment control is actually a 
version of dynamic discharge permits. 
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Appendix 5 Summary of credits held by the PHRSTS participants 
Initial allocation in 1995 Credits by 2002 Credits by 2003 
Bayswater/Mt Arthur 26 25 25 
Camberwell 16 15 15 
Cumnock 15 15 15 
IDartbrook * * 13 15 25 
Drayton 27 25 25 
Howick 37 0 
Hunter Valley 55 120 120 
Mt Thorley 27 0 0 
Leminton 42 40 40 
!Liddell** 56 55 65 
Mt Owen 14 15 15 
Muswellbrook 11 10 10 
IRavensworth/Narama 72 100 100 
IRixs Creek 26 25 25 
Saxonvale/Bulga ** 38 40 50 
Swamp Creek 15 0 0 
United 8 10 10 
Wambo 33 35 35 
Wakeworth 40 40 40 
Pacific Power 229 230 230 
l3engalla * 0 35 35 
!Redbank Power Station * 0 35 35 
Nardell * 0 30 30 
Mt Arthur North** 0 0 40 
Glennies Creek** 0 0 15 
IEP A reserve 200 85 0 
Total 1000 1000 1000 
* refers to the new firms that the NSW EPA allocated credits to between 1995 and 2002. 
**refers to the firms to which the NSW EPA allocated extra credits between 2002 and 2003. 
Sources: Compiled from data from NSW DLWC (2002); NSW EPA (1995; 2003a) 
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Appendix 6 Example of discharge controlled by credits 
The following example, taken from a publication prepared by the NSW EPA (2003a), illustrated 
how the PHRSTS worked in both spatial and temporal dimensions. 
TableA6 River block moves along spatial and temporal dimensions 
FirmA FirmB Singleton 
196 195 194 
15/7/2003 197 196 195 
16/7/2003 199 200 199 
17/7/2003 202 201 200 
Source: Adapted from NSW EPA (2003a) 
Suppose that Block 198 was the block of water that passed Singleton on the 198th day of 2003 
(17/7/2003). Firm A with 25 credits was located at upper sector of the Hunter River, and Firm B 
with 15 credits was at middle sector of the River. Block 198 flowed pass the firms on different 
days (see above Table). The following procedures were followed: 
Based on the real-time monitoring data of flow level and the ambient salinity generated by the 
HITS, DL WC classified the block as Flood, High or Low flow period. If the block was 
classified as a Flood flow period, the industrial wastewater could be discharged freely subject 
only to the volumetric conditions of individual licences. If the block was classified as Low flow 
period, no industrial wastewater discharge was allowed. If the block was classified as High flow 
period, DL WC calculated the total allowable salt load, by the IQQM, that could be added to the 
block so that salinity objective of 900 EC at Singleton was attained. Suppose Block 198 held 
100 tonnes of salt, then each credit allowed discharge of 0 .1 ( = 100 x 0 .1 % ) tonnes of salt into 
the River. 
On 15/7/2003 when the block passed Firm A, Firm A was granted permission to discharge up to 
2.5 (= 200 x 25 x 0.1%) tonnes of salt load. On 16/7/2003 when Block 198 passed to Firm B. 
Site B was granted permission to discharge up to 1.5 (= 200 x 15 x 0.1 % ) tones of salt load. The 
firms performed a second calculation to convert the permitted salt load into the volume of its 
discharge water based on its salinity concentration of effluent. 
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In the extreme case that Firm A did not discharge at all and traded 25 credits to Firm B, then 
Firm B could discharge 40 (= 15 + 25) credits of salt, which was equivalent to 4 (= 200 x 40 x 
0.1 %) tonnes. In the case that Firm A discharged 20 credits of salt and traded the rest of credits 
to Firm B, then Firm B could discharge 20 (= 15 + 5) credits of salt. The total salt load 
discharged from these two firms was still 4 tonnes. 
In this way, the total allowable salt load of a block was controlled under the "cap". On 
17/7/2003 when Block 198 passed Singleton, the river salinity was less than 900 EC. 
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Appendix 7 Simple statistical methods without autocorrelation 
This section uses simple statistical methods to test whether there is a difference in river salinity 
and river flow before and after the PHRSTS implementation. Three methods are used: the 
Student's -test, the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test and the Quantile test. All these methods assume 
that the data are independent of each other. However, the exploratory data analysis has shown 
that considerable autocorrelation is evident in both data sets, so none of these simple statistical 
methods is actually appropriate to test for a difference before and after the HRSTS 
implementation. The purpose of this Appendix is to derive conclusions from these erroneous 
tests so that they can be compared with conclusions drawn from appropriate testing methods, 
which are presented in Section 6.2 of the thesis. 
Statistical methods are generally divided into two classes: parametric and nonparametric. While 
the former relies on the underlying assumption that the data have a particular distribution, no 
assumption about the form of the distribution is required by the latter. The Student's t-test is 
perhaps the most widely-used parametric method for comparing two groups of data. This test 
compares the mean of one group of data with the mean of the other. The following assumptions 
are made: (1) the two groups of data come from distributions with the same standard deviations; 
and (2) the data within each group are independent of each other, that is, no autocorrelation 
exists in the data; (3) in a small sample (no more than 30) the data must be normally distributed. 
In the statistical literature, such as Venables and Ripley (1999), Millard and Neerchal (2001), 
Helsel and Hirsch (2002) and Ginevan and Splitstone (2004), a robust nonparametric method, 
the Wilcoxon Rank Sum (WRS) test, is recommended as an alternative to the Student's t-test 
when the samples are small and the data are non-normal. The WRS test tests the same null 
hypotheses as the Student's t-test. However, the WRS test is based on the ranks of the data, not 
the data themselves. The WRS performs by first pooling the two groups of observations, and 
assigning each observation a rank (the smallest has rank 1, the 2nd smallest rank 2, and so on). 
The ranks for the observations from each of the groups are then added up, and the probability of 
distribution of the rank sum determined. The WRS test requires both groups of data to have the 
same distribution, but is not affected by outliers. 
Another method sometimes used to test the hypothesis of no difference between two groups of 
data while avoiding concerns about the data distribution is the Quantile test. Although the WRS 
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and Quantile test are both nonparametric tests, which do not make assumptions about the 
distributions of the data: they have different focuses from the statistical testing point of view. 
The WRS test is designed to detect a shift in the whole distribution of a data set relative to the 
distribution of another. The Quantile test is used to detect a difference between the two sample 
distributions where only a portion of the distribution of one sample is shifted relative to the 
distribution of another (US EPA 1994; Millard and Neerchal 2001; Ginevan and Splitstone 
2004). The US EPA (1994) once adopted the Quantile test in conjunction with WRS test to 
assess the effectiveness of cleanup programs in remediated soils and solid media. The Quantile 
test was then proposed by Millard and Neerchal (2001) and Ginevan and Splitstone (2004) to 
undertake interrupted time series analysis for general environmental studies, where the 
autocorrelation is minimal and can be ignored. 
In this research, the Student's t-test, the WRS test and the Quantile test were used separately to 
test the following null hypotheses (H0): 
For the river salinity, H0: ln(EC0 ) = ln(EC1 ), meaning there is no difference between the 
monthly mean river salinity observations under the PHRSTS and under the TD. 
For the river flow, H0: ln(Flow0) = ln(Flow1), meaning there is no difference between the 
monthly mean river flow observations under the PHRSTS and under the TD. 
The testing results are listed in Table A 7.1. For ln(EC0 ) and ln(EC1 ), all these simple statistical 
methods strongly reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level, as the p-values are far less than the a 
value of 0.05. However, for ln(Flow0) and ln(FlowJ, the results of these simple statistical 
methods are inconsistent. Only the WRS test rejects the null hypothesis. 
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Table A7 Results of simple statistical methods 
Ho: ln(EC0) = ln(ECJ Ho: ln(Flowo) =ln(Flow1) 
P-value u Conclusion P-value u Conclusion 
value value 
T-test 0 < 0.05 Reject null 0.0749 > 0.05 Accept null 
hypothesis hypothesis 
(significant (insignificant 
difference) difference) 
WRS 0 <0.05 Reject null 0.0112 <0.05 Reject null 
test hypothesis hypothesis 
(significant (significant 
difference) difference) 
Quantile 0 <0.05 Reject null 0.425 > 0.05 Accept null 
test hypothesis hypothesis 
(significant (insignificant 
difference) difference) 
In summary, all three simple statistical methods agree that river salinity of the PHRSTS is 
significantly different from that of the TD. However, the tests lead to different conclusions as to 
whether there has been a change in river flow after the PHRSTS implementation. This is in part 
because the tests have different powers, that is, probability of finding a difference if there is one. 
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Appendix 8 Models considering foresight and transitional effects 
Follows are the fitted models for ln(EC) considering foresight and transitional effects of the PHRSTS. 
Table A8.1 Fitted models of ln(EC) accounting for one-year foresight effect 
Models ar1 Intercept Month PHRSTS1 Month*PHRSTS1 AIC 
Independent 
ln(EC) 1. i.m 1 ln(EC)-Month 6.7802 -0.0157 -32.02 
ln(EC)1.i.m1 ln(EC)-PHRSTS1 6.6896 -0.1883 -19.09 
ln(EC)1.i.m2 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS1 6.7818 -0.0161 0.0065 -30.03 
ln(ECl1.i.m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS1+Month*PHRSTS1 6.7441 -0.0095 0.2427 -0.0177 -31.82 
AR(1) 
ln(EC)1.ar1.m1 ln(EC)-Month 0.4497 6.7815 -0.0161 -78.94 
ln(EC)1.ar1 .m2 ln(EC)-PHRSTS1 0.4751 6.6825 -0.1815 -72.20 
ln(EC)1.ar1 .m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS1 0.4511 6.7902 -0.0184 0.0361 -77.08 
ln(EC)1.ar1 .m4 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS1+Month*PHRSTS1 0.4420 27.8786 -0.0107 0.3111 -0.0207 -77.08 
TableA8.2 Fitted models of ln(EC) accounting for two-year foresight effect 
Models ar1 Intercept Month PHRSTS2 Month*PHRSTS2 AIC 
Independent 
ln(EC)2.i.m1 ln(EC)-Month 6.7802 -0.0157 -32.02 
ln(EC)2.i.m2 ln(EC)-PHRSTS2 6.6529 -0.1977 -15.76 
ln(EC)2.i.m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS2 6.7677 -0.0136 -0.0429 -30.78 
ln(EC)2.i.m4 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS2+Month*PHRSTS2 6.7578 -0.0124 0.4835 -0.0272 -31.72 
AR(1) 
ln(EC)2.ar1 .m1 ln(EC)-Month 0.4497 6.7815 -0.0161 -78.94 
ln(EC)2.ar1 .m2 ln(EC)-PHRSTS2 0.4872 6.6504 -0.2017 -72.74 
ln(EC)2.ar1 .m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS2 0.4480 6.7673 -0.0137 -0.0490 -77.34 
ln(EC)2.ar1 .m4 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS2+Month*PHRSTS2 0.4412 6.7537 -0.0120 0.5911 -0.0332 -77.11 
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Table A8.3 Fitted models of ln(EC) accounting for one-year transitional effect 
Models ar1 Intercept Month PHRSTS2 Month*PHRSTS2 AIC 
Independent 
ln(EC)2.i.m1 ln(EC)-Month 6.7802 -0.0157 -32.02 
ln(EC)2.i.m2 ln(EC)-PHRSTS2 6.6529 -0.1977 -15.76 
ln(EC)2.i.m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS2 6.7677 -0.0136 -0.0429 -30.78 
ln(EC)2.i.m4 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS2+Month*PHRSTS2 6.7578 -0.0124 0.4835 -0.0272 -31.72 
AR(1) 
ln(EC)2.ar1 .m1 ln(EC)-Month 0.4497 6.7815 -0.0161 -78.94 
ln(EC)2.ar1 .m2 ln(EC)-PHRSTS2 0.4872 6.6504 -0.2017 -72.74 
ln(EC)2.ar1 .m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS2 0.4480 6.7673 -0.0137 -0.0490 -77.34 
ln(EC)2.ar1 .m4 ln(EC\-Month+PHRSTS2+Month*PHRSTS2 0.4412 6.7537 -0.0120 0.5911 -0.0332 -77.11 
Table A8.4 Fitted models of ln(EC) accounting for two-year transitional effect 
Models ar1 Intercept Month PHRSTS4 Month*PHRSTS4 AIC 
Independent 
ln(EC)4.i.m1 ln(EC\-Month 6.7802 -0.0157 -32.02 
ln(EC)4.i.m2 ln(EC\-PHRSTS4 6.6609 -0.1909 -16.36 
ln(EC)4.i.m2 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS4 6.7722 -0.0142 -0.0267 -30.29 
ln(EC)4.i.m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS4+Month*PHRSTS4 6.7580 -0.0124 0.3898 -0.0226 -31.39 
AR(1) 
ln(EC)4.ar1 .m1 ln(EC)-Month 0.4497 6.7815 -0.0161 -78.94 
ln(EC)4.ar1 .m2 ln(EC)-PHRSTS4 0.4844 6.6573 -0.1912 -72.42 
ln(EC)4.ar1 .m3 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS4 0.4489 6.7741 -0.0147 -0.0250 -77.04 
ln(EC)4.ar1 .m4 ln(EC)-Month+PHRSTS4+Month*PHRSTS4 0.4421 6.7550 -0.0122 0.4897 -0.0281 -76.93 
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Appendix 9 Parameters of theoretical models and their data availability 
Following the parameters of theoretical model in Section 7.1, the required data for and their 
availability are discussed as below. 
Estimates of the mine water generated 
To apply to coal mines, the model is constructed with the prerequisite that mine water 
generation by an individual coal mine is clearly known. Theoretically, mine water generation 
can be estimated using the water balance principle. That is, 
vit =lit+ Rit -Eit -Uit 
where 
vii= Volume of mine water generated by mine i on day t (ML) 
lit= volume of groundwater inflow (ML) 
Rit =rainfall runoff accumulated in the pits (ML) 
Uit =on-site net water use (ML) 
Eit = evaporation (ML) 
The estimation of the model parameters is explained. 
Groundwater inflow (Ju) 
[A9.1] 
Although the groundwater inflows are a constant by-product of mine activities, they vary from 
mine to mine due to the differences in mining geological conditions, and vary from time to time 
for the same mine due to the changes in depth and area of mining work over its lifetime. In 
general, the groundwater inflows to open-cut mines are less significant than those to the 
underground mines. AGC Woodward-Clyde (1992) estimated that on average, the inflow rate 
for the open-cut mines is less than 1 ML/day, and is up to 4 ML/day for the underground mines. 
These figures can be used to estimate the groundwater inflows for individual PHRSTS 
dischargers. 
Rainfall runoff (Ru) 
The ability of a surface to generate runoff is often referred to as that surface's runoff potential. 
This potential is complex and depends on several factors ranging from the nature of the surface, 
its porosity and vegetative cover, to the spatial distribution of rainfall taking into accounting 
existing moisture conditions. However, in simpler applications where overall potential for 
runoff is evaluated rather than specific short duration events, this potential can be described in 
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terms of a runoff coefficient, expressing the fraction of rainfall that will run off. The runoff 
coefficient is a number between 0 and 1. 
In a fixed time frame, the volume of rainfall runoff accumulated in working pits is a function of 
rainfall intensity, the areas of the mine catchments and their corresponding runoff coefficients, 
given by the following simple linear relationship for any given time period (like one day): 
R = rcxrxB [A9.2] 
where 
R = runoff (ML) 
re = runoff coefficient 
r =rainfall intensity (mm) 
B = area of mine catchments (km2) 
Rainfall stations with long-term records going back at least 100 years occur throughout the 
Hunter Valley. The choice of rainfall stations that can represent the rainfall conditions of the 
PHRSTS coal mines is based on the literature, and some coal mines' Environmental Impact 
Statements (EIS) and environmental reports. The relevant stations for the coal mines in different 
river sectors as defined in the PHRSTS is shown in Table A9.1. 
Table A9.1 Meteorological stations used for estimates of rainfall runoff for coal mines 
River sector River flow and EC Meteorological Years of record 
gauging stations stations available 
Upper Denman Muswellbrook 1990-2003 
Middle Glennies/Hunter Jerrys Plains 1990-2003 
Lower Singleton Singleton 1991-2003 
For some new PHRSTS coal mines, the runoff coefficients can be obtained from their 
Environmental Impact Statements. Where site-specific data are unavailable, the representative 
coefficients that were used for mine water balance studies by the AGC Woodward-Clyde ( 1992) 
can be borrowed. These representative coefficients are for typical mine areas when long-term 
rainfall data are considered. However, the lack of data on mine area distributions (that is, 
disturbed and undisturbed areas) even in an indicative way makes it impossible to estimate the 
rainfall runoff for individual mines. Hence estimating on-site mine water generated for 
individual PHRSTS dischargers is also impossible. 
272 
Appendices 
Evapol"ation (Eit) 
The evaporation data represent what is known as pan evaporation. To convert to the actual 
evaporation rate taking place in mining catchments, they must be multiplied by the so-called 
pan factor, which in the Hunter Valley is 0.8 (AGC Woodward-Clyde 1992). There are no 
evaporation data for the above meteorological stations mentioned above. Although the 
evaporation data at nearby stations can be borrowed, they should be used with caution since 
doing so may introduce a wide range of errors and inaccuracy. 
On-site net water use ( Uit) 
Mine water is used as one of the priority water sources for coal washing and dust suppression. 
Since the water for coal washing is recyclable, only the net water use is of concern. The net 
water use for coal washing depends on the tailings production. The amount of water used for 
dust suppression depends upon the areas of haulage roads and stockpile or/and underground 
mining workings, and fluctuates with climatic conditions. 
Compared with the amount of water used for coal washing, the amount used for dust 
suppression accounts for a small portion and can be ignored. Estimates of tailings production for 
individual PHRSTS coal mines can be made from the differences between their saleable and 
raw coal production. The long series of saleable and raw production data going back to the 
1980s has been well documented in the NSW Coal Profile (NSW DMR 1983; 1994; 1995; 
1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002). AGC Woodward-Clyde (1992) estimated that the 
overall moisture rate of tailing production is in the range of 4%~5%. These, together with the 
estimates of tailing production, allow estimates of net use of mine water on-sites using the 
following formula: 
U = (RC-SR)xMR 
U =on-site net water use for a mine (ML/day) 
RC= raw coal production (tonnes/day) 
SR= average daily saleable coal production (tonnes/day) 
MR = moisture rate of tailing production 
[A9.3] 
This all means that, for any mine, the generation of mine water (vu) is impossible to estimate to 
any useful degree. 
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Appendix 10 Approaches to estimation of marginal abatement cost 
functions for individual firms 
To estimate the size of the cost saving of PHRSTS over other alternative river quality 
management schemes, it is necessary to estimate marginal control cost functions for the firms. 
These functions can be used to calculate the least-cost solution for achieving an aggregate level 
of discharge, as well as the expected costs of alternative schemes. 
An abatement cost function describes the cost of pollution abatement activities. In general, there 
are a number of options open to firms to reduce their pollution, including end-of-pipe clean-up, 
changing production processes, and curtailing production. The costs of the inputs that have to be 
devoted to reducing each additional unit of pollution are measured by marginal abatement cost 
functions/curves (MA Cs). The position and slope of the MAC function are affected by factors 
such as the scale and sectoral composition of production; the average operating efficiency of the 
firm, the available process technologies; and the efficiency of treatment technologies (Dasgupta 
et al. 1996). There are a number of approaches to constructing plant-level MAC functions, 
including the survey approach; the engineering model-based approach; the cost function 
approach; the total factor productivity approach; and the distance function approach. 
The survey is one of the standard methods used to estimate the costs associated with pollution 
reduction. This approach usually asks target firms to estimate how much their abatement costs 
were/would be corresponding to various pollution reduction levels. One of the examples is the 
cost estimate for BOD reduction for the UK Forth Estuary (Hanley et al. 1998). Although the 
survey approach can reflect the real world to a great extent, there are several factors that could 
affect its accuracy. On one hand, firms are generally prone to overestimate the abatement costs 
to show their efforts in compliance with environmental objectives. On the other hand, there is 
the potential to underestimate because of the difficulty in estimating the increase of capital 
expenditure embedded in production processes caused by abatement activities. It is also often 
very difficult to get a large, representative sample if answering the survey is voluntary. 
The engineering model-based approach may be the most common one for estimating the costs 
associated with end-of-pipe control options. However, it bears several significant constraints as 
follows: firstly, where one end-of-pipe measure reduces more than one pollutant (which is 
common in practice), it is very difficult or even impossible to isolate the abatement cost 
274 
Appendices 
associated with one particular pollutant from the costs of another. In such circumstances, the 
abatement cost of a particular pollutant is often overestimated. Secondly, engineering models 
restrict the set of existing abatement options to end-of-pipe controls. However, for each 
pollutant there are many potential pollution reduction techniques. It is impossible to identify all 
the options in order to determine the best one. Furthermore, no interdependences among the 
options are allowed. All options are assumed to be separate with respect to abatement costs as 
well as the amount of pollutant reduction, which may not apply to the real world. Finally, failure 
to use behavioural data could lead to large estimation errors. 
The cost junction approach is frequently employed in empirical studies of MACs. Usually, a 
cost function of pollution abatement, which relates abatement costs to the treatment volume, the 
characteristics of influent and effluent stream and the prices of input used in the pollution 
abatement activity, is pre-established. Then a set of pooled data is used to fit the abatement cost 
function econometrically, to identify the importance of variables and estimate their parameters. 
Using the cost function approach, Dasgupta et al. (1996) estimated a joint abatement cost 
function for China's major industrial water pollutants with the aim of evaluating the economic 
efficiency of current regulations and assessing the impacts of the emission charge system used 
in China. In a similar way, Goldar et al. (2001) derived a form of abatement cost function from 
the production function associated with pollution abatement activities, to estimate the MACs of 
small-scale factories in an industrial estate in India. In this study, they defined the output of a 
pollution treatment plant as the reduction in pollution load. Moreover, they assumed that plants 
minimise the total treatment cost under the given prices of inputs, the volume of waste water, 
and the reduction in the concentration levels of pollution load. 
Traditionally, the engineering model and cost function approaches have been based on plants' 
reports on the direct costs of installing and operating pollution control equipment to estimate 
pollution abatement costs. However, as presented above, firms can adjust to the threat of higher 
pollution-related costs along many dimensions, such as introducing new processing 
technologies and/or improving working efficiency. Thus, the above approaches may provide 
incomplete measures of the costs of pollution reduction. 
In order to overcome shortcomings of this kind, the total factor productivity approach has been 
developed to estimate a total cost function which combines both production and pollution 
control costs. The marginal cost of pollution abatement can be derived by taking derivation of 
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the total cost with respect to a specific pollutant. This marginal cost estimation takes into 
consideration pollution reduction in both the production process and the end-of-pipe treatment 
(Wang 2000). Though conceptually appealing, this method has rarely been used in empirical 
studies because of its intensive requirement for data. 
Wang (2000) attempted to use a demand function approach to estimate MACs of China's 
industrial organic water pollution (for example COD). Firstly, using a plant-level dataset with 
detailed information on discharge fees collection from 1500 industrial firms in 1994, Wang 
constructed a discharge function which related the total amount of a pollutant discharge to such 
variables as discharge fees, firm characteristics, input prices and community characteristics. 
Then the discharge levy can be obtained through the inverse of the demand function. Secondly, 
in China's current discharge levy system, the total cost of pollution discharge to a firm is the 
sum of the costs of pollution abatement activities (including the expenditure on production 
process and the pollution treatment facilities) and the payment of the fees of actual pollution 
discharge. Under the assumption that firms are minimising the total cost of pollution discharge, 
it is plausible to infer that a firm abates its pollution up to the point where the MAC equals the 
marginal discharge levy of pollution discharge. Therefore, a MAC function can be obtained 
from the inverse of the demand function. Like the total factor productivity approach, this 
approach can provide a relatively complete estimation of industrial firms' pollution abatement 
costs because it takes both the production process and end-of-pipe treatment into account. 
Nevertheless, the demand function approach of Wang's study relies on information about prices 
of pollution discharges, which seems to limit its wider application. 
All the methods presented above assume that pollution abatement activities are separable from 
the activities associated with producing the marketed output/production. The distance function 
approach, also known as the joint-production function approach or the shadow price approach, 
provides an alternative way in which to address this issue, and appears a promising approach in 
recent cost studies. 
Duality theory offers the basis for the application of the distance function approach in 
estimating marginal costs of pollution abatement activities. The idea of deriving shadow prices 
using distance functions and duality theory originated from Shephard (1970 cited in Fare and 
Primont 1995). The underlying concept of this approach is treating pollutants as one type of 
output, that is, undesirable or bad outputs. These undesirable outputs are distinguished from 
desirable or good outputs in a number of ways, such as disposability and negative price. Once 
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pollutants are treated as outputs, the opportunity costs of pollution abatement activities, that is, 
MAC, can be measured by the foregone production of the desirable outputs that is caused by re-
allocation of inputs from producing the desirable outputs to pollutant abatement activities (Fare 
eta!. 1993). 
There are at least two advantages in making distance function superior to other MAC estimate 
approaches. First, distance function does not require detailed information about pollution 
abatement technologies and their associated costs. Instead, the total cost of pollution abatement 
activities is measured by the reduced production of the good output due to the decrease in the 
bad output (that is, the increase in the reduction of the bad output). Second, this approach can 
capture the whole actual cost of pollution abatement activities, which may be the joint costs of 
the abatement processes of two or more pollutants, and/or the joint costs associated with both 
'end-of-pipe' techniques and 'changes in the production process' techniques (Fare et al. 1993). 
Nevertheless, the last point may be a drawback as well, because it is very hard to separate the 
costs associated with a particular pollutant from the joint costs of all pollution abatement 
activities. Even so, the outstanding merits and modest data requirements discussed above may 
partly explain the increase in employing distance functions to estimate MAC of pollution 
control activities in empirical studies in during past decade. 
Abatement costs can be estimated based on either an output distance function or an input 
distance function. The abatement costs based on an output distance function account for the cost 
of all pollution abatement methods used by the firms to meet the prescribed standards, but firms 
have resource constraints such that they have to reduce pollution at the cost of reducing the 
production of good outputs. In contrast, abatement costs based on an input distance function 
place no restriction on the source of funding the abatement activities of firms. This 
characterisation explains the fact that firms can achieve their pollution abatement through the 
use of additional input while still increasing or maintaining the desirable outputs (Murty et al. 
2001). 
Fare et al. (1993) produced the first study deriving the shadow prices of undesirable output 
using the output distance function. Thereafter, there have been a number of studies applying the 
Fare et al. (1993) methodology to estimate pollution abatement costs. For instance, Coggins and 
Swinton (1996) estimated the MACs of reducing sulfur dioxide emissions by 14 power plants in 
Wisconsin using data from 1990 to 1992. Also, Carlson et al. (2000) estimated the MACs faced 
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by electric utilities in the reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions with the purpose of estimating 
the gains from emission trading against command-and-control regulation. Fare and Jr (2002) 
have also used the distance function approach to estimate pollution abatement costs incurred by 
US power plants, aiming to identify the extent of any divergence between the survey and 
modelling estimates and to investigate the sources of the divergence. Other studies used an input 
distance function to estimate abatement costs. For example, Hailu and Veeman (2000) used a 
similar approach to the Canadian pulp and paper industry; Murty et al. (2001) applied this to the 
sugar industry in India; and Rao and Kumar (2002) measured the productive efficiency of water 
pollution in India. 
For the research presented here, the distance function approach was originally proposed to 
estimate the MACs of the PHRSTS members in saline water control. Identifying production 
inputs and outputs is the first and most important step of the distance function approach, and a 
good understanding of the production processes of PHRSTS members is a prerequisite for such 
identification. Through reviewing the available annual reports, environmental protection 
licences and other relevant documents, the main inputs and outputs of coal mines and power 
stations in the Hunter Valley were identified, as presented in Tables AlO.l and Al0.2. 
Table Al0.1 Production inputs and outputs of coal mines 
Category Items 
Inputs Annual capital inputs 
Capital depreciation 
Energy (electricity and fuel) 
Labour (number of employee) 
Desirable outputs Saleable coal 
Regulated undesirable salt outputs Salt load 
(Pollutants) Fluoride compounds 
N02 
Particulate Matter 
co 
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Table Al0.2 Production inputs and outputs of power stations 
Category Items 
Inputs Ignition oil usage 
Coal consumption 
Biomass 
Annual capital depreciation 
Labour (number of employee) 
Desirable outputs Electricity 
Saleable by-production Fly ash 
Bottom ash 
Lime 
Gypsum 
Regulated undesirable outputs Salt load 
(Pollutants) S02 
N02 
co 
Particulate matter 
Once the production inputs and outputs have been identified, the next step is to collect the data 
required. After an intensive information search in publicly available and accessible sources, 
such as annual reports published on websites, I found that such crucial information as capital 
depreciation, energy and coal consumption is lacking, which suggested the necessity of a survey. 
A survey was conducted from November 2003 to February 2004 through questionnaires, and 
with the help of the NSW Minerals Council. The survey targeted all PHRSTS participants, 
which included 19 coal mines and two power generators. The main information sought was: 
• Production inputs and outputs: producing material, number of employees, labour costs, 
output production, market price per unit of output, production revenue; 
• Water intake and saline water discharge: annual volume of water intake from the Hunter 
River, conditions set in the discharge licences, and volume and concentration of annual 
saline water discharged to the Hunter River; 
• Saline water control costs: saline water control activities that occurred in each firm during 
1995-2002 and their associated costs; cost estimations of achieving hypothetical salt load 
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reduction targets, which are expressed as percentages (for example, 10%, 25%, 50% and 
80% reduction of the salt load in 2002). 
Unfortunately, the survey elicited few responses. At least two factors could account for the 
PHRSTS members not responding to the questionnaire. First, since the information the survey 
requested may not necessarily be readily available, the survey would impose an extra working 
burden on the participants for reviewing the instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the questionnaires. In some cases, 
completing the survey may have required the joint efforts of firms' financial and environmental 
staff. The firms may have been reluctant or could not afford the time and effort to do this. 
Second, completing the survey may expose the firms to the risk of disclosure of their 
commercially confidential information. In particular, the PHRSTS salt credits auction was 
scheduled for April 2004. The disclosure of information about the costs of saline water control 
could have been extremely sensitive for the PHRSTS members as rivals in the auction. This 
situation prevented this research from estimating the MACs by a distance function approach. 
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